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Personality Determinants of 
Risk-Taking Behavior (July, 1972) 
Charles J. Shelley, University of Massachusetts 
Directed By: Dr. Meyer W. Belovicz 
A theoretical discussion of the literature of psycho¬ 
logy and psychoanalysis appropriate to answering the 
question "Who takes risks?” is presented. This discussion 
resulted in a theory of personality being suggested; one 
that is essentially descriptive, and one that is able to 
accomodate the existing research from these two diverse 
disciplines. The definition of personality assumed is that 
”it is what a person does." What a person does is the end 
result of his origina.1 motives, influenced by the objects 
and people in his environment: observable behavior is the 
means by which personality is manifested. Risk-taking 
behavior is defined within contexts where observation is 
possible -- in this instance, gambling contexts. And guide¬ 
lines for the observation necessary to description are 
offered. 
The personality of the risk-taker may be defined more 
comprehensively by viewing it from three perspectives 
instead of one. The nature of these perspectives is exis¬ 
tential; the individual observed, the nodal "I,” is placed 
in the center of existence as the ultimate refer rent. The 
X 1 1 
perspectives are: (1) the imper sona1, which views his 
relations to the objects that define his environment, (2) 
the interpersonal, which relates the individual to other 
persons, others whose existence modifies the reality of 
personal experience, and (3) the intrapersonal, which 
consists of the purely private realm from which meanings 
and motives arise, and which may or may not be conscious 
to the individual. 
An important characteristic of this approach is the 
recognition that the objects in an individual’s environment 
transcend their physical presence. Just as a shovel is 
more than a shovel because of the mental associations it 
arouses, so the gambling scene is more than the sum of its 
components such as probability, value, etc. because of the 
unique personal experiences of each risk-taker. For each 
individual there is an organic as well as an objective 
meaning to the concept of risk. The latter may be fairly 
uniform, but the former depends upon past associations and 
exper ience s. 
The advantages of a theory of this nature are signifi¬ 
cant. There is, first of all, the recognition that 
experimentation without theory is meaningless; research 
must be guided by some fundamental view of the objects tha^ 
define its field of inquiry. Next, it emphasizes the 
X 1 1 1 
crucial second step of sense observation of the behavior 
in question. This is necessary before the third phase of 
research, manipulative intervention with the purpose of 
modifying and extending theory, may be undertaken. There 
should be a balance of these three steps of inquiry; 
presently, the first two of these steps appear to be 
slighted, and to the detriment of research in this area. 
A review of the appropriate literature from psychology 
and psychoana1ysis did much to emphasize the necessity for 
theory and observation as prior requisites in order to 
determine who does, or does not, exhibit some particular 
behavioral tendency. The points of view of these diverse 
disciplines may readily be incorporated into the theory 
proposed, and existing information from each that was 
useable was integrated. 
1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The question "Who takes risks?" is intriguing, since on 
the one hand nearly everyone has an intuitive notion of what 
is meant by risk and what the personality of the risk-taker 
is like, yet on the other hand psychology cannot answer the 
question. It cannot adequately define risk nor can it des¬ 
cribe the personality of the risk-taker by giving scientific 
substance to the mental image that arises when the question 
is asked. This inability is particularly interesting, 
because the concept of risk-taking has been in the language 
of human experience for centuries. Only within the past two 
decades, however, have psychologists in general begun to 
confront the idea that an individual’s personality may be 
an influencing factor in his reaction to risk. 
The Research Problem 
The issue to be .considered within this thesis is the 
influence of personality on risk-taking behavior. The 
reasons for pursuing this particular line of inquiry will be 
presented before the objectives are described in detail. 
This will be done because there are several forces bringing 
this issue into prominence, the research problems originate 
within these forces, and the forms the specific objectives 
assume reflect this heritage. 
2 
Utility The or y 
Although risk-taking is a concept which may be traced 
back to antiquity, prior to the eighteenth century, person¬ 
ality was never thought to be an influential factor in the 
selection among risky alternatives. The normative position 
to which "rational" men were to adhere in the selection 
process was dictated by the criterion of expected value. 
(Rationality implies reasoning based upon logic, and a 
decision criterion based upon the maximization of expected 
returns: normative means what people should do, not neces¬ 
sarily what they d_£ do.) For every alternative that con¬ 
tained outcomes whose occurrence was a matter of chance, the 
probabilities of occurrence of these outcomes were to be 
multiplied by their respective money values and summed. 
According to the normative position, the largest resulting 
sum of these products, called expected values, was to be 
selected. 
However, observed behavior did not conform to this 
criterion, and in 1738 Bernoulli dismissed the notion with 
■« 
the presentation of his now famous St. Petersburg Paradox. 
According to the expected value criterion, a "rational" man 
should be willing to pay up to the expected value of a 
gamble for the privilege of playing. Bernoulli proposed a 
simple game in which the player tosses a "fair” coin until 
a head turns up. He is paid 2n dollars where n is the 
3 
number of tosses up to and including the last one. The 
expected value of this gamble is: 
2*1/2 + 4*1/4 + 8*1/8 + ... = 1 + 1 + 1... 
which does not sum to any finite number. No person would be 
willing to pay an infinite amount of money to play this game, 
even if such a sum existed, and refusal to do so does not 
necessarily imply non-rationality. 
After rejecting the expected value criterion, Bernoulli 
proposed instead that decision-makers replace the money 
value of each outcome by its subjective or personal value, 
a value which he named utility. The utility assigned to 
each outcome was assumed to accurately reflect the prefer¬ 
ences of the individual. Calculation proceeded as before, 
only the criterion for selection became one of choosing so 
as to maximize expected utility. 
From that time until the present, the expected utility 
criterion governing choices among risky alternatives has 
assumed one of two basic forms. The first, originated by 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern and popularized by Luce and 
2 
R a if fa, places the concept of expected utility maximization 
at the heart of game theory, a normative theory developed 
to deal with risky choices made in conflict situations. 
Conflict arises when the preferences of two or more persons 
are divergent across joint decision outcomes, and risk is 
4 
involved because of either the presence of chance in the 
outcomes, uncertain knowledge concerning the opponents' 
choices, or both. According to the theory, decisions are 
made simultaneously, and each person governs his decision 
selections by the prior specification of a strategy of play 
that is consistent with his preferences for risky alterna¬ 
tives. Each person's strategy is a function of his 
individuality as it is reflected in his utility assignments. 
If the individual conforms to the set of "highly reasonable” 
axioms postulated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, then 
theoretically it is possible to construct a utility curve to 
predict his choice among risky alternatives. For this 
behavioral hypothesis: "The underlying thesis is that an 
individual makes choices among alternatives involving risk 
as if he were trying to maximize expected utility." 
(Davidson, Suppes and Siegel, 1957, p.29.) 
Behavioral decision theory, the other form of the 
expected utility hypo.thesis, has been advanced by Edwards 
who went one step further than Bernoulli and incorporated 
subjective probability, as well as utility, into the 
decision model. The calculations proceed in the same 
manner as for the expected utility model, only now sub¬ 
jective estimates of the probabilities of occurrence of each 
outcome replace the objective values. The behavioral 
criterion for this model is the maximization of subjectively 
5 
expected utility. Edwards does not assert that the decision¬ 
maker deliberately chooses to achieve this, rather that the 
hypothesis enables an experimenter to predict subject's 
behavior in risky-choice situations.^ * 
Both of these hypotheses concerning behavior allow 
ample opportunity for individual expression of preference in 
the selection of alternatives when risk is present, but this 
same opportunity for individuality has hampered research. 
The experimental determination of utility curves has proven 
extremely difficult. One attempt by Mos teller and Nogee 
determined that the expected utility maximization model did 
predict choices slightly better than the expected value 
criterion.^ Another attempt was made by Davidson, Suppes 
and Siegel to eliminate some of the glaring research problems 
encountered in the earlier study. Their results, however, 
were not completely satisfactory and this merely served to 
emphasize the experimental difficulty -- a difficulty under¬ 
scored by Deutsch who explicitly considered the personality 
of the subjects in his analysis. He determined that person¬ 
ality did influence strategy (in the game theory sense): 
7 
that behavior was related to personality predispositions. 
And finally, Edwards has made several attempts at experi¬ 
mentally confirming his subjectively expected utility 
maximization model. Results of his work also indicate that 
6 
this model predicts choices only slightly better than the 
O 
expected value criterion. 
The crucial issue involved in these utility models is 
that differences in utility curves represent differences in 
9 
individual attitudes toward risk. What is important to 
psychology is the fact that theoretically any behavior may 
be explained by assuming the appropriate utility curve, and 
even if these curves could be readily constructed experi¬ 
mentally, they would provide no insight into individual 
personality differences. To say that a person has a convex 
utility curve and hence will prefer risk to conservatism ma y 
be true but tells us nothing about the individual, since 
there is, as yet, no known and well defined correspondence 
between utility preference and personality. The question 
’’Who takes risks?” may be answered in terms of utility 
curves, but understanding of the personalities behind the 
curves is nonexistant and this is unsatisfactory to 
psychology. 
Personality Theory 
Another reason for the direction of interest toward the 
study of personality as an influencing factor on risk-taking 
is that this is part of a general trend toward the study of 
personality and its influence on a wide range of behavior. 
Personality has always been an important concept in psycho- 
7 
logy, but until recently definitions were part of broad 
clinical theories, such as Freud’s, which is not easily 
tested in an empirical sense. 
There are two popular uses of the word personality: 
the first is concerned with social skill or adroitness, and 
the second is concerned with the more outstanding impres¬ 
sions created by an individual, such as aggression or 
introversion. But rigorous definitions of personality are 
most meaningful within a particular theoretical context. 
There are several reasons for this; perhaps the clearest 
explanation may be found in a considerat ion of the 
historical development of personality theory. 
There are four relatively recent sources of influence 
on personality theory.First, there is the tradition of 
clinical observation beginning with Charcot and Janet, and 
including most importantly Freud, Jung and McDougall. 
These theorists were clinical practitioners as well as 
scholars, and, faced with the everyday problems of their 
patients as magnified by neurosis, they addressed them¬ 
selves to formulations that were of value in treatment. A 
second closely related influence comes from the Gestalt 
tradition of William Stern. Theorists in this tradition 
emphasize the unity of behavior and the study of the person 
as a whole. They specifically reject the approach that 
8 
emphasizes the study of small, fragmented pieces of behavior. 
The third influence, experimental psychology, has fostered 
concern for carefully controlled experimental research, for 
better theory construction and for more detailed awareness 
of how behavior is changed. Finally, the psychometric 
tradition with its focus has provided sophistication to the 
quantitative analysis of data. 
The personality theorist, influenced by these forces, 
has been concerned with such questions as why certain people 
develop neurotic symptoms, the role of childhood trauma in 
adult adjustment, the conditions under which mental health 
could be gained, and the major motivations that underly 
human behavior. Their personality theories are functional 
in orientation and integrative in nature. They are concern¬ 
ed with the problems faced by the "whole" person that are of 
vital importance for his existence. Most experimentalists 
have restricted their study to small segments of behavior 
such as perception, audition or vision, and it has been left 
to the personality theorist to synthesize this material. 
"Thus it was the personality theorist, and only the person¬ 
ality theorist, who in the early days of psychology dealt 
with questions which to the average person seem to lie at 
the core of a successful psychological science." (Hall and 
Lindzey, 1957, p.4-5.) These theorists use any material 
that has functional significance for human behavior. As a 
9 
consequence their theories tend to be more general, more 
vague in specification and more complex than those of the 
sub-divisions of psychology which they encompass. 
The definitions of personality that have been proposed 
by the various theorists from the traditions mentioned above 
are quite diverse. Sometimes the definitions embrace 
personality by enumeration: the theorist lists all of the 
concepts he believes important and suggests that personality 
consists of these. 
Other definitions place primary emphasis upon the 
in tegr a tive or organizational function of person¬ 
ality. Such definitions suggest that personality 
is the organization or pattern that is given to 
the various discrete responses of the individual 
or else they suggest that the organization results 
from the personality which is an active force with¬ 
in the individual. Personality is that which gives 
order and congruence to all the different kinds of 
behavior in which the individual engages. A number 
of theorists have chosen to emphasize the function 
of personality in mediating the ad jus tment of the 
individual. Personality consists of the varied and 
yet typical efforts at adjustment which are carried 
out by the individual. In other definitions, 
personality is equated to the unique or individual 
aspects of behavior. In this case, it is a term to 
designate those things about the individual that 
are distinctive and set him apart from all other 
persons. Finally, some theorists have considered 
personality to represent the essence of man. These 
definitions suggest that personality refers to that 
part of the individual which is most representative 
of him, not only in that it differentiates him from 
other persons, but more important, because it is 
what he actually is. Allport's suggestion that 
personality is what a man really is illustrates this 
type of definition. The implication here is that 
personality consists of what, in the final analysis, 
is most typical and deeply characteristic of the 
person. (Hall and Lindzey, 1957, p.8-9.) 
10 
From experimental psychology's point of view, a defini¬ 
tion of personality, beyond the intuitive meaning assigned 
by the layman, depends to a great extent upon the particular 
theoretical orientation in use. A rigorous definition must 
be based upon the empirical concepts that are a part of the 
theory. Hall and Lindzey suggest that a concrete definition 
should consist of a set of scores or descriptive terms which 
are used to describe the individual being studied according 
to the variables or dimensions which occupy a central 
position within the theory utilized. 
Experimental Psychology 
Definitions of personality in the experimental psycho¬ 
logical literature on risk-taking are couched in terms of 
scales measuring a particular attribute such as Machiavel¬ 
lianism or achievement motivation. In the testing proce¬ 
dures, typically, a paper-and-pencil test assessing the 
degree of correspondence of the subjects to the various 
scales is administered, after which they are grouped 
according to a high-low ranking or some similar arrangement. 
The behavior of these groups is then compared in terms of 
the subjects' preferences among risky alternatives in 
forced-cho ice situations. This form of analysis does allow 
statements relating the grouped extremes of the personality 
scale to extremes (high-low) of risk-taking behavior. The 
difficulty is that, since the data for the subjects are 
11 
pooled into groups, we are limited to probability statements 
for any individual. 
Several personality scales have been used. One which 
has initiated a large amount of research is a derivative of 
Atkinson's hypothesis relating risk-taking to achievement 
motivation.^ This hypothesis states that moderate proba¬ 
bilities will be preferred by persons in whom the motive to 
succeed is stronger than the motive to avoid failure, and 
conversely either very high or very low probabilities will 
be preferred by those for which the opposite is true. The 
interna1-externa1 control scale has also been used exten¬ 
sively. Internal control refers to a belief in the ability 
to control one's fate, while external control refers to a 
passive acceptance of the environment. Liverant and Scodel, 
for instance, assumed that belief in internal control should 
12 
result in less conservative choices. Heider's "locus of 
causality" and DeCharms' "origin-pawn" are comparable scales 
which have been discussed from theoretical and motivational 
13 
points of view. Other personality variables tested from 
the experimental psychological approach include scales asses¬ 
sing Machiavellianism, impulsiveness, self-sufficiency, 
independence and rigidity. Differences on the Edwards 
personal preference schedule, the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory (MMPI) and sex and age influences have 
also been studied with low correlations between the measures 
12 
of risk and the hypothesized scale the rule rather than the 
. . 14 
excep tion. 
Conflicting findings exist in all of these research 
studies. Support is found for an influencing variable by 
those initiating the research, while subsequent replication 
produces mixed results. General reaction to this dilemma 
has been emphasis of the apparent multi-dimensionality and 
pervasiveness of risk. 
Psychoanalytic 
Personality as defined from the psychoanalytic point of 
view is quite different, however. A psychoanalytic explana¬ 
tion of behavior is concerned primarily with unconscious 
motives; motives which have their roots in childhood experi¬ 
ences and which we re repressed because of their painful 
nature. These motives, consigned to the unconscious by the 
individual's defense mechanisms, occasionally surface in the 
form of neurotic symptoms, however, and it is these symptoms 
that are the basic raw material with which analysts operate. 
During the course of analysis there are several points 
of view available to the psychoanalyst which he may use to 
better understand the patient’s symptoms and personality. 
These may include any, or all of, the dynamic, economic, 
structured, genetic and adaptive views of mental function- 
15 
ing. (These are adaptions of Freud’s me tapsychologica1 
13 
perspectives: the dynamic, topographic and economic.) Also 
during analysis the patient, the subject matter of this 
activity, is not being examined for curiosity's sake, but 
has a dysfunctional mental abberation of some magnitude, and 
the analyst is seeking to unravel the clues leading to the 
behavior, and in so doing seeks a definition of personality 
which will be of functional useage in his task. The modes 
of operation of this theory of personality will be discussed 
in a later chapter when a specific symptom, the gambling 
neurosis, is presented. 
This discussion is not intended to be exhaustive, but 
is intended to emphasize the diversity of approaches to the 
definition of personality and the two particular approaches 
mentioned will be typical of the material to be encountered 
later when specific literature is reviewed. With improve¬ 
ments in measurement techniques the current trend, and with 
the development and synthesis of definitions of personality 
that are more specific, psychologists are devoting more 
energy to the study of personality and the implications of 
personality differences for behavior. And psychoanalysts 
are devoting more time to the subject for the reasons 
given in the next two sections. 
Gamb1ing 
Interest in this basic question may also be found 
14 
because of the social debate that has arisen as increased 
efforts are being made to legalize gambling. Forms of bet¬ 
ting ranging from church sponsored bingo to state lotteries, 
casino and sports betting are being proposed. Those in 
favor of legalization tend to emphasize increased revenues, 
while opponents fear both organized crime and the possibili¬ 
ty of low-income earners gambling while their families 
suffer. Behind this debate is an assumption that both sides 
share: some people want to gamble and others do not. The 
various arguments advanced reflect the differing reactions 
to this belief: one side says people want to gamble so let 
them do it legally, and the other side says people may want 
to, but they shouldn’t for moral or ethical reasons. Both 
sides would agree that all of the forms of gambling pro¬ 
posed are unfair to the player and that this information is 
readily available. (Unfair in this sense refers to the 
expected monetary return to the player i.e. the price of 
playing any game is always greater than the expected 
monetary value of the game.) The question that should be 
asked is why some people want to gamble and others do not. 
Questioning the reasons behind this basic assumption will be 
informative. It could very well be that the role, the 
immediate presence, of risk is not perceived uniformly by 
e ver yone . 
A definition of risk has been postponed because one 
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does not exist that is generally acceptable. When used as 
a verb there does not seem to be too much disagreement: for 
instance, to "risk" one's life or to "risk" a union strike. 
In these contexts it is clear that something is being 
exposed to the chance of loss, damage or injury. (Chance is 
used to represent probability.) There is a probability 
associated with the outcomes "death" or "strike" in the 
course of action selected in these examples. Since there is 
a chance of "dying" or "being struck" the decision-maker is 
"risking” whichever one of these unfavorable outcomes is 
in vo lve d . 
The definition of risk when it is used as a noun con¬ 
tains a good deal of ambiguity, however. In the example, 
"to risk one’s life," there may be general agreement upon 
what is happening, the active "risking" part, but it is not 
clear how one goes about measuring the am o un t of "risk" 
within this or any other situation. The usual noun defini¬ 
tions mention such terms as "chance of loss, damage or 
1 6 
injury" or the "degree of probability of loss, etc.," but 
these are ambiguous. The actual quantity, the physical or 
conceptual amount of risk present in a situation, eludes 
capture. If we resort to an example, in a pure gambling 
situation, in which we control the amount of money wagered 
and the probabilities are fixed, we still cannot measure 
the amount of risk nor can we compare all possible pairs of 
16 
gambles to determine which of them has the greatest amount 
of risk. 
Some concreteness may be given to the following terms 
used in this thesis, however: "risk-preference'' refers to 
the amount of risk that a person prefers in a situation, at 
a particular moment in time, in which he has freedom of 
choice among several alternatives containing risk. (The 
amount of risk in the alternatives must be different for at 
least two possible choices or the term risk-preference is 
not meaningful.) The term "risk-selection" indicates the 
process of choice and refers to the alternative with the 
preferred amount of risk. Preferred level of risk also 
applies to the choice made under risk-preference. 
The Gambling Neurosis 
The gambling neurosis, examined in psychoanalytic 
literature, is a form of behavior whose study is poten¬ 
tially informative for the debate concerning legalized 
gambling. The unconscious motivations involved in this 
neurosis have been studied in some depth and tentative 
agreement among psychoanalysts concerning the basic person¬ 
ality factors influential in this extreme form of risk¬ 
taking behavior is available. Greenson identifies three 
classes of gamblers or risk-takers: the normal person who 
gambles for diversion, the professional gambler and the 
17 
17 
neurotic gambler. He states that the same motivations are 
found in all of them; the neurotic gambler caricatures the 
normal and professional, and the psychopathology is most 
vivid in him. 
Freud's "Dostoyevsky and Parricide" is the source of 
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most of the theoretical work on the gambling neurosis. In 
this he explores the themes of bi-sexuality and the Oedipal 
complex as they relate to the compulsive gambler. A majority 
of subsequent hypotheses may be traced to this early discus¬ 
sion; a principle source, the validity of which has been 
affirmed based upon the results of further clinical experi¬ 
ence with this neurosis. 
The primary method by which analysts reach conclusions 
concerning unconscious processes is through the clinical 
study of disturbed persons. Although the abnormal is 
studied, much insight into the operation of the normal 
psyche is obtained. Bergler has suggested six purely 
descriptive characteristics of the neurotic gambler: 
(1) The gambler habitually takes chances. 
(2) The game precludes all other interests. 
(3) The gambler is full of optimism and never 
learns from defeat. 
(4) The gambler never stops when winning. 
(5) Despite initial caution the gambler 
eventually risks too much. 
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(6) "Pleasurable-painful tension” (thrill) is 
experienced during the game. 
(Bergler, 1958, p.2-5.) 
Experimental psychologists, however, raise serious 
questions about what they consider to be non-scientific 
methods and conclusions in this approach. They argue that 
research results based upon subjective evaluations of non¬ 
observable, unconscious mental processess -- if indeed they 
would agree to the term "unconscious" -- are not public, 
are non-rep1icable in nature, hence are inadmissable as 
scientific evidence. The validity of this approach, however, 
will be seen in subsequent chapters as research from both 
sources is reviewed. 
The Decision Situation 
A final reason for interest in studying the influence 
of personality on risk-taking behavior may be found within 
the context of the decision situation. The only ways we 
have of determining whether or not an individual prefers 
risk are either to ask him or observe his behavior. In 
either case, he must select among alternatives that differ 
in the amount of risk present. His selection among risky 
alternatives may be only partially influenced by his person¬ 
ality, however. Although the values of prizes, probabili¬ 
ties of outcomes and utilities are possible determinants in 
a decision, the "gestalt" of the situation is actually what 
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the individual is reacting to, and his choices made in one 
location and time may not be the same as those made in 
another. The physical setting may be an important determin¬ 
ant. For instance, the amount of risk seen in specific 
decisions pertaining to automobile driving will be different 
for dry days and rainy days. Familiarity and learning also 
have an influence; the experienced driver will certainly 
react to a particular decision made under either of these 
circumstances differently than the novice driver. And there 
are several other mental states that can influence behavior. 
One influencing factor which is almost so obvious as to 
be overlooked is perception. This concept is important, 
because it assumes that no two people actually "see" what is 
in their physical and psychological environment identically; 
so it is possible that any two people may "see" differing 
amounts of risk in a given alternative for no other reason 
than their differing perceptions, and will behave accord¬ 
ingly. Perceptual differences are largely the result of 
motivational differences, and these are to be considered 
explicitly in analysis. 
Variable s 
From the above discussion it is possible to derive 
several determinants of behavior in risk-taking situations. 
From a psychological point of view, however, risk has been 
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linked to only two major variables: learning and person¬ 
ality. Expected values, expected utilities and subjectively 
expected utilities are possibly influencing factors, but 
the latter two concepts cannot be separated from the person¬ 
ality of the decision-maker, and the influence of expected 
values is an open empirical question. (Edwards has shown, 
for instance, that some people have preferred probabilities 
at which they choose to bet and these are a greater deter- 
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mining factor than an expected value for these people.) 
Considering the learning variable, although the individual 
reacts to the "gestalt” of the situation, a good many 
psychologists take the Skinnerian point of view and assume 
that his reactions are a function of past reinforcement 
histories. From this point of view, any behavior can be 
analyzed within learning theory. These theorists, however, 
reject the concept of mind, which means that internal moti¬ 
vation or personal causation are also rejected. This implies 
that any definition of personality within this approach 
would be couched in terms of the past reinforcement history 
of the individual. This seems to be a reasonable approach 
from a theoretical point of view, but from a practical 
standpoint there are almost insurmountable difficulties: 
the entire past reinforcement history of an individual is 
required before predictions may be made concerning his 
behavior. The personality variable has already been 
dis c us sed . 
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So, a study of risk could proceed by considering at 
least two psychological variables as determinants of risk¬ 
taking behavior: this thesis will ignore learning and 
focus on personality. The reasons against learning are the 
general theory's extremely narrow view of human motivation 
and personality, and lack of material bearing on the topic. 
The reasons for personality per se are its importance for 
clinical psychologists and psychoanalysts, amount of 
material available which has not been unified and an intui¬ 
tive feel for the existential usefulness of the approach. 
And whenever a discussion of risk-taking arises, the layman 
probably tends to think in terms of personality rather than 
past reinforcement histories. This latter reason is not 
unimportant; Heider observed that great writers are able to 
present a more complete description of personality and 
human behavior than psychologists; so any more material for 
2 0 
a "naive psychology" approach will be welcome. 
The Problems 
The issue of scientific accomplishments to date on 
theory construction and validation of the influence of 
personality on risk-preference arises. Specific results 
will be discussed in detail in future chapters, but general 
results may be considered now to point out the problems 
hindering research. The first problem encountered is that 
there is no theoretical structure to organize and direct 
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research. No serious research proceeds without some theory 
at least implicitly assumed, but to be of value the struc¬ 
ture within which an experimenter operates must be made 
explicit to expose its flaws, contradictions, and where it 
needs empirical substantiation. The lack of a theoretical 
structure to unify the research in question has tended to 
present a haphazard manner of inquiry and to emphasize the 
incompatibility of independent pieces of research. The 
second problem encountered concerns the nature of risk. A 
definition that may be used as a common reference for 
experimental testing does not exist. The lack of a basic 
definition that is operationally meaningful for a wide 
range of situations leads to the formulation of ad hoc 
specifications, and as a result the experimental findings 
of independent investigations of the same relationships 
between risk and personality will be neither comparable, 
nor complementary. 
The Research Objectives 
The objectives of the thesis are: (1) to unify and 
integrate the literature of experimental psychology dealing 
with risk and personality, and to synthesize this material 
and the psychoanalytic literature on the gambling neurosis; 
(2) to answer the question "Who takes risks?" by presenting 
the personality determinants of risk-taking behavior drawn 
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from the synthesis; (3) to provide a theoretical structure 
to guide further research within this area; and (4) to 
discuss the definitions of risk that are involved in this 
research, and how they are limited in their scope and 
usefulness. 
Method of Inquiry 
The method of inquiry of this thesis is primarily a 
literature review. To accomplish the objectives, material 
must be unified and conclusions drawn, but the criteria for 
selection of material, method of synthesis and method of 
analysis will differ with the objectives. These factors 
will be discussed for the definition of r'isk first and then 
for the more important issue of personality influences. 
Risk Definition 
The criteria for this objective will be determined 
largely by the desired end result: a discussion of risk 
that will introduce c ommonality of useage into the type of 
studies to be analyzed in later chapters. No attempt is 
being made to provide a universal definition. This first 
requirement should sharpen focus on the problem of ad hoc 
definitions and their habit of making independent pieces 
of research incompatible because of the different uses of 
the term "risk.” 
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The element of inherent objectivity of measurability 
of the behavioral situation is crucial for a definition. 
These situations may vary from well ordered gambling choices, 
in which probabilities and prizes are clearly specified, to 
less clearly defined actions such as automobile driving. 
Adaptability to diverse situations requires flexibility: 
enough flexibility so that operationally meaningful deduc¬ 
tions may be derived for specific instances without 
destroying the spirit of the meaning of the term. At the 
very least, the definitions used must allow ordinal ranking 
of alternatives according to the amount of risk present for 
the studies to be reviewed so that the more important 
problem for this thesis of personality influences upon risk¬ 
taking behavior may be pursued. Material from behavioral 
decision theory, mathematical psychology and experimental 
psychology dealing with risk will be the primary sources for 
the discussion. The criteria for selection from this 
material will depend to a great extent upon the context 
within which the definition is to be applied; in this thesis 
it will be that related to gambling situations. 
An objective definition should be largely mathematical 
in nature, having components which nia y be modified with the 
situation. If it were mathematical, for instance, varying 
the probability involved in the situation, or varying the 
values of the outcomes involved will effect the mathematical 
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moments, such as expected value, variance and skewness, 
and were these moments components in a definition then it 
would be reasonably easy to determine the objective amount 
of risk in a situation if we knew any of these components 
and their inter-relationship for a definition. 
Most definitions of risk in literature are mathematical 
in nature utilizing combinations of the moments of the 
probability distributions involved, but it is still an open 
proposition as to which of these is the most suitable. The 
relative magnitude of what is being risked is also an 
important factor. (A universal definition of risk would 
quickly become involved with a concept similar to utility, 
but this will be avoided.) The analysis of this material 
will be concerned primarily with making explicit the 
assumptions in the various definitions proposed. 
Personality 
The fact that a definition of personality depends upon 
the particular theoretical orientation in use has implica¬ 
tions for the objective of specifying a theoretical frame¬ 
work for the study of personality influences on risk- 
preference. To specify the personality determinants of 
risk-taking behavior, a single definition of personality is 
preferable to maintain consistency of exposition. However, 
since the method of inquiry of this thesis is a literature 
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search, this creates the problem of utilizing material from 
two widely divergent theories of personality: the experi¬ 
mental psychological and the psychoanalytic. 
Experimental Psychological 
The material utilized from this approach will be that 
concerned with correlating risk-preference with personality 
differences. Relevant material to date will be investigated. 
Although there are no explicit theoretical formulations 
guiding this research implicit assumptions concerning behav¬ 
ior may be derived from the particular personality scales 
used in the research. These assumptions, and their empiri¬ 
cal subs tantiation,if any, will be a basic part of the 
inductive process of building a theory of how personality 
influences risk-preference from this point of view. This 
material and any inductive extensions must be synthesized 
with the research and theory concerned with the gambling 
neurosis . 
Psychoanalytic 
The method of analysis and synthesis of this material 
must be quite different than that for the experimental 
psychological. Whereas in empirically oriented psychology 
tests validating a theory decide between alternative and 
mutual exclusive hypotheses, as a rule this is not possible 
for psychoanalysis. According to Rapaport there are few, 
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if any, specific psychoanalytic propositions for which other 
theories have an alternative to offer, and since the psycho¬ 
analytic theory itself is not geared to experimental tests, 
it does not usually envisage alternatives in the sense 
implied by the conception of crucial tests, but rather in 
that implied in alternative interpretation. Thus, theories 
are not built by tests of predictions excluding all but one 
of several alternatives which are consistent with the theory. 
Only those which clash with the existing theory are excluded. 
So postdiction, guided by the aim of preserving the internal 
consistency of the theory, rather than by parsimony, is the 
principle means of theory building in psychoanalysis. The 
primitive state of systernization of the general theory along 
with the non-existence of other theories of comparable 
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scope does not generally allow crucial tests. 
The The or y 
The set of conventions that will characterize the 
theory to be formulated within this thesis will be based 
upon these two theoretical orientations. These conventions 
will appear to be partly arbitrary, as they do in all new 
theories, and will also be partly derivitives of the litera¬ 
ture review. The assumptions of the theory will consist of 
the evidence from psychology and psychoanalysis, their 
inductive and deductive extensions, and any other additions 
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that are necessary to insure systematic relationship. These 
latter are what appear arbitrary, but in reality are neces¬ 
sary so that the assumptions and elements of the theory are 
explicitly combined and related to each other. To give 
logical consistency and permit the derivation of hypotheses 
directly related to the issue, these internal relations must 
be clear, and clarity will be provided by specifying as 
complete a descriptive picture as is possible. This means 
that empirical definitions will be explicitly stated for 
those points at which theory and reality come into contact 
already, and for those points at which they should come into 
contact for verification. To be an effective incentive to 
research the theory must provide this opportunity. 
The utility, or usefulness, of this particular theory 
is certainly an open question at this point, but it is 
hoped that adequate description will lend both comprehen¬ 
siveness and verifiability to it in order that it may lead 
to reasonable incorporation of the current research on risk¬ 
taking behavior, and also allow the derivation of relevant 
empirical relations not yet observed. It should also be 
complete enough so that important aspects of complex behav¬ 
ior may be observed and understood rather easily. This is, 
of course, an aim of all theories. 
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Limitations 
There are several restrictions upon this thesis. Not 
all of the forces bringing the issue of risk and personality 
into prominence will be investigated. They are sources, but 
not all of them will be discussed as effects. Utility 
theory, separated into game theory and behavioral decision 
theory, will be a source of material for the definition of 
risk, but will not be investigated further. The concepts 
central to these theories -- utility theory, expected 
utility, subjectively expected utility and maximizing 
behavior -- will not be discussed further, since the research 
on them focuses on the behavior of aggregates rather than 
concentrating on factors affecting individual differences. 
Mathematical psychology will also serve as a source of 
material for risk definition, but will not be investigated 
otherwise. 
The investigation of risk as related to concepts other 
than personality, for instance risk in investment theory, 
will not be undertaken, and learning theory will not be 
discussed as they are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Primary beneficiaries of the results of this investiga¬ 
tion are experimental psychologists working within the area 
of risk and personality, those who are just curious and 
those whose work with decision problems requires an under- 
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standing of risk. The organization of the current litera¬ 
ture to date, a discussion of the definition of risk which 
may be operationalized, and a theoretical framework to 
suggest and direct research should assist research consider¬ 
ably. No progress may be made after all until we speak in 
terms which are clearly understood and whose meanings are 
agreed upon. 
Future use of the material contained in this thesis 
includes testing of various aspects of the theory, its 
descriptive aspects, its structure and derivable hypotheses, 
and extensions of the theory to include those variables 
perhaps important in the risk-selection process which were 
eliminated for time and space considerations. 
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CHAPTER II 
RISK DEFINITION 
This chapter will review definitions of risk; histori¬ 
cal development and current uses of the concept as it 
applies to psychologica 1 research will be of primary 
interest. The important question is ’’What is risk?” The 
purposes of the review are to discover the essence (in the 
philosophical sense) of risk-- the exact meaning conveyed 
by the written and oral expression of the term within this 
limited context -- and to suggest guidelines for the con¬ 
struction of risk measures. The accomplishment of these 
objectives will minimize the problems created by the use of 
ad hoc definitions of risk. 
Most of the psychologica 1 research investigating 
relationships between risk-preference and personality uses 
choices among pairs of gambles as the method of determining 
relative degrees of risk-preference. So the primary empha¬ 
sis of this chapter will be upon definitions of risk that 
have been developed within gambling contexts. These are 
mathematical in nature, and a majority of the chapter will 
be devoted to their study. A short discussion of the 
relationship between mathematical and non-mathematica1 uses 
of the risk concept in the psychological literature will be 
included to emphasize the difficulties associated with a 
more general definition of the term "risk.” 
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Historical Overview 
History does not record the first use of the word 
"risk,” nor does it record the first situations involving 
the concept t owar d which man directed his analytical 
faculties. The concept is ancient, however; the casting of 
lots in the Bible, the earliest insurance regulations 
recorded in the Code of the Hammarubi and anthropological 
writings of gambling activities in vanished cultures attest 
to its age.^ It is interesting to discover that the 
earliest uses of the concept were in relation to gambling 
events, exactly as current definitions in the psychological 
1itera ture ar e . 
Evidence of gambling’s antiquity may also be found in 
ruins in Egypt and Pompeii. Gambling equipment and paint¬ 
ings depicting gambling scenes have been found in the tombs 
of Pharaohs. ”...in the upper Egyptian gallery of the 
British Museum, where in a case containing the throne &c., 
of Queen Hatasu (B.C.1600) are her draught board, and...in 
the same case is an ivory Astragal, the earliest known form 
of dice, which could have been of no use except for gambling." 
The Chinese game of "Wei-ki" and the Japanese game of "Go" 
are said to date from about 2300 B.C. The ancient Jews 
gambled by either drawing or casting lots. In Num. 26:52, 
55-56, "and the Lord spake unto Moses, saying. ..the land 
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shall be divided by lot...according to the lot shall the 
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possessions thereof be divided between many and few.” 
Dice playing is undoubtedly as old as any gambling 
activity. Aristotle was acquainted with the game and com¬ 
pared dice players to thieves. Prohibitions against this 
game may be found in the Koran and the Midrash, and 
according to the Talmud, dice playing was tantamount to a 
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c r ime . 
There was, notwithstanding the severe laws 
against it, hardly a more common and more ruin¬ 
ous pastime -- a pastime in which Cicero himself, 
who places a gambler on a par with an adulterer, 
did not disdain to indulge in his old days, 
claiming it as a privilege of ”Age." Augustus 
was a passionate dice-player. Nero played the 
points -- for they also played it by points -- at 
400,000 sesterces. Caligula, after a long spell 
of ill-luck, in which he had lost all his money, 
rushed into the streets, had two innocent Roman 
knights seized, and ordered their goods to be 
confiscated. Whereupon he returned to his game, 
remarking that this had been the luckiest throw 
he had had for a long time. Claudius had his 
carriages arranged for dicing convenience, and 
wrote a work on the subject. Nor was it all 
fair play with those ancients. Aristotle already 
knows of a way by which the dice can be made to 
fall as the player wishes them; and even the 
cunningly constructed turret-shaped dice cup did 
not prevent occasional ’’mendings” of luck. The 
Berlin Museum contains one "charged” die, and 
another with a double four. The great affection 
for this game is seen, among other things, by 
the common proverbs taken from it, and the no 
throws, taken from kings, heroes, gods , hetairae, 
animals and the rest. But the word was also 
used in a mathematical sense. In a cosmogonical 
discussion of the Midrash, the earth is likened 
to a "cubus ." (Ashton, p.11-12.) 
37 
The use of dice in all of the northern European nations 
is of great antiquity. And it was fervently played. The 
ancient Germans, for instance, would not only wager their 
wealth, but would wager their personal liberty upon a throw 
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of the dice. ’’Shakespeare mentions dice and dicing thir¬ 
teen times in seven plays, and in Johnson, and the early 
dramatists, there are many allusions to this species of 
gambling.” (Ashton, p.16.) Despite several edicts condem- 
ing the activity and severe penalties for playing, the 
game flourished. 
Historically, this particular game is very important. 
It was almost completely responsible for the initiation of 
theoretical developments in mathematical probability.^ In 
1654 the Chevalier de Mere consulted a young Frenchman, 
Blaise Pascal, about a problem he kept encountering with a 
particular dice game. The Chevalier had been betting that 
within a sequence of twenty-four tosses of a pair of dice 
at least one twelve would turn up. At even odds, however, 
he was losing money rapidly. He wanted to know one of two 
things: either the correct odds for a fair bet or the 
proper number of tosses for the same result. 
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Pascal solved this problem for the Chevalier, and upon 
being presented with more complicated questions of this 
nature, started a correspondence with another noted mathema- 
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tician, Pierre de Fermat. The exchange of letters between 
these two provided the basis for the mathematical theory of 
probability. 
Components of Mathematical Definitions of Risk 
Mathematical analysis of dice playing, or any game of 
chance, must begin with the probabilities associated with 
the events upon which men wager. This is just the begin¬ 
ning, however, something of value is being wagered and must 
be taken into consideration. Once these two factors are 
analyzed separately, their combined presence (per se) and 
their combination into mathematical moments becomes important. 
Probability 
This is undoubtedly the primary concept involved in 
the mathematical definition of risk. The reason for the 
importance of this concept is simple: probability indicates 
the degree to which an event is expected to occur. Proba¬ 
bility measures run (continuously and inclusively) from 0.0 
to 1.0. A probability of 0.0 indicates that an event will 
not occur, and there is no point in pursuing analysis from 
a gambling, or risk-taking, point of view. Similarly, a 
probability of 1.0 tells us that the associated event will 
occur and is also uninteresting from a gambling point of 
view. Values between 0.0 and 1.0, however, are important. 
They impart some, but not perfect, information about the 
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occurrence of an event. The lack of perfect knowledge, or 
uncertainty concerning outcomes, is what men wager upon. 
The word "probability” is widely used in everyday life 
and is so basic to ways of thinking and acting that it is 
difficult to define precisely. It originated from the Latin 
probabilis which means "like truth." Three technical 
definitions of the term have received more credence than 
other s 
Laplace’s Definition 
Pascal, Fermat and Laplace assume the events under 
discussion are equally likely, and define probability as the 
ratio of the number of outcomes favorable to an event divi¬ 
ded by the total number of equally probable outcomes. 
Laplace’s definition (developed in a series of lectures in 
1795) : 
The theory of chance consists in reducing all the 
events of the same kind to a certain number of 
cases equally possible, that is to say, to such 
as we may be equally undecided about in regard to 
their existence, and in determining the number of 
cases favorable to the event whose probability is 
sought. The ratio of this number to that of all 
the cases possible is the measure of this prob¬ 
ability, which is thus simply a fraction whose 
numerator is the number of favorable cases and 
whose denominator is the number of all the cases 
possible. (Laplace, p.6-7.) 
An example of this definition’s use is in the calcula¬ 
tion of the probability of throwing two ordinary six-sided 
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dice and having them total seven. There are thirty-six 
equally probable outcomes for the denominator of the ratio. 
For the numerator, there are six equally probable outcomes 
associated with the event "the total of the two faced up 
equals seven." The probability of this event then is six 
g 
divided by thirty-six or one-sixth. 
Relative Frequency Definition 
But a drawback of this definition is the possibility 
that not all of the outcomes will be equally likely. 
Consideration of this led to the relative frequency inter¬ 
pretation of probability. This assumes probability to be 
the limiting value of the relative frequency of occurrence 
of an event as the number of trials approaches infinity. 
In practice, since an infinite number of trials is a theo¬ 
retical and not an actual requirement, an approximation is 
used. Insurance companies, for instance, keep large 
statistical files of occurrences of events relevant to 
their operations, and assume these figures give approxi- 
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mately "true" probabilities. 
Subjective Probability 
Sometimes, however, situations are encountered in 
which previous experience is useless. The probability of 
WWI1I, the probability of immortality and the probability 
that Shakespeare never wrote "Hamlet" are events which do 
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not allow frequency interpretation. Probabilities between 
0.0 and 1.0 cannot be assigned by these methods. People 
are willing to assign numbers to these events though. These 
numbers, representing probabilities, reflect their degree of 
belief in the occurrence of the events and are subjective. 
They are subjective in the sense that different persons may 
assign different probabilities to the occurrences of the 
same events; numbers arrived at by a combination of intro- 
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spection and experience unique to that individual. 
Selection of a Definition 
The selection among these three definitions of prob¬ 
ability depend upon the situation and the assumptions that 
can be made. If the outcomes are equally likely, as in 
most gambling situations, then the classical "equally 
probable” approach may be taken. If empirical data is 
available, as for instance in insurance operations, then the 
relative frequency interpretation may be used as an approxi¬ 
mation. If the classical approach is not applicable or if 
there is no historical data, then subjective degree of 
belief is the alternative. 
In the words of Laplace: 
...the theory of probabilities is at bottom only 
common sense reduced to calculus; it makes us 
appreciate with exactitude that which exact minds 
feel by a sort of instinct without being able 
ofttimes to give a reason for it. It leaves no 
arbitrariness in the choice of opinions and sides 
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to be taken; and by its use can always be deter¬ 
mined the most advantageous choice. Thereby it 
supplements most happily the ignorance and the 
weakness of the human mind. If we consider the 
analytical methods to which this theory has given 
birth; the truth of the principles which serve 
as a basis; the fine and delicate logic which 
their employment in the solution of problems 
requires; the establishments of public utility 
which rest upon it; the extension which it has 
received and which it can still receive by its 
application to the most important questions of 
natural philosophy and the moral science; if we 
consider again that, even in the things which 
cannot be submitted to calculus, it gives the 
surest hints which can guide us in our judgements, 
and that it teaches us to avoid the illusions 
which ofttimes confuse us, then we shall see 
that there is no science more worthy of our 
meditations, and that no more useful one could be 
incorporated in the system of public instruction. 
(Laplace, p . 19 6.) 
Value 
This is the second concept that is of importance in 
mathematical definitions of risk. Value in this context 
refers to the physical and/or psychological worth of what¬ 
ever is being wagered, not moral or ethical canons.^ 
A Gambling Incentive 
Men gamble for something’. It is true that the gains 
or losses may be secondary to the ’’thrill” of taking risks, 
for instance, but something of value to the individual is 
being both wagered and offered as a prize. The gambler is 
seeking this prize and for the chance must offer a payment. 
That which is sought and that which is offered presumably 
are of value to him. The simplest measure of the value 
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involved is the "objective" monetary amount. Some amount of 
money is offered as a prize and some amount must be tendered 
for a chance at it. The values are "objective" in the sense 
that the monetary amounts are clearly stated. 
However, no two people "value" the same amount of money 
equally. Give any two the same amount as a gift and then 
ask each of them how much value he believes that he received. 
They cannot answer in money amounts because that is like 
saying, "I value the gift of five dollars as being worth 
five dollars to me." They must answer in terms of the satis¬ 
faction received by owning the amount, and that is where the 
divergence enters. No two people are alike, and since the 
value of an object is in the personal satisfaction of owner¬ 
ship and use, no two people value the same object equally. 
Objective and Subjective Value 
The possibility of allowing either objective or sub¬ 
jective values into analysis signals a theoretical diver¬ 
gence in the literature on risk. One possible approach 
explicitly considers subjective value (utility) and focuses 
analysis on the experimental determinantion of utility 
curves as indicators of individual reactions to choices in 
risky situations. The other explicitly treats value (and 
probability) as objective quantities, and assumes risk to be 
a property of the distribution and value of outcomes. Risk 
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is present in both cases, but treated differently in each. 
In the former, risk is an integral part of the theory in 
that it is the starting point of analysis: its presence is 
reacted to by subjects and their reactions form the basis 
for utility curve construction. The latter assumes that 
risk is part of its experimental structure, but subjects 
reactions to the choice situations determine the amount of 
it present. In the former, risk is a starting point; in 
the latter it is an end result. 
Although utility analysis is a fruitful area of inquiry 
with an extensive body of research, it will not be consider¬ 
ed as an approach to be evaluated within this thesis. 
Several reasons against considering this approach were men¬ 
tioned in Chapter I. To these may be added one other: the 
risk measures involved in the psychological literature to be 
reviewed are, with few exceptions, gambling choices with 
small, clearly stated, amounts of money as prizes. The 
probabilities and values are objectively stated and their 
mathematical features are assumed to be determinants of 
relative amounts of risk. So utility will not be discussed. 
Probability and Value 
These components are always present simultaneously in 
gambling contexts, and may be reacted to either singly or 
in combination by subjects in experiments. Edwards has 
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shown for instance that some people have preferred proba¬ 
bilities at which they choose to bet as long as the money 
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values are not too large. And value in the outcomes of a 
gamble or risk may be an overriding factor. Literature is 
full of examples in which people have undertaken challenges 
in the face of overwhelming odds, because of the attractive- 
13 
ness of the outcomes. As far as the relative importance 
of probability and value is concerned, Pollatsek found 
selection strategies among bets to reflect the belief that 
probabilities are more important than payoffs; the latter 
14 
are considered only when probabilities are the same. One 
point this brings up, however, and which will be mentioned 
later during the review, is the extremely small amounts of 
money used as prizes and losses in the experimentation. 
And furthermore the small amounts are generally supplied by 
the experimenter; the subject need not risk his own money! 
Probability and value are also reacted to in combina¬ 
tion, particularly when subjective probabilities are 
appropriate. For instance, a person’s belief about stock 
market movements should be unaffected by the implications of 
these movements for potential gains or losses, yet people do 
allow such considerations to color their probability assess¬ 
ments. And this is noticeable at race tracks. ’’Long-shots" 
(as determined by betting amounts prior to each race and 
seemingly unrelated to objective probabilities of winning) 
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are valued more highly than favorites. The potential 
gain makes a low objective probability appear higher (in the 
subjective sense) and so the bet is preferred. 
A more important aspect of the combination of proba¬ 
bility and value, however, is in the calculation of 
probability distribution moments. 
Probability Distribution Moments 
Probability distribution moments are the mathematical 
expectations of various powers of the random variable in 
question. (A random variable is one whose occurrence is a 
matter of chance e.g. the number of spots face up after the 
roll of an ordinary die.) The moments are summary charac¬ 
teristics of distributions; they impart much information 
and provide a basis for comparison between distributions. 
Expected Value 
This is perhaps the most familiar of the moments. It 
is how much will be received on the average over a large 
number of plays. It is calculated by multiplying the value 
of each outcome by its probability of occurrence and summing. 
For example, consider the gamble in which a person throws 
one ordinary six-sided die and receives a number of dollars 
corresponding to the number of spots face up. The expected 
value of the gamble is 1/6($1) + l/6($2) + ... + l/6($6) = 
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$3.50. He cannot receive $3.50 on a single trial; this is 
what his average winnings will be if he plays for a long 
time. This quantity also tells him the "fair" value of the 
game . 
Variance 
This gives an indication of the "spread" of returns 
about the expected value. A low variance implies that 
returns are clustered fairly closely around the expected 
value, while a high variance implies that there is a good 
deal of "spread" associated with the gamble. It is calcu¬ 
lated by squaring the differences between the expected 
value and the value of each possible outcome, multiplying 
by the respective probabilities and then summing. For 
example, consider the following two gambles: 
Gamble A Flip a coin; receive $1 if a head lands 
face up, lose $1 if a tail lands up. 
Gamble B Flip a coin; receive $10 if a head lands 
face up, lose $10 if a tail lands up. 
The expected value of each gamble is $0. But there is a 
good deal of difference between the two. The variance for 
Gamble A is one and the variance for Gamble B is one 
hundred. Although the expected value is $0 in both cases, 
the possible returns are much closer to this value in A than 
in B . 
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S kewne s s 
This refers to the tendency of a distribution to ’’tail 
off" in one direction or the other. A skewed distribution 
is one in which there are extreme values with small prob¬ 
abilities of occurrence located on one side or the other. 
An example of a skewed distribution is personal income in 
the United States. Most persons make a relatively small 
income, while there are a handful who make relatively large 
amounts. There are more people making $10,000 than there 
are making $10,000,000. 
This is caluclated by cubing the difference between the 
expected value and each individual outcome that is possible, 
multiplying by the respective probabilities and then summing. 
Consider the following two gambles: 
Gamble C Receive $4 with probability 1/5, and 
lose $1 with probability 4/5. 
Gamble D Receive $1 with probability 4/5, and 
lose $4 with probability 1/5. 
For these gambles the respective figures for expected value, 
variance and skewness are: $0, $0; 4, 4; and 12, -12. 
Gamble C tails off to the right and Gamble D tails off to 
the left. 
These are the important concepts involved in mathemati¬ 
cal risk: probability and value, and their combination into 
the distribution moments of expected value, variance and 
skewness. 
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Review of Mathematical Definitions of Risk 
At present there are only three generally agreed upon r 
properties of risk: (1) it is a property of gambles (or 
alternative) that affect choices, (2) alternatives can be 
ordered with respect to their riskiness and (3) the risk 
17 
of an alternative is somehow r elated to its dispersion. 
Concerning the first of these, there is no doubt: the 
presence or lack of risk in alternatives is certainly a 
factor considered in the evaluation of a particular course 
of action. Concerning the second of these, there does not 
seem to be room for a great deal of controversy. To dis¬ 
agree implies that a risk measure is not ordinally scaled, 
which means that it is an either/or concept: it is present 
or not and the degree is meaningless. The third of these, 
however, is an assumption which may not be reasonable, and 
will be returned to after reviewing mathematical defini¬ 
tions of the concept (which almost universally assume these 
three properties are .true.) 
In a majority of the literature of risk and personality 
the concepts most often assumed to be measures of risk are 
either probability or the probability distribution moments. 
A number of studies assume that preferences for particular 
probabilities, or particular extremes of probability give an 
indication of risk-preference. These studies (reviewed in 
the next chapter) assume that preferences for "long-shots" 
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reflect risk-preference, and vice versa. Probability is 
the risk measure. The lower the probability of winning (in 
two-outcome gambles) the higher the risk. Edwards has done 
research indicating that some people have preferred prob¬ 
abilities at which they choose to bet. But the phenomenon 
may be restricted to gambles with only two outcomes; 
Lichtenstein failed to find these preferences among three- 
outcome gambles . ^ 
Expec ted Value 
If the prizes offered in a gamble are held constant 
and the probabilities varied, the expected value will change. 
But it is generally assumed that expected value does not 
give an accurate indication of the risk of a gamble. Studies 
using risk measures do not as a rule manipulate expected 
value; they assume that subjects can calculate this and will 
assign too much importance to it in the selection process. 
This is in sp ite of the fact that expected value maximiza¬ 
tion has been discounted as a selection criterion for over 
two hundred years. Gambles A, B, C and D in Table 2.1 have 
the same expected value, but it is doubtful if anyone would 
argue that the same amount of risk is present in each of 
them. 
Compare Gambles A and B and it is obvious that they 
differ in the variance or "spread” of the outcomes. This 
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Comparison of the Parameters of Four Gambles 
Gamble A Gamble B Gamble C Gamble D 
Win probability 1/2 1/2 1/5 4/5 
Win amount $1 $10 $4 $1 
Lose probability 1/2 1/2 4/5 1/5 
Lose amount $1 $10 $1 $4 
Expected value $0 $0 $0 $0 
Variance 1 100 4 4 
S kewne s s 0 0 12 -12 
TABLE 2.1 
has led to the consideration of variance as a risk measure: 
the higher the variance the greater the risk and vice versa. 
Variance 
As early as 1906 Fisher argued for variance considera¬ 
tions in gambling analysis.19 Allais also criticized the 
expectation criterion by presenting the following pairs of 
gambles: 
Gamble (1) 
Choose: Ai and receive $1,000,000 for sure 
B1 and receive $5,000,000 with pr obabil ity 0.10, 
or $1,000,000 with pr obabi1it y 0.89, 
or nothing with pr obabi1it y 0.01 
Gamb1e (2) 
Choose: A2 and receive $1,000,000 with probabi1ity 0.11, 
or nothing with probability 0.89 , 
B2 and receive $5,000,000 with pr obability 0.10, 
or no th ing with probability 0.90 
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If a person chooses A-^ in the 
second (as many do), then the 
criterion is violated.^ ^ 
first gamble and B2 in the 
expected value maximization 
There are several recent experimental studies address¬ 
ing the issue of risk and its relation to variance. In the 
first of these, Edwards concluded that variance preference 
2 1 
in gambles was less important than probability preferences. 
However, research by Lichtenstein; Littig; Royden et al and 
Van der Meer has produced results indicating that variance 
is seen as a property of risk and does influence choices 
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among gambles. And a study by Coombs and Pruitt testing 
for higher order moment preferences also found variance 
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preferences. These were in addition to stable probability 
preferences which interacted with them: subjects preferred 
high variance when the gambles involved their preferred 
probabilities and low variance otherwise. 
There has been criticism of this research. From the 
definition of variance it is obvious that it is related to 
probability, and manipulating one of them while the other 
remains constant requires that values vary. All that the 
subjects see, however, are the probabilities and values; it 
is doubtful if any but a small percentage of them can 
calculate a variance (or skewness). If they place unequal 
weight upon the probabilities and values in the selection 
process, then it becomes difficult to explain choices via 
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distribution moments. In the studies by Coombs and Pruitt 
and Van der Meer a large proportion of the systematic 
preference for variance was in bets having either extreme 
probabilities (9/10, 1/10 etc.) or extreme variances 
(90, 100). They could be construed as consistent with the 
preferences that would have occurred had the subjects been 
attaching unequal importance to probability and payoff.24 
Slovic and Lichtenstein avoided the problem of inter¬ 
acting probabilities and values by presenting bets in 
different formats within which variance could be manipulated 
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without changing probabilities and values. Called duplex 
bets (Figure 2.1), they consisted of discs with spinners on 
them; the subject chooses from two alternatives. 
In the low variance alternative two discs were played 
i.e. one a win disc (.6 probability win $2, .4 probability 
lose $0) and the other a lose disc (.6 probability lose $0, 
.4 probability of losing $2). Variance was found to have 
„ „ 26 
little or no influence on the decision of most subjects. 
Pollatsek and Tversky consider the expected value and 
? 7 
the variance to be important in the risk of an alternative. 
They assert that if three assumptions hold (positivity, 
monotonicity and continuity) then a "regular risk system" 
can be defined in which there is a unique value 6 (continu¬ 
ous, between C and 1) that allows gambles to be ordered with 
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Example of a Duplex and a Standard Bet 
Win $2 Lose $2 W in $2 
Win $0 Lose $0 
Duplex Bet 
Expected Value = $.40 
Var iance = 1.92 
Lose $2 
S tandar d Bet 
Expected Value = $.40 
Var iance = 3.84 
FIGURE 2.1 
p O 
respect to riskiness. The risk of an option is computed 
by Risk = 9V-(1-9)E where V is the variance and E is the 
expected value of the option. No experimental verification 
of this hypothesis has been undertaken as of yet. 
S k ewn ess 
Skewness, the third moment, has been said to capture 
the idea of "odds A distribution skewed to the right 
(positively) such as Gamble C in Table 2.1 represents a 
"long-shot ," while one skewed to the left (negatively) such 
as Gamble D represents "almost a sure thing." Preference 
for extremes of skewness are assumed to reflect preference 
for these "odds." One aspect of Coombs and Pruitts' 
study was to test for the existence of variance and/or 
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skewness preferences, and to test for the possibility of 
an interaction between them, all of which were found but 
2 9 
not fully explained. 
Experimental Paradigms 
The experimental method of these studies, as is true 
for virtually all psychological research on mathematical 
risk, was to present subjects with a series of gambles, or 
bets, which they must choose from. The gambles were pre¬ 
sented in pairs and only one in each pair was to be 
selected. Within the pairing the distribution moments, 
usually variance and skewness, were manipulated. Responses 
made to the various pairings were recorded with respect to 
the distribution moments, and discussions of the research 
results typically have been in terms of aggregate prefer¬ 
ences for one or the other of them. 
There is a paradox in this method. On the one hand 
the experimenters assume that risk is a function of one or 
the other, or some combination, of the probability distri¬ 
bution moments, yet on the other they assess preferences 
among these combinations with no regard for the underlying 
risk-approach of risk-avoidance tendencies of the subjects. 
They cannot be empirically determining what risk is because 
the aggregate reactions of the subjects may be reflecting 
both of these tendencies, and probably are. Also they 
cannot be assessing reactions to their various definitions 
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of risk because they are not specified; their only defini¬ 
tions are a priori assumptions about the parameters 
involved in risky choices. These assumptions are only 
tested insofar as they are reflected in preferences among 
risky alternatives. 
Perhaps one reasonable way to determine the amount of 
perceived risk in a gamble, as a function of the distribu¬ 
tion moments, is to present subjects with a series of 
gambles differing in these mathematical properties, and 
have them rank the various gambles with respect to riskiness. 
Although underlying attitudes toward risk would affect 
choices, they should not affect the ordinal ranking, and the 
resulting orderings could be analyzed with respect to their 
moments. One experiment in which this was done was by 
Coombs and Huang in which subjects ordered various gambles 
3 0 
according to their riskiness. Unfortunately, however, the 
experimenters assume that the risk in a game (as they call a 
gamble) may be characterized by just two parameters: 
expected value and perceived risk.^l 
So, three of the distribution moments have been sugges¬ 
ted as important parameters in the definition of risk. 
Neither they nor any of their combinations have, as yet, 
been good predictors of subjects’ preferences. But it has 
been mentioned that these studies do not penetrate to the 
crucial issue of risk definition. They have, with the 
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exception of the Coombs and Huang study, been assessing 
preferences among alternatives in which risk is present. 
The Meaning of Risk 
In the noun usage of the term, "risk" is present in 
a situation when there is any probability of losing some¬ 
thing of value; in the present context, money. This is 
obvious. What has not been obvious is the fact that a 
gamble presented to a subject contains several potential 
determinants of choice behavior. These are: the prob¬ 
abilities of winning and losing, the amount won or lost, 
the combination of these into the probability distribution 
moments, and risk. 
Its Pr esence 
It is easy to separate risk from the other components. 
Consider the following two gambles: 
Gamble E Receive $4 with probability 1/5, lose $1 
with probability 4/5. 
Gamble F Receive $5 with probability 1/5, lose $0 
with probability 4/5. 
Is there risk in Gamble E? Yes. Is there risk in Gamble F? 
If the gamble is presented as it is with no price to play, 
no. If this is the case then the individual faces two 
possibilities, although he is unaware of them: one is the 
offer of the gamble in which the worst that can happen is 
no gain, and the other is ignorance of the gamble’s exist- 
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ence. If the first possibility materializes then an argu¬ 
ment could be "The expected value of this gamble is $1 
which means that on the average that is what I should expect. 
If zero dollars is the outcome for the one play I am being 
offered then I feel that I have suffered the risk of 
experiencing one of the unfortunate outcomes." But this is 
weak. The $1 expected value is a possible gain over a large 
number of plays and is not something being risked on one 
trial. And particularly if this possibility is compared to 
the second (unknown) alternative the individual faces, 
complete ignorance of the offer, there is no risk. 
Comparing Gambles E and F, the addition of the one 
dollar to E eliminates the risk. It seems evident that risk 
is present only to the extent of the possibility of losing 
that amount. The variance and skewness of the two gambles 
are equal, differing only in expected value. (None of the 
studies mentioned manipulate expected value; they all assume 
that higher expected values are preferred, which at least 
in this case would be true.) 
Its Manipulation 
So in a gamble of the form: win W^, W2, . . . , W n 
dollars with probabilities P^, P2> ...» Pn> lose L^, L2, 
..., Lm dollars with probabilities Pn+1, Pn + 2> •••, pn+m 
(where P^ + P2 + ... * Pn + m =1) risk is present because of 
the losing alternatives. If any of the L2, ..., Lm 
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are increased then the amount of risk increases. The 
expected value, variance and skewness of the distribution 
will also change, but their change is preceeded by 
increasing the amount of possible loss. And if any of 
the Pn+i, Pn+2 > •••> Pn + m increase (with a corresponding 
decrease in P^, P2> •••> Pn) then the amount of risk will 
increase. Once again the distribution moments will change, 
but the change is preceeded by the change in a basic 
component. The converse also hold; decreases in either 
of these two values will lower the amount of risk present. 
And if these values are changed in the same direction 
simultaneously the effect upon risk is also straight- 
f or war d. 
In the gambling context then, risk is a function of the 
probability and amount of potential loss. If P^ = 
probability of loss and = amount of loss then R=f(PL, $j ) . 
Risk is changed by varying one or the other or both compon¬ 
ents. The partial derivative of R with respect to P^ is 
positive and the partial derivative of R with respect to 
is positive. And the partial derivative of R with respect 
to P^ and $j is also positive. But suppose Pl and $l vary 
simultaneously in opposite directions? The effect upon 
risk is not clear . 
Suppose we start with a gamble in which five dollars 
is either won or lost with probabilities of 1/2. If the 
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amount of possible loss is increased to ten dollars then 
the amount of risk is increased. And if the probabilities 
(for the original gamble) are changed to 3/4 and 1/4 for 
win and lose respectively, then the amount of risk is 
decreased. But suppose both changes occur simultaneously. 
The new gamble is: win five dollars with probability 3/4, 
lose ten dollars with probability 1/4. For comparison we 
have gamble #1: l/2($5), l/2(-$5), and gamble #2: 3/4($5), 
l/4(-$10). What has happened to the relative amount of 
risk in the two gambles? A discussion of the following 
figure will be helpful in this regard. (See Figure 2.2.) 
The R^ represent equal or iso-risk lines i.e., trade¬ 
offs between and in bets of equal (objective) value 
or equal (subjective) utility. (It seems reasonable for 
the to assume this shape: for an EMV'er, and for 
constant , the curves would be given by = $L.PL + 
$W.(1-PL) and solving for $L gives K^/Pl - $w(1-Pl)/pL 
which has the required characteristics.) These curves 
contain most of the properties of economic indifference 
3 2 
curves. 
To examine the effects of varying P^ and in 
opposite directions simultaneously, the iso-risk curves are 
useful. Assume that an individual has some preferred level 
of risk (a concept for which there is support and which 
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Iso-Risk Curves 
FIGURE 2.2 
will be discussed in Chapter III), and that he is at his 
preferred level with a bet of P and $ j (See Figure 2.3). 
If PL is increased and/or is increased then the 
individual will be placed on a- higher iso-risk curve as 
the small arrows show. But it is clear that either P or 
J-j 
$ may be increased, and with a suitable decrease in the 
Xu 
other value he may remain on R±. Bets could be presented 
to a subject in which, first, P;p was varied through its 
range and he indicated the necessary shift in to main¬ 
tain an iso-risk level, then could be varied with 
compensating changes in P noted. Shifts in the probability 
Xu 
distribution moments could be noted throughout this process 
to see if there were any correlation. 
62 
Changing Iso-Risk Levels as P^ and Change 
FIGURE 2.3 
Risk and Preference 
However, two issues are involved: relative amount of 
risk, and preference among gambles. The latter issue has 
been confused with risk. To return to gambles #1 and #2, 
there is risk in both of them. Preference between them 
may be a function of risk, probability, value, distribution 
moments or all of them. But the risk is not defined by 
these latter values; it is defined by the potential loss 
and its probability. The expected values of #1 and #2 
respectively are $0 and $1.25, and their variances are 
25 and 42.1. Gamble #2 should be preferred because of its 
higher expected value -- but its variance is greater than 
that of gamble #1. Yet on the other hand gamble #1 has a 
zero skewness while gamble #2 is negatively skewed at 
-316.4 which represents more of a ’’sure thing." In both 
cases the "expected" loss on the losing alternative is 
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$2.50. If risk alone entered preference then there may be 
indifference between the gambles, but the probability 
distribution moments are influencing factors: choices are 
made on the basis of the distribution properties as well 
as the risk involved. 
Consider the following two gambles: 
Gamble G Win $10 with probability 1/2, lose $10 
with probability 1/2 
Gamble H Win $20 with probability 1/2, lose $10 
with probability 1/2 
Taken separately, there is the same amount of risk in each 
of them: lose $10 with probability 1/2. Considered 
simultaneously, however, the issue of relative attractive¬ 
ness in terms of distribution moments quickly arises. In a 
paired comparison Gamble H will be preferred because it has 
a higher expected value. The risk in H is offset by a 
greater potential gain than the risk in G. In essence, a 
greater inducement at the same probability is being offered. 
In this comparison G would be seen as riskier than H, but 
only because of the additional $10 on the win side and not 
because of theintrinsic "amount of risk” in either gamble. 
Looked at in this manner then the issue is not one of 
comparing the relative riskiness of the gambles, but of 
comparing the "regret" that one would have in the choices, 
and it is not necessarily an issue in which the probability 
distribution is involved. 
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To repeat, there are four ways the amount of risk in 
a gamble may be varied: 
1. Increase (decrease) the potential loss and 
risk increases (decreases). 
2. Increase (decrease) the losing probability and 
risk increases (decreases). 
3. Increase (decrease) both and the same effect 
will hold. 
4. Vary these two parameters in opposite directions. 
In the first three changes the effect upon risk is clear. 
In the latter, however, it is not. Experimental work needs 
to be done on this last possibility along the lines sug¬ 
gested above, and it is here that risk definitions may 
become dependent upon the distribution moments. 
In the first three ways of changing the amount of risk 
in a gamble the distribution moments change, but a change 
in the latter may not signal a change in the amount of risk 
present. For instance, if the value of a losing alterna¬ 
tive is increased then risk increases; also the expected 
value decreases, variance increases and skewness decreases. 
If, however, the value of a winning alternative is increased 
then the opposite effects will be seen for these moments; 
but will the amount of risk change? No. The amount and 
probability of potential losses are the same and according 
to a "naive" use of the word "risk," it remains unchanged. 
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Exper imentation 
Research by Slovic and Lichtenstein and most recently 
Payne and Braunstein has focused on four "risk dimensions”: 
probability of winning, probability of losing, amount to 
win and amount to lose. The purpose of these studies was 
to determine whether or not these dimensions are more 
psychologically meaningful than the concepts involving 
objective or subjective values of the moments associated 
with the underlying distributions of gambles for risk 
considerations. These researchers conceptualize the process 
of choosing among risky alternatives in terms of a simple 
information processing system using the four basic dimen¬ 
sions and their relative magnitudes as inputs. According to 
this processing system, comparisons are made between the 
probability of winning and the probability of losing. 
Depending upon the results of this comparison subjects 
either choose among the gambles or make further comparisons 
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between amount to win and amount to lose. Written state¬ 
ments (describing how they evaluated the attractiveness of 
a gamble) made following the experimental session buttressed 
the information processing concept. (This follows 
Polletsek's research indicating that probabilities are con¬ 
sidered before values.) 
As with the other research reviewed here, this last one 
does not define risk; it assesses preferences among risky 
alternatives. The importance of these studies is their 
focus on the basic dimensions facing any gambler: winning 
and losing, how much and at what odds. Since it is doubt¬ 
ful if any but a very small percent of the population can 
calculate a variance of skewness it must be that the 
studies assume that these moments have some psychological 
aspect that is reacted to. But all that is seen by the 
subjects are the probabilities and values. Perhaps the 
simpler explanation of preferences is the most reasonable. 
A Definition 
The same must be true for definitions of risk: the 
simple fact of a probability of losing something indicates 
that risk is present. Increase the amount of possible loss 
and the risk increases. Increase the probability and risk 
increases. And vice versa: change them simultaneously in 
the opposite direction, however, and the effect upon risk 
is not known. Experimental verification is needed. And 
not verification assessing preference: alternatives in 
which these changes are made must be ranked to determine 
the relative orderings on a risk scale, and the influence 
of the distribution on the orderings. 
However, given the several ways of increasing or 
decreasing the amount of risk in a gamble, some of which 
have unambiguous effects upon risk, some of which do not, 
it seems because of the ambiguity of the role of the 
distribution moments in risk, that an instrument that 
assesses risk-preference must consist of a set of choices 
between risky alternatives and sure things. 
This type of measure is seldom used in the psycho¬ 
logical literature. The studies using measures that are not 
true indicators of preferred levels of risk may experience 
biased results which would partially account for the lack 
of consistency in research assessing the correspondence 
between risk-preference and the same personality scales. 
This area will be discussed in the next chapter, but since 
there is a good deal of difficulty in being reasonably 
sure that the psychological test the researcher is using 
does measure the phenomenon in question, it seems that he 
should be as certain as possible of the validity of the 
instrument he is using to measure risk. At the present 
time, a reasonable way this is possible is to use the 
method described in the last paragraph as long as gambling 
preferences are in the experimental paradigm. 
Two final items that are important when assessing the 
involvement of the subjects within these experiments must 
be mentioned: the amounts of money are either very small 
or imaginary, and the experimenter supplies the stakes. 
If money is being wagered on every trial then the expected 
value is usually zero and the possible wins and losses are 
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usually in pennies. If the subjects are to make a series 
of decisions before playing any (usually one or two) bets 
then the amounts of possible wins and losses are on the 
order of a few dollars. Never more than $10 or $15 is 
involved and at the end of the session the experimenter 
usually "selects” a bet so that the subject will receive 
something for his time. And if large amounts of money 
are involved it is in an imaginary situation. The notion 
of involvement will be of particular importance in 
following chapters. 
Risk Measures in Psychological Research 
Most of the psychological research attempting to 
correlate risk-preference with personality variables use 
choices among pairs of gambles as the measure of risk- 
preference. However, there are other measures of risk. 
The instruments used in specific pieces of research will 
be reviewed in the next chapter, but it is interesting to 
examine the possibilities for non-mathematical risk measures 
in the light of what is known about mathematical measures. 
Ways of increasing (decreasing) the amount of risk in 
a gamble have been mentioned: increase (decrease) the 
amount and/or probability of a losing outcome. A transla¬ 
tion of this method to behavioral situations may not be 
as simple as making a direct correspondence between analogous 
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components. When assessing choices between a sure thing and 
a gamble it is possible to determine relative degrees of 
risk-preference; theoretically utility curve construction 
is an excellent method of assessing these preferences. 
Risk-preference may be separated from distribution consider¬ 
ations this way. But it is far less easy to determine 
risk-preference in "real-worId" settings when factors such 
as learning, ability, familiarity, motivation and informa¬ 
tion feedback are present. 
For example, consider automobile driving. There is 
certainly risk involved: over 50,000 people are killed 
each year in this country as a direct result of car 
accidents. For each decision that a driver makes it is 
extremely difficult for him to assess the probabilities 
involved with each possible outcome, and equally difficult 
to determine the value of these outcomes. When talking 
about risk from a mathematical point of view, attention 
need be focused on the "losing" outcomes only. This may 
not be true for driving. It's difficult to imagine every 
driver considering the probabilities of accident, injury 
or death every time he drives. Rather, there is a 
"balancing" of the "risks" with the "advantages" to each 
separate decision made in this context. A behavioral 
"expectation" is operating. (A mathematical expectation 
is a "balancing" of prizes where the probabilities are 
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the weights.) This makes a universal discussion of risk 
difficult. Although mathematical expectations (expected 
value) do not play a very large role in the amount of risk 
in gambling contexts, human expectations are very prominent 
in situations that are less objectively measurable. 
Consider the following example of a situation in which 
Mr. A must make a difficult choice between relative certain¬ 
ty and relative uncertainty: 
Mr. A, an electrical engineer who is married and 
has one child, has been working for a large 
electronics corporation since graduating from 
college five years ago. He is assured of a life¬ 
time job with a modest, though adequate, salary, 
and liberal pension benefits upon retirement. 
On the other hand, it is very unlikely that his 
salary will increase much before he retires. 
While attending a convention, Mr. A is offered 
a job with a small, newly founded company with 
a highly uncertain future. The new job would 
pay more to start and would offer the possibility 
of a share in the ownership if the company 
survived the competition of the larger firms 34 
He must consider several factors in his choice, not the 
least of which is his subjective evaluation of the prob¬ 
ability of success of the company. In this situation it is 
difficult to point to the risk facing Mr. 
upon his evaluation of the probability of 
worth, or value, of failure (a subjective 
implying utility considerations.) 
A . It depe n ds 
failure and the 
e va1ua tion 
A general definition of risk would have to consider 
subjective probability, utility and interpersonal comparisons 
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of the two: a problem not faced by gambles using objective¬ 
ly stated probabilities and prizes. If the above situation 
were presented to a number of persons with instructions to 
give the lowest probability of success they think reasonable 
before Mr. A should take the job, then factors such as 
familiarity, ability and motivation become important deter¬ 
minants in subjective probability assessments. And direct 
comparisons of these probabilities among persons will not be 
possible because of these factors. In the gambling situa¬ 
tion probability, value, risk and the probability distribu¬ 
tion are potential determinants of choice. In this real- 
world situation these factors may be present (in objective 
or subjective form) and in addition, concepts related to 
personality influence choices. Because of these complica¬ 
ting factors a general discussion of risk beyond gambling 
situations will not be undertaken given the present state 
of psychological theories of risk at this time. This will 
be returned to in Chapter V when a more comprehensive 
definition of risk from the "objective” and "organic" mean¬ 
ing of the term will be given based upon subsequent reviews. 
Summa r y 
Experimental psychology uses choices among gambles as 
a method of determining risk-preference. The gambles do 
contain risk. However, the assumptions that choices among 
gambles are dependent upon the probability distribution 
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moments, and that risk is a function of these moments is 
erroneous. Two separate issues are present: preferences 
among gambles and risk. Risk exists independently of the 
distribution moments. It exists when there is a probability 
of a loss. It may be increased by increasing either the 
probability and/or value of a losing outcome and vice versa. 
The distribution moments may become important in risk 
definition as a result of experimental work assessing the 
effects of varying the probability and value of a losing 
outcome in a gamble in opposite directions. Presently the 
distribution moments are important in determining prefer¬ 
ences among gambles, the research is clear on that, but 
their importance exists apart from the definition of risk 
in a gamble. 
To determine a subject's relative risk-preference, 
choices among gambles should not be the measure because of 
the confounding with the probability distribution, rather 
choices between a sure thing and a gamble should be the 
method. This would eliminate preferences based upon the 
moments. Risk measures should be restricted to choices of 
this nature instead of using reactions to artificial 
real-world situations where there are so many intervening 
variables that it is difficult to separate risk-preference 
from a number of idiosyncratic personality variables. 
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C H A P T E R III 
THE NORMAL RISK-TAKER 
The question "Who takes risks?" has been addressed by 
experimental psychology, albeit only recently. A large 
amount of research has been undertaken in which relation¬ 
ships between risk-taking behavior and personality variables 
have been studied. This chapter will review the experi¬ 
mental literature; the principal objective will be a criti¬ 
cal unification of diverse theories of personality and 
risk-taking. 
The chapter will be concerned primarily with theories 
of conscious risk-taking behavior. Experimental psychology 
as a discipline is interested in behavior, responses, etc. 
that are conducive to large-scale testing; behavior that 
is public in that it can be elicited by questionnaires or 
interviews, rather than behavior that is private whose 
motives are largely unknown, even to the individual himself. 
Of particular importance are the risk measures involved in 
testing, the personality variables and what they assume 
about human behavior, and the validity and replication of 
the basic theories reported. 
The material reviewed will be divided into four 
sections: (1) research on risk-taking behavior within the 
framework of Atkinson's achievement motivation model, (2) 
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research relating risk-taking preference with perceived 
environmental control following Rotter’s social learning 
theory, (3) research relating risk-avoidance and risk- 
approach tendencies to a theory postulating "optimal” 
preferred levels of arousal, and finally (4) research 
undertaken with no apparent theoretical guidelines in which, 
nevertheless, a large number of personality attributes have 
been investigated with regard to risk-taking behavior. 
The Achievement Motive 
The theory of achievement motivation has generated a 
large amount of empirical research bearing directly on the 
issue of risk-taking. The theory is an attempt to account 
for the determinants of the direction, magnitude and persis¬ 
tence of behavior in a limited domain of human activity. It 
is applicable when an individual knows that his performance 
will be evaluated, either by himself or by others, in terms 
of a standard of excellence. His actions will be evaluated 
either favorably or unfavorably according to the correspon¬ 
dence of the consequences to a success/failure criteria; the 
fact of evaluation presumably arouses the desire to perform, 
hence, the situation becomes achievement-oriented in 
nature.^ 
The Theory 
The general theory is a theory of achievement motiva 
tion, not of risk-taking. Insofar as a risk-taking con¬ 
struct can and has been, incorporated into the theory, 
however, it must be discussed vis-a-vis this particular 
aspect. Some descriptive comments will be made on the theory 
before the research relevant for this thesis is examined. 
Development 
First proposed by McClelland, Atkinson, Clark and 
Lowell in 1953,the theory separates individuals into two 
categories and is concerned with the reactions of each to 
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achievement-oriented situations. One category contains 
persons who are high in the need to achieve success. This 
is conceived of as a relatively stable disposition aroused 
by situational cues; the cues are linked to the possibility 
of performance evaluation and performance results in terms 
of achievement. This is considered to be an approach 
tendency -- a seeking out of situations in which one has 
some standard to compete against and which, in addition, 
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contains some incentive to perform in terms of reward. 
The second category, by way of contrast, contains 
those individuals who are the exact behavioral antithesis 
of those ;n the first grouping. They tend to avoid situa¬ 
tions in which they can be evaluated by some yardstick of 
performance. They appear to be motivated by a fear of 
failure in task completion rather than a desire for success. 
Atkinson followed the outline of the theoretical conception 
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developed by Tolman when he assumed that the impact of the 
situational cues of evaluation will lead to differential 
4 
performance on the part of those in the two categories. 
There are two important variables in this evaluation. 
First is the extent to which the individual, in evaluating 
the task to be performed, expects that his performance will 
lead to the goal of success. Second is the attractiveness 
of success at this particular activity for the individual: 
how much of an incentive is involved? 
According to Atkinson an expectancy is a cognitive 
anticipation, aroused by cues in the situation, that per¬ 
formance of some act will be followed by a particular 
consequence. The strength of the expectancy can be repre¬ 
sented by the individual's subjective probability of the 
consequence given that he performs the act. The incentive 
variable represents the relative attractiveness of a 
specific goal offered in a situation. It can be positive 
or negative depending upon the relative attractiveness.^ 
Dynamics 
The general principle of motivation is simple. It is 
assumed that the motive to achieve success (or avoid 
failure, since this is at the opposite end of the same 
continuum), which the individual carries with him from 
situation to situation, combines mu 11ip 1icative1y with the 
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two specific situational variables: expectancy and 
incentive. If Ms= the motive to achieve success; Mf= the 
motive to avoid failure; Pg = the probability or expectancy 
of success; and P £ = (1-PS); Is= the incentive value of 
success which is linearly and inversely related to the 
probability of success; and If= the incentive value of 
failure which is negative, and linearly and inversely 
related to the probability of failure; then approach moti¬ 
vation is given by (Ms x Ps x Is), and avoidance motivation 
is given by (Mf x Pf x If). 
Since Pf= (1-PS) and If = -Ps , the sum of the approach 
and avoidance motivations can be re-arranged and written as 
(Ms - Mf) (Ps) (1-PS). Thus, if Ms is greater than Mf, the 
resultant motivation will be highest when the subjective 
probability of success is .5. And when Mf is the highest, 
the resultant motivation will be a minimum for Ps= .5. 
However, multiplication by Ps(l-Ps), since Ps goes from 0.C 
to 1.0, implies that the resultant (Ms - Mf) differences 
will reflect, at most, one quarter of the "true” difference. 
This weakens the TAT scale. 
Imp 1ic a t ions 
According to the theory this imp lies that individuals 
in whom the motive to achieve success is greater than the 
motive to avoid failure will prefer tasks with intermediate 
probabilities of success, while persons dominated by the 
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motive to avoid failure will prefer those tasks for which 
probabilities of success are either very high or very low, 
although nothing is said about the differences between the 
latter preferences. Since Pg affects the variance of two- 
outcome bets, this research could be contrasted to that 
concerned with variance preferences (pp.51-54). Those 
choosing intermediate values of Ps are also choosing minimum 
var iance. 
An alternative interpretation that could be offered, 
however, is the high Ms persons prefer intermediate prob¬ 
abilities of success because uncertainty about the outcome 
of task performance is the highest for these values, while 
the high prefers the greater relative certainty of 
knowing that he will either very probably succeed, or very 
probably fail, depending upon his choice of high or low Ps. 
The latter is, in essence, choosing alternatives so that 
there is no "failure" for him; a fact which casts doubt 
upon present means of conceptualizing this behavior. 
Meas ur erne n t 
There are at least two methods of assessing the level 
of achievement motivation in a subject. Originally persons 
were separated into either high Ms or high Me (which 
originally meant low Ms) categories according to their 
written responses on the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). 
This is a projective personality test that consists of a 
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series of pictures of ambiguous scenes: for instance, a 
boy in front of a grocery store holding a broom and gazing 
at a group of students the same age as himself. The 
subjects are requested to write a short paragraph describ¬ 
ing the scene, and their responses are scored according to 
the number of achievement-oriented themes in the descriptions. 
The assumption underlying the use of this test is that 
as someone attempts to interpret a complex social situation 
he tells as much about himself as he does about that situa¬ 
tion.^ And written fiction is the conscious or unconscious 
expression of the author’s experiences or fantasies -- the 
process involves projection into the written theme. 
But this measure of achievement motivation did not 
adequately distinguish between the two categories in the 
scale middle range, and further, a single measure for two 
variables was not as meaningful as separate tests would 
have been. Accordingly, Atkinson assumed that sinee the 
disposition to avoid failure makes all activities in which 
performance is evaluated threatening, a measure of anxiety 
should predict whether or not a person is high in . The 
Test Anxiety Questionnaire became the new measure of the 
7 
Mf . 
This ends the description of the theory. Now to 
direct attention to the hypothesized relationship between 
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the achievement motive and risk-taking it is necessary to 
examine the first study of this kind which, in a structural 
sense, set the pattern for subsequent research relating 
these two concepts. 
The Theory and Risk 
In 1958 McClelland argued that need achievement is a 
key factor in accounting for the behavior of business 
entrepreneurs -- persons in whom there is a willingness to 
take calculated risks, and upon whom the development of 
national economics is so dependent. The successful entre¬ 
preneur is one who is willing to take risks that are not so 
large as to be almost certainly ruinous, nor so small as to 
be overly conservative and limiting from a growth point of 
view, but of a magnitude that entails both moderate risks 
and moderate returns. McClelland felt that the taking of 
a small risk is not satisfying to a person with a strong 
motive to succeed, nor is the taking of a large risk, 
since chance will tend to thwart the motive in the latter, 
while the accomplishment of something that is easy will 
g 
thwart it in the former. 
He conducted an experiment to test the hypothesis that 
persons high in the motive to achieve will prefer "moderate" 
risks, while those low in this motive will prefer either 
"high" or "low" risks. He made four assumptions in the 
study, and it is only fair to say that he recognized their 
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tenuous nature. They are: (1) stable individual differ¬ 
ences in need achievement have been formed by age five, 
(2) these differences will be reflected in scribbles the 
children produce (instead of TAT stories as a measure of 
need achievement), (3) stable preferences for risk-taking 
have also developed by age five, and (4) the hypothesized 
connection between need achievement and risk-taking exists 
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and has already been developed by this time. 
The subjects in this study were children between the 
ages of five and nine; their level of need achievement was 
measured by a ’’doodle” test devised by Aronson;^ and 
their risk-taking behavior was measured by four tests. 
These were: (1) distance preferred from the target in a 
ring-toss game, (2) the distance a child thought he could 
move a ball through a hole maze, (3) the number of dots 
put on a sheet of paper under instructions to put down as 
many as possible and still be able to connect them without 
crossing any lines, and (4) the length of a word list 
constructed by each child when he must recall the list at 
a later time.^ McClelland found support for his hypothesis. 
Experimental Replication 
Verification of these results were carried out by two 
groups of investigators. The first replication was by 
Atkinson, Bastian, Earl and Litwin. High and low need 
achievers were compared on the distance (level of risk) 
they preferred from the target in a modified shuffleboard 
game. Support for the theory was found as high need 
achievers chose intermediate differences (moderate risks) 
to a significantly greater extent than did low need 
achievers. The choices of the latter group were not 
distributed evenly across "low” and "high" risks, however, 
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but were largely at the "risky" end. 
And comparable results, and further confirmation of the 
Atkinson Theory, were produced in the second study, con¬ 
ducted by Atkinson and Litwin. This was the first investi¬ 
gation in which the two scales (TAT and TAQ) were 
administered to differentiate low from high need achievers. 
This made it possible to form four subgroups: those high 
in both the motive to achieve success and avoid failure, 
those low in both, and those high in one and low in the 
other. The latter two subgroups are of the greatest 
interest since they presumably reflect the purest expression 
of the two motives. The high need achievement, low test 
anxiety group did prefer intermediate distances (risks) in 
a ring-toss game, while the low need achievement, high test 
anxiety group preferred either extremely risky or extremely 
13 
conservative risks. 
TheoreticaJL Obstacles 
If these two independent confirmations of the relation¬ 
ship hypothesized by McClelland were without major flaws. 
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then an investigation of risk-taking and personality could 
continue with emphasis on the theoretical personalities of 
the high and low need achiever. But there are flaws: 
several of them in fact. 
The studies dealing with these faults, by either 
attempting to explain them or show that they may be ignored, 
are reviewed by Koch, and presented in their entirety in 
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separate works by Atkinson and Feather, and Atkinson. 
They will not be reviewed here. What will be discussed 
are the flaws that apparently are so serious that 
researchers are not as anxious to embrace the theory as 
they one e were. 
Differential Risk-Preference 
First of all, the theory says nothing about why some 
persons low in the motive to achieve success will prefer 
very low levels of risk while others differentiated along 
the same criteria will prefer very high levels. The person 
high in the motive to achieve (a very commendable figure in 
the researcher's estimations) is the only one about whom 
predictions can be made from the theory. Yet the person low 
on this motive is the one whose actions are the most predic¬ 
table (even though the greater predictability does not 
provide a wealth of information -- choices of extremes in 
this case.) 
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Differential Risk 
An even more basic problem is the definition, for each 
subject, of low, medium and high risk. The experimental 
paradigms have contained both skill and chance conditions. 
According to the theory the achievement motive should not 
be operating when the outcomes of decisions are the result 
of chance alone, but there is research which finds the basic 
differences in behavior generalizable to these situations I^ 
Furthermore, even in skill situations, allowances are not 
made for differential skills within subjects. Group 
averages are used to separate low, medium and high levels 
of risk, a procedure which is unsatisfactory for the 
individual. 
Conflicting Variables 
Further, there are several other social-psychological 
variables which certainly have a favorable climate within 
which they could operate. Since the research is univer¬ 
sally (to this point) conducted within the spirit of a 
competitive group, and since several trials are offered 
each person within which he is urged "to do his best,” 
learning, social facilitation, pressures toward uniformity, 
etc., may confound the simple dichotomization of personality 
that is being tested. 
These theories will not be discussed, a reference is 
provided, but it must be noted that it is impossible to read 
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any of the research methodology on risk-taking and the 
achievement motive without wondering when these variables 
will be discussed in terms of either effects or controls. 
That they have not been indicates a limitation of the 
prediliction for specialization among psychologica 1 
researchers.^ ^ 
The Theory and Personality 
The final point to be considered is one which touches 
much of the research within experimental psychology in 
which individual differences are assessed: the measure¬ 
ment of personality. That is, the measurement of person¬ 
ality on a large scale. The archetypal research made for 
this branch of psychology, steeped in the tradition of 
positivism, requires large numbers of subjects in order to 
discuss the characterist ics of groups of individuals. 
Since it is felt that present techniques for knowing how 
one person will behave are inadequate, it is better to use 
proven techniques and -know how a group will behave. This 
leaves the difficulty of translating from the group’s action 
to the individual's behavior, but as with weather fore¬ 
casting, probability statements for the individual instance 
serve as a temporarily useable basis for psychological 
knowle dge . 
Measurement 
The measurement of personality in this research is 
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accomplished by administering the TAT and TAQ tests, tests 
which are amenable to large-scale usage. Among other things, 
Cattell points out that a personality test must have 
1 7 
administrator and scorer reliability. Reliability checks 
on the scoring of the TAT have shown that among skilled 
scorers there is not complete agreement as to the final 
disposition of any one test. The ’’reliability" measures 
have been reported variously as in the .70’s and .80’s, 
with serious doubts about the validity of the technique when 
18 
this measure drops into the .70’s. As for the TAQ, Jesser 
and Hammond point out that its use is based more upon 
convenience of administration than on the properties of the 
construct, i.e. manifest anxiety.^ 
Validity 
Fundamentally, a test measures only itself, and its 
further validity rests entirely on its established relations 
to other behaviors. It is the network of relations to other 
variables and real-world situations that give further mean¬ 
ing. A valid test must give meaningful results; that is, 
it must coincide, or match up, with various kinds of observ¬ 
able behavior which have been predicted from the theory. 
And stability is a further characteristic of a valid test; 
resutls should generally remain the same no matter where, 
and on whom, the test is applied. 
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An experimental check — on this notion of validity is 
what Alker had in mind when he conducted an experiment to 
compare the results of the A tk inso n-McC le 1 la nd formulation, 
with the theory of individual risk-taking set forth by 
2 0 
Kogan and Wallach. Another part of Alker's reason for 
empirically comparing these two theories on essentially 
the Atkinson-McClelland hypotheses stems from a belief that 
it is possible to explain performance on tasks known to 
arouse the achievement motive by the Kogan-Wallach theory 
without recourse to need achievement. 
Kogan and Wallach make a distinction between motiva¬ 
tionally and cognitively determined risk-taking. The 
cognitive risk-taker is operationally defined as a low 
scorer on test-talcing anxiety and defensiveness: he 
discerns the particular features of tasks relevant to 
successful performance. The motivational risk-taker, how¬ 
ever, scores high on both test-taking anxiety and defen¬ 
siveness, and searches for other cues to performance. His 
concern is not with the task itself, but with the positive 
interpersonal evaluation required in order to avoid 
failure. 
Neither the motivational (irrational) nor the cognitive 
(rational) risk-taker is necessarily conservative or risky. 
The difference between them that emerges from the Kogan- 
Wallach findings lies in the consistency with which their 
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preferred risk-taking strategy is employed. The motivation- 
ally determined risk-taker is either consistently risky or 
consistently conservative. His concern with anticipated 
evaluation leads him to ignore whether or not particular 
tasks require skill or only luck. The defensiveness of 
this concern also leads him to ignore whether different risk¬ 
taking strategies are differentially successful on particular 
tasks. The cognitive risk-taker,on the other hand,does not 
exhibit a ’’consistent" risk-taking orientation across 
various tasks. His choice of strategy depends on the 
expected success in a particular case of a given strategy. 
Alker contends that the achievement of success, insofar 
as it results from individual differences in motivation and 
personality, is determined by the subjects attention to cues 
that provide feedback regarding his performance on the task. 
When the feedback is negative, the cognitive risk-taker for 
instance will change his risk-taking strategy to improve 
his results,while the motivational risk-taker will not. 
According to Alker, the presence of a strong wish or desire 
to succeed would seem to be a basic determinant of the 
subject’s trying hard. The individual’s need for achievement, 
however, does not guarantee that he will possess the cap¬ 
ability of learning, a capability which characterizes the 
cognitive risk-taker. 
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The results -- of this research indicated that the 
Kogan-Wallach formulation was a better predicter than the 
achievement criteria. According to Alker, a post hoc 
explanation for the markedly different behaviors across 
tasks for cognitive and motivational subjects would stress 
the capacity of the former to appraise the properties of 
particular tasks. It appears then, that achievement 
oriented subjects merely try harder; they have no special 
capacity to learn from their mistakes. As is well known, 
extensive motivation is no guarantee of success at complex 
tasks. In this study, need achievement was uncorrelated 
with the rationa1ity-irrationa1ity variable. Thus some 
subjects high on need achievement will also be irrational, 
will rely on rigidly espoused risk-taking strategies and 
will not successfully compete with standards of excellence. 
"All this, in a sense, is no surprise. Afterall, Horatio 
Alger, whose creative stories expressed possibly most need 
achievement of any, was not a great writer, even though he 
carried with him a bust of Shakespeare everywhere he went." 
(Alker, 1968, p.222.) 
The Achievement Motive and Risk 
Generally, three measures of risk have been used in the 
research on risk-taking and need achievement: these.are 
(1) distance preferred from a target in various skill 
situations, (2) probabilities of winning in gambling situa¬ 
tions, and (3) occupational preference. 
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Distance 
In the studies using the first of these, there is 
little doubt that the farther a subject stands from a 
target, the riskier his trial will be. The only difficulty 
is that, although for the individual it is possible to say 
whether one distance is riskier than another, it is less 
possible to compare all possible combinations of his choice 
with another’s and say for each pair which is the riskier. 
Interpersonal comparisons of preferred risk without cancel¬ 
ling out skill and ability are suspect. 
Probability 
The second measure of risk has been popular in the 
studies in which chance alone controls the outcomes of an 
action. Scodel et al realted probability preferences in a 
real gambling situation to achievement motivation. Persons 
preferring intermediate probabilities of success (probabil¬ 
ity of winning on dice throws) and intermediate payoffs 
scored highest on the need to achieve However, Atkinson 
et al examined probability preferences in a make-believe 
gambling situation, and while those low on the motive to 
achieve success preferred extreme probabilities, those high 
on this motive did not prefer intermediate values, but were 
2 2 
evenly distributed among all probabilities. In a replica¬ 
tion of this study, Littig experienced essentially the same 
2 3 
results. And finally, Meyer et al found no relationship 
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between achievement motivation and probability preferences 
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using the same paradigms as Atkinson et al, One explana¬ 
tion for the discrepancy in these findings is the fact that 
the probability of winning is a poor choice for a risk 
measure. From Chapter II, it may certainly be a determinant 
of choices among risky alternatives, but it is not a 
measure of risk. 
Occupation 
The third measure has been used in studies such as that 
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by Mahone . The assumption he made is that sociologists 
rank occupations by social status; these rankings are highly 
similar and stable in all industrialized societies; and 
these rankings may be viewed as a hierarchy of jobs which 
differ in apparent difficulty of success. That is, the 
higher the occupation on the scale the lower the subjective 
probability of success and vice versa. One assumption of 
the theory of achievement motive is the incentive value of 
success is equal to 1.0 - Ps is the subjective probability 
of success. This led Mahone to predict that the correlation 
of an ordering of occupations in terms of their prestige, 
and estimates of P s for these orderings, should be -1.0. 
The correlation Mahone did derive was -0.9 which he assumed 
to be close enough to -1.0 to justify his assumption that an 
occupational hierarchy can be viewed as a series of achieve- 
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ment tasks that differ in difficulty! This was not a test 
of the main Atkinson-McCle1land hypotheses, but an attempt 
to use part of the theory to relate occupations and achieve¬ 
ment. In this generalizing it resembles McClelland’s 
arguments concerning the social consequences of risk-taking 
2 7 
and the achievement motive. 
Arousal of the Motive 
Other than the risk measures, one outstanding diffi¬ 
culty for the Atkinson-McCleHand formulation has been its 
genera 1izabi1ity to chance games -- situations in which 
skill plays absolutely no part. There is nothing in the 
theory to suggest that the selection of an event which 
occurs purely by chance should arouse either the motive to 
achieve success or the motive to avoid failure. And if 
either were aroused there is no a priori basis for predic¬ 
ting who will behave in what manner. Yet from the Scodel 
et al study a chance situation did function as a skill 
situation was supposed to. One explanation is every person 
feels that to some degree his bet or choice influences the 
outcome in some manner: or he influences it directly by 
psychokinesis. Either way, the issue of locus of control, 
or causality of the event, comes into focus. If a person 
believes he controls his fate,then he will behave different¬ 
ly than a person who believes his fate is not under his 
control. 
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Internal and External Control 
Rotter's social learning theory is the theoretical 
source for the internal/external control variable. 
According to Rotter: 
When a reinforcement is perceived by the subject 
as following some action of his own but not 
being entirely contingent upon his action, then, 
in our culture, it is typically perceived as the 
result of luck, chance, fate, as under the control 
of powerful others, or as unpredictable because 
of the great complexity of the forces surrounding 
him. When the event is interpreted this way by 
an individual, we have labeled this a belief in 
external control. If the person perceives that 
the event is contingent upon his own behavior, 
or his own relatively permanent characteristics 
we have termed this a belief in internal control. 
(Rotter, 1966, p.l.) 
An event regarded as either a reward or reinforcement 
will be perceive d, a nd reacted to, differently according to 
whether or not it is felt that its occurrence follows from, 
or depends upon, one's own behavior. So the effect of a 
reinforcement following some behavior is not a simple pro¬ 
cess (as traditional learning theorists would have it), but 
depends upon whether or not the person perceives a causal 
relationship between his behavior and the reward. The 
internal/external control belief is assessed by means of 
a pa per-and-pencil test (I-E scale) developed by Liverant, 
and used by Liverant and Scodel in this first study asses¬ 
sing the correspondence between risk-taking and perceived 
28 
environmental control. 
97 
Experimental Origin 
In this study Liverant and Scodel assume that internal/ 
external control is a determinant of risk-taking behavior. 
By internal control they mean a tendency, in risky situa¬ 
tions, to employ a strategy which attempts to maximize the 
number of favorable outcomes over several trials. The term 
had been given (by Rotter) a broad meaning to specify a 
general belief in one’s ability to order his own fate. But 
with respect to situations where chance is perceived as 
governing outcomes, Liverant and Scodel assume that internal 
control would mean a restriction to assure control by a 
policy of selecting cautiously. By external control they 
mean a disposition to select bets either on the basis of 
hunches or the outcomes of previous trials. They assume 
that, in general, there should be a tendency to ignore 
objective probabilities in selecting bets by the externally 
controlled subjects. 
Principal Hypotheses ' 
The principal hypotheses in this study were: (1) that 
internally controlled (refers to belief, not locus of 
control) subjects would select more high probability bets 
than externally controlled subjects and (2) that internally 
controlled subjects would be less variable in their choices 
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of bets than externally controlled subjects. Essentially 
they were hypothesizing that an individual’s choices in 
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chance determined situations are influenced by expectations 
about the occurrence of events which have developed in less 
chance determined settings. One of these expectations may 
be conceptualized as the degree of belief in luck relative 
to the belief in one's own ability to control events. 
The Experiment 
The experimental paradigm consisted of the administra¬ 
tion of the I-E scale, and the selection among several dice- 
throw bets offered. There were thirty trials; the indivi¬ 
duals had to select one of seven gambles on each trial. The 
expected value was zero in all cases and the probability of 
winning was a low of 1/16 to a high of 2/3. (Once again, 
the maximum bet was small, $.40, and the subjects played 
with the experimentor 's money. They were allowed to keep 
one-tenth of everything won over the initial stake.) Results 
of the study supported the hypotheses. 
Results 
The internally controlled subjects selected more of the 
alternative dice bets which, on an objective basis, should 
occur most frequently. This was in spite of the fact that 
the greater probability of winning implies a smaller payoff. 
The chance-oriented externally controlled subjects on the 
other hand played more of the low probability bets. The 
second hypothesis concerning variability was supported also. 
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In addition, Liverant and Scodel assert that internals, as 
compared to externals, have less confidence in the occur¬ 
rence of low probability bets. This was on the basis of 
the smaller amounts they wagered on the risky bets relative 
to the safer ones 
To restate their position: internals desire to have 
control of their own fate and so will prefer high probabil¬ 
ity bets which are almost certain to assure them of success 
in their choice. Externals, however, will choose more low 
probability bets,since they believe their fate control is 
not in their own hands. And the internals will be less 
variable in their choice of strategy. This, however, is 
contrary to the Atkinson formulation (pp.77-83) which 
suggested that intermediate probabilities will be preferred 
by those who may be described as internals. 
Referring back to Rotter’s description of the function¬ 
al characteristics of internal and external control beliefs, 
it appears that the hypotheses derived by Liverant and 
Scodel are somewhat arbitrary, and further, no experimental 
measure was used which confirmed assumptions about the sub¬ 
jects' perceptions of chance governing the outcomes of games. 
Experimental Counterpoint 
Accordingly, Strickland et al followed Slovic’s 
speculation that the internally controlled person might 
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become more ego-involved in risk-taking contexts than the 
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externally controlled counterpart. They assumed that 
the person who sees himself as "master of his fate” might 
well employ this predisposition in a gambling situation, 
and instead of playing a cautious game might try to outwit 
it. He might commit the gambler's fallacy and be generally 
less stably conservative than first imagined. Likewise, 
the person who sees general outcomes as determined by 
factors outside his own control might take the most conser¬ 
vative path and hope that fate is not too unkind. 
Principal Hypotheses 
As a result of this reasoning, Strickland et al formu¬ 
late hypotheses which are the exact opposite of those 
tested by Liverant and Scodel. These are: (1) internals 
will show greater risk-taking propensities than externals 
and (2) internals will be more variable in their pattern of 
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choices than externals. A major reason for this study, 
and for formulating the particular hypotheses, was the fact 
that other reports of the initial work by Liverant and 
Scodel were assuming that the relationships tested had been 
definitely established while in actuality statistical 
3 3 support was marginal. J 
Results 
The experimental paradigm was the same as in the initial 
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study. No relationship was found between I-E control and 
risk-t ak ing.^ ^ 
D iscus sion 
On the surface there appears to be little reason for 
devoting much space to a discussion of this concept. 
Statistical tests of relations are low in one study and 
non-existant in the other. All that appears to have been 
accomplished in the research is the refutation of a hypothe¬ 
sized relationship that was incorrectly becoming an estab¬ 
lished finding. But this is an important area of inquiry 
for two reasons: the next chapters will explore internally 
motivated aspects of behavior, an important part of which 
explicitly raises the issue of locus of control; further, 
this research highlights one difficulty facing risk-taking 
studies. 
Research in the area of internal/external control, and 
to a degree in achievement motivation, continues to dind the 
physical characteristics of the risk-taking situation to be 
troublesome. The experimental translation of Rotter's 
theory from a chance-skill situation to a chance only set¬ 
ting produced contradictory results and the Atkinson- 
McCleiland theory was embarrassed by the occurrence of 
motivated behavior in chance controlled games. This point 
will be returned to in a later section of this chapter. 
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Arousal Regulation 
There is a large body of evidence which supports the 
contention that in order to function efficiently people 
require a moderate level of arousal. Research supported 
the position that intermediate levels of arousal result in 
better task performance than either very high oz very low 
levels.35 In general, an inverted U-shaped relationship 
may be assumed in which increased arousal is associated 
with improved performance, up to a point, after which 
further increases will lead to increasingly inferior per- 
formance . 
Hebb discussed this relationship and speculated that 
states of insufficient arousal will result in boredom, and 
if prolonged, as in experiments on sensory deprivation, 
will give rise to a desire for stimulation and a wish to 
escape from the situation. On the other hand, excessive 
arousal, such as that seen in active combat, results not only 
in a disruption of normal behavior but a similar desire to 
escape. Thus when the level of arousal is below optimum 
Hebb suggests that a person should approach, and take 
pleasure in, any circumstances which will increase arousal. 
Conversely, when arousal is above optimum he should with- 
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draw in displeasure from the situation if he can. 
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Risk and Arousal 
Steiner, Jarvis and Parrish consider the functional 
significance of this arousal hypothesis as it relates to 
risk-taking behavior.37 Following Hebb they assume that 
situations involving risk are likely tc give rise to high 
arousal levels; thus their hypothesis suggests that an 
individual can influence this level and bring it toward 
his optimum by either avoiding or embracing risk. The 
extent to which a person will take risks then, depends 
upon his current level of arousal. 
On the basis of their extensive review of the arousal 
hypothesis, Steiner et al conclude that, despite fluctua¬ 
tions in responses to different situations, each individual 
will, on the average, be characterized by a particular level 
of arousal which should be reflected in his personality. 
(Personality as they define it consists of responses tc the 
MMPI . ) They predict that persons in states of high arousal 
will generally adopt.more cautious strategies than normally 
O O 
aroused control subjects. 
Thr ee S tudies 
Steiner et al report three studies they conducted. 
The same experimental paradigm was used in each — the 
administration of the MMPI followed by a risk-preference 
measure -- with two exceptions to be noted. There were two 
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experimental groups involved: a group of people whose 
arousal level was assumed to be fairly normal, and a group 
of obsessional psychiatric patients whose arousal level was 
very high. (Clinical experience suggests that they are 
very reluctant to take risks.) 
Early Results 
The results of the first two studies were inconclusive 
which fact led Steiner et al to make two mod i fications in 
the paradigm. The measure of risk-preference was changed 
to incorporate gambles and sure things as the choice alter¬ 
natives, and a 30-40 minute interview was added at the end 
of the regular testing. Presumably these changes would 
lend more authenticity to the responses generated. This 
was, after all, an artificial laboratory experiment utili¬ 
zing small sums of money, and the involvement of the 
individual was open to question. 
Based upon correlations between the revised risk 
measure and the MMPI there was once again no support for 
their hypothesis of differential risk-taking between the 
two groups. Next, however, they examined the results of 
the interview. 
Interview 
During this interview each individual was questioned 
about his attitude and behavior in everyday risk-related 
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situations. These consisted of behavior in school; petty 
thievery; participation in sports and gambling; borrowing, 
spending and saving of money; consumption of alcohol; 
driving behavior and attitude toward speed; travel and 
unfamiliar places; ease of making friends; willingness to 
3 9 
speak in public; and sexual behavior. 
Interview Results 
From these interviews separate ratings were made of 
hov; risky or how cautious each individual reported himself 
to be in situations involving physical, financial and 
social risk. The results of these ratings, which had very 
high in ter cor re lations, supported the research hypothesis 
under investigation and, in addition, there were highly 
significant correlations between these indices of risk¬ 
taking and some of the scales of the MMPI. 
Important scales -- the following scales are the ones 
for which there was a statistically significant negative 
correlation: depression, hysteria, psychopathic deviate, 
interest, paranoia, psychas thenia, schizophrenia, social 
I.E., introversion and caution. And the scales for which 
there was a statistically significant positive correlation 
were: hypomania, ego-strength and extraversion. These 
scales will not be expanded now, but will be developed 
40 
further in a later section of this chapter. 
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Strategy -- in addition to the interview, each indivi¬ 
dual was asked about his strategy during the risk-measure- 
ment portion of the experiment, his feelings while he was 
playing and his motivation to win. Steiner et al discovered 
that each person approached the game in a different way, 
sometimes in such a manner as to invalidate the risk 
me a s ur e . 
There were two general patterns, one among males and 
the other among females. A number of the men who appeared 
to be very risky on the basis of the post-test interview 
had adopted very conservative strategies during the risk- 
measurement portion of the test. This was because they had 
been very anxious to behave in what they felt to be a 
rational manner during the testing. And a conservative 
pattern was discovered among females who had appeared to be 
very risky during testing. They had actually become very 
anxious and embarrassed about winning money; four of them 
said they actually tried to lose money because of their 
reluctance to take money from the experimenters. This was 
manifested in their preference for low probability bets. 
This subgroup indicated that they would never agree to play 
such a game in real-life. 
According to Steiner et al there were in fact eight 
people, out of the thirty-six.whose risk-measure from the 
test was grossly abberrant with the risk-measure derived 
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from the interview. When excluded from the original statis¬ 
tical analysis, the risk-measure correlated significantly 
with personality scales of the MMPI. 
C onelusions -- they concluded that the difficulty of 
establishing adequate motivation (ego involvement) in the 
face of diverse attitudes among individuals is responsible 
for the failure of other studies, as well as their own, 
to establish relationships between personality variables 
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and experimental measures of risk-taking. Further, they 
provide support for the structured interview as a method 
of attitude assessment -- a technique, according to Wing 
et al which has been unjustly neglected as it is capable 
of good reliability.^ Although Steiner et al did not 
conduct reliability checks, the interview data did have a 
meaningful pattern, and did conform to the predictions 
made from the hypotheses. 
Miscellaneous Risk-Taking Research 
A number of studies have been initiated in order to 
determine the correlation between risk-taking behavior and 
various personality scales. The ones in this section 
appear to have been random in their selection of person¬ 
ality variables and risk-measures. The absence of 
theoretical guidelines to bring order to some of these 
chaotic studies is very evident. 
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Kogan-Wallach 
Probably the most ambitious of these remaining studies 
was undertaken by Kogan and Wallach in which thirty-three 
major variables were examined. The personality variables 
were quite diverse: scales were used which measured 
rigidity, impulsiveness, independence, confidence, aptitude, 
etc. The risk measures were also quite varied. Prominent 
among them were the choice dilemma instrument described 
in Chapter I, measures associated with gambling choices 
and measures associated with performance in skill games. 
The correlations resulting from this study are generally 
very low, and the few that were statistically significant 
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are difficult to interpret. 
DeCharms-Dave 
A study which is difficult to place within this review 
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was by DeCharms and Dave. One aspect of their investi¬ 
gation was of the achievement motive and its relation to 
risk-taking under special conditions, so it should probably 
have been included in the earlier section. However, the 
major thrust of the research was concerned with risk-taking 
and a personality scale named Hope of Success, Fear of 
Failure, and for this latter aspect it is included in this 
miscellaneous section. 
Elementary school boys were administered the standard 
TAT and TAQ tests — scored for both achievement imagery and 
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the Hope of Success, Fear of Failure scales -- whereupon 
they participated in a risk-measuring game. This consisted 
of shooting a volleyball into a basket. An advantage of 
this study is that individuals went through practice sessions 
alone in order to determine their subjective probabilities 
(skill) for various distances. Another advantage was having 
each person participate in private. These two changes in 
procedure should eliminate skill differences and should 
negate any possible group pressure or social facilitation 
influences. Under these conditions no relationship was 
A fa 
found between risk-taking and need achievement. 
Beyond these results, however, the Hope of Success, 
Fear of Failure test was not very useful in differentiating 
among risk-takers. Persons high on each dimension shot 
more successfully and took more moderate r isks than those 
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low on both dimensions. 
Scodel et al 
In a study already mentioned, Scodel, Ratoosh and 
Minas also used the Hope of Success, Fear of Failure test 
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as one of six measures. The others were: an opinion 
questionnaire, a risk-measure, an intelligence measure, the 
TAT and the A 1lport-Vernon-Lindzey study of values. In this 
study there were two groups, Air Force enlisted men and 
college undergraduates, and their results on these dimensions 
were to be compared. 
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The results of this comparison indicated that expected 
value had negligible influence on betting preferences (this 
was either slightly positive, zero or slightly negative in 
one-third of the trials); the military group selected more 
low probability bets (probability of winning in a dice game) 
intelligence was unrelated to risk-taking; those preferring 
high probabilities scored high on the Fear of Failure scale 
and were higher on need achievement; within the college 
group those preferring low probabilities scored higher on 
the theoretical and aesthetic values and lower on the 
economic, social and political values of the Allport-Vernon- 
Lindzey scale; and, those high in need achievement selected 
intermediate probabilities more often than those low on 
this variable. Scodel et al concluded that high probability 
betters vs. low betters are a more other-directed, socially 
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assimilated and middle-class oriented group. 
0the r s 
And there are several other studies in which nebulous 
results are encountered: Cameron and Myers report incon¬ 
clusive tendencies based upon the administration of the 
Edwards Preference Schedule and a risk-taking game, and 
Anker et al found no relationship between decision-making 
variables and the MMPI to mention just two.^ 
Assessment 
At this point it will be useful to examine the experi¬ 
mental results reviewed so far to see how, and if, they fit 
into a larger scheme. The portrait of the risk-taking 
personality that has emerged from this research is far from 
complete. Indeed there appears to be little more than a 
beginning. There seems to be minimal support for the often- 
stated assumption that risk-taking is a generalized 
personality characteristic, easily aroused and easily 
assessed. If all of the measures utilized in research so 
far are tapping a common dimension then a measure of the 
reliability of this assumption would be reflected in a high 
degree of inter-correlation between the various measures. 
However, this is not the case. 
A study by Slovic attempting to provide evidence about 
such validity by determining whether the in ter-cor re lations 
among several typical risk-taking measures are significantly 
different from zero and sufficiently large to encourage 
further examination.51 Slovic administered a battery of 
risk-taking measures. These measures included instruments 
assessing probability preferences, variance preferences, 
life experiences, job preferences, etc. His results were 
not encouraging. The risk-taking measures did not demon¬ 
strate convergent validity. Slovic concluded that the 
implications of his study for the existence and measurement 
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of a general risk-taking trait are (1) none or only a few 
of the variables analyzed actually measure the trait, or 
(2) willingness to take risks may not be a general trait 
at all, but rather one which varies from situation to 
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situation within the same individual. 
In a later work, Slovic again reviews much of the 
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research on risk-taking behavior. He notes that there 
are enough positive results to encourage the investigator 
to further pursue the notion of risk-taking propensity as 
a general disposition. However, he also notes that a 
large amount of evidence bearing on the convergent validity 
of these methods is negative. He discusses three ideas 
that bear on this fact: the multi~dimensionality of risk, 
the subjectivity of risk, and emotional arousal and risk. 
The first concerns the stimuli that a person in a risk¬ 
taking situation actually sees; the probabilities, values, 
distribution moments, etc. The second is concerned with 
the perception of risk; how do subjective factors such as 
probability and value enter into responses. The third is 
directly related to the hypotheses of Steiner et al concern¬ 
ing optimal levels of arousal and their attainment by seeking 
or avoiding risk. 
These three points deserve some further discussion 
because of their importance naturally, but also because of 
the common element of perception running through them. To 
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an extent, most of the studies reviewed limited themselves 
to gambling situations to exclude much of the difficulties 
raised by perceptual differences. But several problems 
concerning risk and its measurement remain. From one 
direction, risk has not been unambiguously varied in the 
physical data presented to the person. This has already 
been discussed. From the other direction, the person 
perceiving the physical data, what he sees may or may not 
be risky per se even if probabilities and values are 
clearly specified. Since so much of what is seen contains 
meanings completely ascribed by ourselves, by custom and 
usage, by culture, it may very well be that physical 
evidence is perceived as risky or not regardless of 
probability and value. For instance, if a person finds 
himself in a gambling experiment, and if it is made 
perfectly clear to him that he cannot lose money (he is, 
after all, using the experimenter's funds), then for him 
there may or may not be risk in the situation depending 
upon what cues he chooses to attend to. 
That these problems remain to frustrate research is 
underscored by the inconsistency of results from one study 
to the next. The inadequate treatment of risk in the 
various studies is enough to invalidate whatever results 
may be derived from them. And the possibility that risk 
is in the mind of the beholder, that he attends only to 
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those cues he chooses to and ignores the others, deserves 
further discussion. In Freudian terminology and dynamics, 
it is the ego that is responsible for perception and 
reality testing. If this process is incomplete or unreli¬ 
able then there are unconscious reasons for it. This will 
be dealt with in Chapter IV when the role of the unconscious 
in risk-taking is analyzed. 
A Gambling Situation 
To examine what has been learned so far, the reactions 
of a hypothetical person to a typical "risky" gambling 
situation will be attempted. We have been concerned with 
conscious aspects of behavior up to this point; with this 
in mind the physical and psychological setting may be 
developed. 
The Ph ys .ic a 1 
A useful taxonomy of situations does not exist, so the 
best that can be done is to describe the physical objects 
and patterns the individual sees (assuming no misperception 
of physical entities), and how his actions are constrained 
by the dictates of the experimental paradigm. 
This individual, at some time of the day, goes to a 
location where he sees some number of others who are at the 
same place for the same reason. Inside this location there 
is an experimenter and the particular apparatus for assess- 
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ing risk-preference . The experimenter explains as much of 
the procedure as he feels he must to elicit cooperation and 
explains the measurement apparatus to the group. This 
explanation will, at the very least, deal with value won or 
lost, and in some instances will emphasize probabilities of 
winning and losing. The other times will be those in which 
distance, say, is the risk measure and it should be clear 
without explanation that greater distance equals more risk. 
During the risk-preference measurement session the experi¬ 
menter has set forth rules which to a large extent curtail 
choice. These are usually to the effect that each person 
must participate in every trial offered him, the amount of 
the possible bets, hence gains and losses, is tightly res¬ 
tricted, and the kind of bet, hence probabilities, are also 
restricted (the skill tasks are also tightly controlled 
when they are used, but for the purpose of introducing 
procedural uniformity.) The session is conducted during 
which several trials of either skill determined or chance 
determined choices are made. There may or may not be pay¬ 
offs at the end of each trial; the people may or may not be 
playing for money at all. If the sessions are not "imagin¬ 
ary,” then there can be a final payoff at the end after 
which each person pockets his winnings and leaves. 
The Psychological 
To see the psychological side of this experimental 
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setting, let us look at the research utilizing this paradigm 
first, then we may be able to more clearly discern what is 
lacking,at which time a future course may be suggested. 
The research will be taken in the order in which it has 
been reviewed . 
The Theory of Achievement Motivation 
This theory properly applies to skill only or skill/ 
chance situations. The theory does concern situations in 
which the need to achieve success is aroused. But it does 
not specify these situations first of all, nor does it say 
much about the risk-taker -- only that he is low on the need 
to achieve success and is anxious. Furthermore, for all the 
theory says, the risk-taker may be extremely conservative 
instead of extremely risky. But the hypothesized relation¬ 
ships of this theory have been found in chance situations 
also: at times when the achievement motive should not be 
aroused. There are at least two possible reasons for this: 
either one of the assumptions of the theory, Is = 1.0-PS, 
must be relaxed so that incentive is constant for all 
gambles, hence the absolute value of (Ms - Mf) must increase 
monotonically with Pq, or the second explanation, the high 
Mg person somehow believes that he is able to exert control 
over the outcome of the chance-determined situations. 
Actually there is support for this latter explanation: 
Strickland et al observed more cautious betting strategies 
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when the persons under study threw the dice first and then 
bet (they could not see the result until after the bet) 
rather than the other way aroundAnd Cohen contended 
that some form of felt control is often a preferred accom¬ 
paniment of risk-taking, even when the feeling has no 
realistic basis. ^ 
The research Alker conducted, comparing the theory of 
achievement motivation to the Kogan-Wallach rational/ 
irrational variable, does not tell us so much about the 
risk-taker as it does about the ability of the designated 
individual to determine whether or not the strategy he is 
presently employing is feasible in terms of outcomes. It 
must be concluded that there is little in the way of 
explanation of risk-taking behavior to be derived from this 
research. 
Internal Versus External Control 
In a sense this variable considers the problem created 
by the perceived locus of causality. But only to the extent 
that those in the studies were aware of the part played by 
chance. It is true that an internal and an external, or an 
origin and a pawn, to use DeCharm's terms, will behave 
differently no matter what the situation is, be it chance 
or skill determined. It appears that the internal attributes 
too much skill to situations in general, while the external 
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attributes too much chance to them. Just how each will 
behave in either situation is difficult to determine from 
this research, however. The aspect of the Strickland et al 
study just mentioned suggests that in chance-oriented 
situations such as those under investigation it may be the 
internal who plays a little more recklessly when he feels 
that he can have some control over the chance mechanism. 
But even if this were so, and observation in dice games 
certainly seems to support it, there remains the problem 
of arousing the tendency in the laboratory. 
The Arousal Hypothesis 
This research was concerned primarily with the arousal 
of emotion, of attention and interest, and the presumably 
authenticating capacity of the aroused state vis-a-vis the 
genuineness of responses elicited under this condition. 
The effect upon the psychological portrait of the risk-taker 
will be seen in a moment. 
Up to this point it has been emphasized that conscious 
determinants of behavior are being reviewed. This pattern 
must now be modified because of the nature of the responses 
elicited by the MMPI; it is not possible for the personality 
prof ile to be discussed solely in terms of conscious mental 
activity,since the clinical scales are in fact assessing 
reactions along dimensions commonly characteristic of dis¬ 
abling psychological abnormalities. And it is recognized 
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that complete descriptions of these phenomena are possible 
only through consideration of the unconscious workings of 
the m ind . 
The MMPI — this test assesses personality character¬ 
istics on the basis of scores on clinical scales such as 
depression, hysteria, paranoia, etc., and although the 
scales are named according to abnormal manifestations of 
the symptomatic complex, they have all been shown to have 
5 6 
meaning within normal ranges. They were developed by 
contrasting the reactions of seven hundred "normal” 
individuals representing a cross-section of the Minnesota 
population with those of over eight hundred clinical cases 
from the neuropsychiatric division of the University of 
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Minnesota hospitals. The instrument itself comprises 
five hundred-fifty statements covering subject matter 
ranging from the physical condition to the moral and social 
attitudes of the individual being tested. The derivation, 
validation, use and interpretation of the MMPI is a complex 
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matter which will not be attempted here. Its importance 
lies in the fact that it is a reasonably objective, self- 
report test that taps unconscious dimensions by the very 
nature of its construction and scaling categorization. It 
is true that the other personality tests which have been 
mentioned may very well have tapped the same unconscious 
areas, but this has not been considered theoretically and 
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the scale constructions reflect this in their orientation 
toward explanation via consciousness. 
Interpretation -- explaining MMPI profiles is not an 
easy task. It requires an experienced practitioner to 
explain the patterns satisfactorily due to the intercor¬ 
relations among the scales. With this in mind we may 
examine the results from the Steiner et al study to see 
how they add to the psychological picture that is being 
developed. 
They report correlations between their interview 
measure of risk-taking and the MMPI, so in a sense a true 
"profile” is not being examined; the scales may be grouped 
with respect to significantly positive and significantly 
negative corre lations, and these groups may then be 
examined separately for their implications. The scales and 
their correlations are presented in Table 3.1 according to 
strength. 
The positive correlations indicate that the risk-taker 
may be characterized by physiological stability and good 
health, a strong sense of reality, feelings of personal 
adequacy and vitality, a permissive morality and lack of 
ethnic prejudice, emotional outgoingness and spontaneity, 
and intelligence. The negative correlations on the other 
hand indicate that the risk-taker is not cautious (by 
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MM PI Correlations 
Negative Positive 
Correlations Correlations 
(p less than . 001) Caution - 
Psychoasthenia - 
H ys ter ia - 
(p less than .01) Depression Ego Strength 
Social I.E. Ex tr overs ion 
- H ypomania 
(p less than . 05 ) Psychopathic Deviate — 
Masculinity-Femininity - 
Pa r a noia - 
Schizophrenia - 
Introversion 
TABLE 3.1 
definition), psychologically immature, suffering from 
general systemic complaints and hysteria; does not engage 
in compulsive behavior, suffer from phobias or unreasonable 
fears; is not depressed, withdrawn socially and emotionally; 
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nQr is he suspicious and oversensitive. 
Caution -- too much should not be made of these con¬ 
clusions, however, as they are the results of but one study, 
and the risk-measurement procedure was not fully reported 
and so cannot be evaluated. In fact, it is evident that, 
other than the results from this study, little knowledge 
has been gained as a result of the research reviewed. How¬ 
ever, directions for inquiry are indicated. 
122 
Additional Concepts 
There are essentially four additional concepts which 
must be considered besides personality when discussing the 
risk-taking concept. These are: the situation, the per¬ 
ception of risk, ego-involvement and unconscious determinants 
of behavior. 
The Sit ua tion 
First of all it appears to be meaningless to talk 
about the risk-taking personality in situation-free terms. 
This is evident from the lack of support for risk-taking as 
a unitary concept. Apparently there has been enough 
variance in structure within the laboratory experiments to 
allow inconsistencies to develop. This is a characteristic 
of the achievement motive replications under chance condi¬ 
tions, for instance. As a rough first approximation, 
physical and psychological situations may be described as 
either structured or unstructured, ambiguous or unambiguous 
or, in this context, skill and/or chance-determined. It is 
reasonable to assume that different personalities will 
behave differently in each of these dichotomous characteri¬ 
zations; it is hard to imagine the risk-taker, whoever he 
is, being equally risky in a loosely structured chance- 
determined situation and one that is highly structured and 
skill-determined. The question "Who takes risks?" must, in 
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the light of this, be modified to ’’Who takes risks under 
the following conditions...?" 
Per ception 
A second important feature which must be added concerns 
the possibility that risk is partly a psycho logica 1 pheno¬ 
menon, and as such exists in the mind of the beholder, some¬ 
what independently of physical reality. It is true that to 
a degree everyone misperceives the environment within 
which he finds himself, and physical objects may have 
different meanings for any two people; so the problem 
becomes one of discovering why misperceptions occur. In 
this context is the label "risk-taker" so ego-satisfying 
that risk in situations is distorted to fit a self-image? 
Imagine the child who puts on a cape and pretends he is 
superman performing great feats; or the adult who puts on 
driving gloves and imagines he is at LeMans while on the 
city streets. Levinger and Schneider have shown that being 
perceived as a risk-taker has a psychologica1 value in our 
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society. If this is true, then this image may be main¬ 
tained by either taking risks, misperceiving the environ¬ 
ment, or both. It is probably true that people can act in 
accordance with a value system imposed upon them, and which 
contradicts their true feelings. And both Piaget and 
Churchman have argued that what is seen by a person has 
meaning that is largely ascribed, and independent of physical 
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presence. If this is true then risk in a situation may 
certainly be misperceived to suit the individual’s ego needs. 
Ego-Involvement 
A third area of difficulty for these studies is that of 
ego-involvement during the assessment of risk-preference and 
personality. Under what artificial circumstances (laboratory 
experiments) will a person reveal as much of his "true” 
preferences as he is able? And as much of his personality? 
Steiner et al admit the importance of this factor based upon 
the disparate results from their interview and questionnaire 
measures of risk-taking. Allport, and Iverson and Reuder, 
review the concept of ego-involvement;^ the latter work 
considers its importance as an experimental variable and 
concludes that it is quite definitely related to the 
efficacy of responses in experiments, while the former 
discusses the concept from the point of view of a unifying 
"self" -- the true object of psychology. 
Unconscious Motives 
These three points lead to the fourth area for further 
discussion: the unconscious determinants of behavior. 
These mental processes must be included in any complete 
discussion of ego-involvement, the processes of perception 
and reality testing or, in short, the functioning of 
personality. The ego itself is the focal point as it is 
responsible for these processes. That unconscious mental 
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processes exist is hard to deny in the face of the evidence 
6 3 
in its favor i.e. dreams, parapraxes, jokes, etc. 
Clinical evidence has shown that in neurosis the con¬ 
scious and unconscious aspects of mental functioning may be 
in direct conflict. The neurotic gambler, for instance, 
6 
consciously wants to win, but unconsciously needs to lose. 
The consideration and reconciliation of these two sides of 
mental functioning will be attempted in the following 
chapters. Since these four points of the situation, per¬ 
ception, ego-involvement and the unconscious are related 
to a degree, this will shed some light upon the issue of 
risk-taking, by whom, and under what circumstances. 
Summar y 
So, as far as conscious determinants of risk-taking 
behavior are concerned, there is little evidence available 
to fill in the psychological portrait of this personality 
type. Indeed the assumption that there is such a person¬ 
ality type has not received serious support. Several 
theoretical directions were explored within which measures 
of personality were correlated with measures of risk-taking 
propensity. Based upon the review it became obvious that 
what was emerging was not so much a personality type as an 
indication of several factors which must be considered in 
addition to personality. These are: the situation the 
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individual finds himself in; his perception of risk in the 
situation, how he sees the physical data; the degree of 
ego-involvement of the person during testing, how genuine 
are his responses; and finally the unconscious determinants 
of behavior. 
It would be discouraging to have to report the results 
of several major studies in the area of risk and personality 
and conclude that they have been for naught. Such will not 
be the case here; their efforts have made obvious several 
of the problems inherent in the assessment of such an elu¬ 
sive behavioral pattern. Four factors which are still to be 
discussed have been indicated, and these must be combined 
with the conscious determinants of risk-taking behavior for 
a complete theoretical specification of the conditions tinder 
which this behavioral pattern will manifest itself. The 
next chapter will continue this quest with a search for the 
unconscious motivations of risk-taking. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE NEUROTIC RISK-TAKER 
Chapter III ended by observing that theories of risk¬ 
taking that consider an individual's conscious motivations 
for behavior only are inadequate for explanatory purposes. 
Additional points of view are needed. Just as an object is 
more accurately located in three dimensions than in one, so 
the personality of the risk-taker may be defined more com¬ 
prehensively by viewing it from three perspectives instead 
of one. The nature of these perspectives is existential; 
the individual, the "I," is placed in the center of exist¬ 
ence as the ultimate referrent. These are: (1) the intra¬ 
personal, which consists of the purely private realm from 
which meanings and motivations arise, and which can be 
either conscious or unconscious, (2) the interpersonal, 
which relates the "I" to other persons, others whose exist¬ 
ence modifies the reality of personal experience and (3) 
the impersonal, which views the ”1" as one of a set of 
objects. 
These perspectives are complementary; they enable more 
accurate and comprehensive explanations of why a person 
behaves as he does, and hence, why he has the personality he 
does. That is, they allow the integrative consideration of 
a person's conscious and unconscious motives, how they are 
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shaped by his relations with others, and how they are 
affected by his continual interaction with the physical 
envir onment. 
Primarily because the assumption that psychologists 
made concerning risk-taking as a generalized personality 
trait was not supported, the original question of the thesis 
was changed to ’’Who takes risks under the following condi¬ 
tions...?” Psychoanalysis is an important source for a 
partial answer in that it sheds light upon two of the three 
perspectives. It explicitly considers unconscious (intra¬ 
personal) motivations for behavior, and developmental and 
experiential (interpersonal) factors from the period of 
childhood. Furthermore, it has investigated an extreme 
form of risk-taking behavior -- compulsive gambling -- and 
the personality of the neurotic gambler. 
The gambling neurosis has actually received little 
attention in psychoanalytic literature to date, but this 
will undoubtedly change in the near future as more forms of 
gambling are legalized, and as there is an increase in the 
number of chapters of Gamblers' Anonymous. There is not 
necessarily any connection between these two occurrences, 
but legalization does remove barriers to participation; one 
does not have to gamble with the additional fear of detec¬ 
tion. The argument concerning whether or not legalization 
will increase the number of compulsive gamblers is irrele- 
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vant for this thesis, 
seem to indicate that 
question ’’Who becomes 
being asked, however, 
answer s. 
But more important than just answering these questions, 
psychoanalysis must be able to effect cures -- to provide 
new ways of coping with the problems that give rise to this 
symptom -- for those who need them. The difficulties that 
analysts will face in this task are two-fold: the clinical 
evidence accumulated to date on this neurosis is generally 
unavailable, since the case histories are confidential and 
in the analysts' private files, and the theory (the meta¬ 
psychology) encompassing explanation and understanding of 
the dynamics of this neurosis has remained virtually 
unchanged since Freud's time. 
There is nothing that can be done here about the 
inaccessability of the clinical evidence; one suspects after 
reading much of that available, however, that the difficulty 
of translating clinical experience into theoretical terms 
accounts for much of the lack of publication* Anti as far 
as the roc tapsychology is concerned, there have been suggest¬ 
ions that it be scrapped completely as it does not directly 
contribute to the clinical experience* But research can 
run in circles if it is not guided by some fundamental 
although historical evidence would 
illegality is no obstacle.1 The 
a compulsive gambler, and why?" is 
and psychoanalysis is looked to for 
135 
conceptions of the field it studies and the nature of the 
objects that lie within that field. Furthermore, not to 
change the theory is to leave it reigning supreme. 
The separation of psychoanalysis into clinical and 
me tapsychologica1 aspects is a useful procedure for under¬ 
standing the growth of knowledge concerning this particular 
neurosis. Both of these parts have the common historical 
basis of clinical observation. The clinical findings are 
the result of countless man-hours of pat ient/ana 1yst 
contact; they exist independently of the metapsychology, and 
their validity (or lack of it) rests squarely upon their 
clinical value and not on their correspondence to deductions 
from an a priori theory. The metapsychology has its origins 
in clinical analysis also, and Freud intended it to be the 
source for deductions concerning motivations for behavior 
that are not obvious from either observation or psycho¬ 
analysis. Unfortunately, as Freud was working within the 
climate of nineteenth century Newtonian determinism, so his 
theory is rooted in the same philosophy: psychic determin- 
2 
ism is one of his assumptions that reveal this history. 
(According to this assumption, everything that happens in 
the mental sphere follows from some prior occurrence, just 
as the physics of the time held that this same phenomenon 
characterized the physical world.) 
In this chapter the shift in importance from the theo- 
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retical to the clinical will be seen, as the psychoanalytic 
material that is available concerning the gambling neurosis 
is reviewed. The implications of this shift bear directly 
upon and support the primary contention of this thesis: 
there must be viable theory to direct research on this 
behavior, not only for the extreme, the neurotic risk-taker, 
but also the normal. 
The Risk-Taker Defined 
Up to this point in the thesis, a risk-taker has been 
defined in accordance with the dictates of several ad hoc 
risk-preference measures. These dimensions have been, 
variously, probability of winning, variance of outcomes, 
distance from targets, etc. Now, however, a definition will 
be advanced which will be consistantly adhered to through¬ 
out the remainder of the thesis. It is important to note 
first that, although three categories will be named here -- 
risk-taker, non-risk-taker and risk-avoider -- they are 
conceived of as lying on the same dimension; there are 
behavioral criteria for differentiating among them, but 
these merely separate three sections of the same continuum. 
Defining Criteria 
There are three criterion that separate the risk-taker 
from the non-risk-taker. The first condition is a willing¬ 
ness to accept bets (gambles) in which the expected value 
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is clearly not favorable. This is not to say that bets with 
positive expected value will be refused, but that, while 
the non-risk-taker will only choose the latter (if he 
chooses at all), the risk-taker will accept those with a 
negative expected value also. This is not inconsistent with 
the definition of risk given in Chapter II. It is true that 
there can be risk in a gamble with a positive expected value, 
but one who will accept such gambles exclusively is not a 
risk-taker according to this definition. If this were the 
case, then it would, in fact, be difficult to find a non¬ 
risk-taker . 
Along with this first condition, it may be well to 
point out the third term implied: the risk-avoider. The 
risk-avoider is not, be haviorally, in direct contrast with 
the risk-taker . The former categorical label indicates 
that no risk, or at most the absolute minimum possible, will 
be tolerated in preferred alternatives. This term, however, 
will not be of further interest. 
The second condition for the label of risk-taker lies 
in observable long-term behavior: preference for bets with 
unfavorable odds as a usual matter of course. The one-time- 
only better cannot be classified as a risk-taker on just 
this basis. Generally speaking the label should be properly 
reserved for one who habitually gambles. 
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This leads to the third condition: the amount wagered 
by the person who habitually gambles. The person who buys 
a fifty-cent state lottery ticket each week meets the first 
two conditions, but cannot reasonably be called a risk- 
taker. At least not in any meaningful sense of the term; 
that is, he is not in the usual mental image that arises 
whenever it is used, since for most people fifty-cents is 
not important. The amount wagered must be "excessive.” 
This is a difficult thing to determine, as are expected 
value choices, and frequency, in the first two conditions. 
The expected value of a gamble may be calculated easil} , 
but the other moments of the distribution may be different 
for different amounts of risk; the frequency of "habituall\ 
is also open to question. As a first approximation to 
setting definitional limits the best that can be done now 
is to emphasize the extremes, and the interpersonal compar¬ 
ability, of these three criteria which are, atterall, what 
they are ultimately intended for in this thesis. 
The three behavioral criteria that define the risk- 
taker have their origins in, and are entirely consistent 
with, the literature on decision-making under risk and the 
3 
literature concerning the gambling neurosis. To repeat, 
these characteristics are: (1) the willingness to accept 
alternatives (bets) whose expected value is negative, (2) 
the exhibition of this behavior over time as a normal mode 
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of functioning, and (3) the wagering of excessive amounts 
on the outcomes of these gambles. 
Further Criteria 
If either skill or luck happen to favor the individual 
then there is usually no cause for concern. If, however, 
he exhibits some additional behavioral features, then the 
condition may become pathogenic, and if so he is said to 
be a compulsive gambler -- a neurotic. These additional 
features are: (4) gambling precludes all other of his 
interests, (5) he never stops when winning, but continues 
gambling until he loses, (6) he is unable to learn from 
his losses and stop, and (7) he experiences a "pleasurable- 
4 
painful tension," or thrill, during the game. If these 
seven conditions are characteristic, or descriptive, of 
any individual, then his problem has been the subject of 
psychoanalytic inquiry. 
Early Psychoanalytic Discussions 
D os t oe vs k y 
The influence of Fyodor Dostoevsky on the psycho¬ 
analytic theory of the gambling neurosis is enormous. His 
novel The Gambler (1866) is the finest description of 
gambling and the gambler ever written. Furthermore, it is 
important for its autobiographical content; Dostoevsky was 
a compulsive gambler. The large amount of information 
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available concerning Dostoevsky’s childhood, his relation¬ 
ship with his cruel father and frail mother, and the period 
of his life when he was a compulsive gambler, combine with 
the content of The Gambler to form the basis for early 
psychoanalytic discussions of this neurosis. 
The novel was written under extremely difficult circum¬ 
stances: for various reasons Dostoevsky had accumulated 
several debts and was forced by his creditors into accepting 
a commission for a book to be completed on November the 
first, 1866. The penalty for missing this deadline was 
forfeiture of publishing and royalty privileges to all of 
his writing, past and future. As a result of the enormous 
pressure to complete the work -- he wrote it in 26 days -- 
there is a good deal more of himself in it than would 
perhaps normally be the case. 
Dostoevsky wrote The Gambler in the first person, 
dividing it into five sections. In the first section the 
narrator, Alexis Ivanovich, rejoins a group vacationing in 
Roulet tenburg , a fictitious German resort featuring gambling 
and mineral springs. Alexis, well-educated, is a tutor for 
the children of a retired General, ^nd is passionately in 
love with the General’s step-daughter, Polina. The old 
General is himself in love with a Mademoiselle Blanche, a 
woman who loves only money. The General, however, has no 
money and is in debt to a Frenchman named de Grieux. These 
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latter three are anxiously awaiting word of the death of 
the General's aunt whom everyone calls Grandmamma. She is 
very wealthy, and everyone stands to profit from her death; 
but her continued life hold everyone in a state of nervous 
tension. Another principal character associated with this 
group is a wealthy Englishman, Mr. Astley, who is also in 
love with Polina. Who she loves, however, is never made 
clear until the end of the novel. 
Alexis is continually trying to decipher everyone's 
secret involvements. It seems to him that the fate of 
everyone associated with the family (except Mr. Astley) 
depends on Grandmamma's death. The waiting, the discussion, 
the expectation of this, sets the tone for the entire novel. 
Everybody is desperate for something — the General, Blanche 
and de Grieux for money; Alexis a.nd Astley for Polina; and 
Alexis for certainty, for omniscience. In the first section 
this latter is presented in the ambivalent relationship 
between Alexis and Polina as she continually tortures him by 
carelessly flaunting his love for her to the point where he 
is capable of killing both her and himself. As a reward to 
him though, she allows him to question her about anything 
which develops some of the entanglements between the charac¬ 
ters -- but which also drives him further to distraction 
because she never answers his questions to his satisfaction. 
Part two of the novel interrupts the nervous waiting of 
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the party as Grandmamma arrives in Roulettenburg, healthy, 
and ready to play roulette. With Alexis as a guide she 
wins at first, but subsequent times he refuses to accompany 
her, and she eventually loses a huge part of her fortune. 
With this she returns to Russia, and the stage is set for 
the disintegration of the family group. 
Part three details the results of Grandmamma's visit. 
Everyone is stunned, and reacts in different ways: Blanche 
leaves the General, whom Grandmamma threatened to disinherit; 
the General himself is close to a nervous breakdown; Polina 
becomes ill and stays with Alexis for one night, the promise 
of which makes him feel as if he were "struck by lightening." 
He assumes she loves him and in a burst of enthusiasm an 
"impossible idea" takes hold of the young tutor and he rushes 
off to the casinos where, in a fever he begins gambling. 
He cannot lose. Although he plays haphazardly, he 
closes one roulette table after another. He even plays a 
game which he does not understand and wins. During his play 
he is conscious only of a "desire for risk," a desire to 
show the watching crowd that he is impervious to the reck¬ 
less chances he takes by betting huge amounts of money. 
Eventually he comes to his senses, rakes up his winnings 
and returns to Polina at the hotel. After spending the 
night together, he trys to give her enough money to pay her 
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debt to de Grieux, but she throws the money in his face and 
runs out of the room, fleeing to Mr. Astley for protection. 
"Temporary madness," Alexis labels it. 
Everyone in Roulettenburg has heard of his fabulous 
winnings, and Blanche in particular is impressed. She 
invites him to live with her in Paris, and part four of the 
novel describes this episode. 
Blanche is determined to spend his money as fast as 
possible, but Alexis apparently is completely apathetic: 
he even allows her another lover; the only stipulation 
being that she give him no money. The General soon arrives 
also, and at this point he is completely childish; he is 
forgetful, silly, cannot speak coherently, but he still 
looks magnificant in his uniform. And when Grandmamma 
finally dies the General does inherit some money, which 
makes Blanche fond of him once again. She determines to 
marry him and Alexis treats the whole affair as "an idle 
spectator." Alexis' money is gone so he leaves Paris for 
Germany again. 
The concluding section takes place eighteen months 
later. Alexis has gone from one gambling resort to another 
trying to duplicate the winnings of the night when Polina 
came to him. He does not, however, and he chronicles the 
low positions to which he fell trying to earn enough money 
to continue playing. 
Mr. Astley finds him in Hamburg and informs him that 
Polina inherited a large sum from Grandmamma, and is now 
traveling in Switzerland for her health. Although Alexis 
has sunk to a low position, gambling has ruined him, Astley 
tells him that Polina loves him. With this he gives 
Alexis some money and leaves. Alexis now has a revived 
desire to be "restored to life" via the roulette wheel. 
Psychoanalysts, using this book and the biographical 
material, have traced several developmental factors they 
assume to be important in the genesis of this particular 
neurosis. That Dostoevsky was a compulsive gambler, at one 
period in his life, who could not stop until he had lost 
everything has been attested to by himself in his letters, 
and in the diaries of his second wife. That he was a 
neurotic and that this gave rise to his gambling behavior, 
was first postulated by Freud, among psychoanalysts. 
(One key assumption analysts make which is important 
for this thesis is that normal and neurotic individuals 
differ in degree of psychic disequilibrium, not in kind. 
There is a quantitative and not a qualitative distinction 
between the normal and the neurotic gambler. The motiva¬ 
tions for the former may be derived from those behind ihe 
more obvious symptoms of the latters. 
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Freud on Dostoevsky 
7 
Freud wrote "Dostoevsky and Parricide" in 1927. It 
was to be the introduction to the psychological section of 
a biography by Fulop-Miller and Eckstein. He did not 
intend it to be a basis for generalizations about all 
compulsive gamblers, but, unfortunately, it has been taken 
in such a manner by subsequent theorists; a fact which has 
served to restrict theoretical discussions of etiology to 
particular family influences in childhood development. 
Identification 
Nevertheless, Freud utilized available information 
concerning Dostoevsky’s childhood, his relationship with 
his father, and particularly his epileptic attacks, to 
reach some tentative conclusions about his development into 
a compulsive gambler. Dostoevsky’s cruel father contri¬ 
buted greatly to the early seizures; to Freud these were 
significant for their relation to death. They signify an 
identification with someone who is either dead, or is 
wished dead: they also have value to this person because 
of their punishment factor -- "you wish someone were dead, 
now you are that someone and you are dead." In the case of 
a young boy it is usually the father who is the object of 
o 
the death wish. As for the guilt and punishment of such a 
wish, Freud has commented elsewhere on both the status of 
146 
parricide as the principal crime of humanity and its posi- 
9 
tion as the major source of these feelings. 
Continuing, the relation of a boy to his father is an 
ambivalent one: on the one hand there is a good deal of 
natural affection and tenderness, and on the other the father 
is hated because he is the barrier to the son's possession 
of his mother. According to Freud, the two attitudes com¬ 
bine to produce identification with the father -- the boy 
wants to be in his father's place first of all because he 
likes him, and secondly because he wants to possess his 
mother. The boy eventually realizes, however, that an 
attempt to remove his father would result in an extreme 
punishment -- one that he feels will be castration. And so 
he gives up the Oedipal wish; but insofar as it remains 
unconscious, it forms a basis for the sense of guilt. So 
far this is considered normal. 
Bisexuality 
When the constitutional factor called bisexuality is 
also fairly strong in a child, there is a further threat to 
his developing masculinity. He seeks to put himself in his 
mother's place and take over her role as the object of his 
father's love. But he would have to be castrated to do this, 
and fear makes this alternative impossible. Thus two 
impulses, hatred of the father and being in love with his 
father, undergo repression. Of the two, the former is 
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considered normal; it becomes pathogenic with the addition 
of the second factor, and hence, becomes a reinforcement 
for neurosis. 
Such a disposition must certainly be assumed in 
Dostoevsky, and it shows itself in a viable form 
(as latent homosexuality) in the important part 
played by male friendship in his life, in his 
strangely tender attitude toward rivals in love 
and in his r emarkable understanding of situations 
which are explicable only by repressed homo¬ 
sexuality, as many examples from his novels shows. 
(Freud, 1927, p.185.) 
From Reality to Psyche 
Identification with the father makes a permanent place 
for itself in the ego. It establishes itself as a separate 
agency in contrast to the rest of the ego, and is called 
the super-ego. It is the inheritor of the parental influ¬ 
ence; it assumes the conscious relationship between the 
parent and child and continues this unconsciously between 
itself and the ego. As the parent is cruel and the child 
submissive, so the super-ego becomes sadistic and the ego 
masochistic. Freud comments on the development in this case: 
A great need for punishment develops in the ego, 
which in part offers itself as a victim to Fate, 
and in part finds satisfaction in ill-treatment 
by the super-ego (that is, in the sense of guilt.) 
For every punishment is ultimately castration and, 
as such, a fulfillment of the old passive attitude 
toward the father. Even Fate is, in the last 
resort, only a later projection of the father. 
(Freud, 1927, p.185.) 
The relationship between Dostoevsky and his father was, 
then, transformed into a relationship between his ego and 
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his super-ego. The early epileptic symptoms, the result of 
father-identification , and subsequent guilt feelings, are 
now carried on unconsciously: for the ego the death symptom 
is a satisfaction in fantasy of the masculine wish, and at 
the same time a masochistic satisfaction; and for the super¬ 
ego it is a punitive, a sadistic, satisfaction.^ 
These psychic reactions to the Oedipal and bisexual 
tendencies may actually disappear if reality gives them no 
reinforcement, but for Dostoevsky the father became more 
cruel and was eventually murdered. It was then, when the 
mental fantasy became physical reality, that the epileptic 
attacks became especially severe. 
After this shattering episode, Dostoevsky’s neurosis, 
and sense of guilt, took on tangible shape as a large 
burden of debts. The forced writing of The Gambler to 
alleviate this condition was part of it. He was in Germany 
at the particular time that his gambling mania surfaced, an 
activity which had several rationalizations for its pursual. 
Dostoevsky admitted that in spite of his debts, however, the 
12 
chief thing was gambling itself -- le je u pour le j e u. 
He never stopped until he had lost everything, punishment in 
itself, and when he was reduced to poverty he felt that he 
so humiliated himself in his wife's estimation that this was 
another source of punishment -~ a pathological satisfaction. 
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Remar ks 
Freud's comments in the short introduction merely 
expose the tip of the massive iceberg of psychoanalytic 
theory that is directly relevant to a complete explanation 
of the unconscious motives, and their development, in 
Dostoevsky the compulsive gambler. It was not written for 
a technically knowledgeable audience, and so contains almost 
no mention of the instincts, energy transference, defense 
mechanisms, etc. These details may be added by any psycho¬ 
analyst with little difficulty, however. A noticeable 
feature of the paper is its dependence upon the case history 
of one individual: material drawn from written records 
which cannot be questioned as can an individual. It is true 
that this was written for a study of Dostoevsky and so only 
one person was analyzed. But what makes it noticeable is 
the place reserved for it in the psychogenesis of the 
gambling neurosis. Freud admitted at the end of the intro¬ 
duction that most of the views he had expressed were 
contained in Dostojewski, A Psycho-Analytical Sketch , 
13 
written by Neufeld in 1923. Even the major themes of bi¬ 
sexuality and the Oedipal complex, along with the processes 
of iden t if icat ion and super-ego for.mation were not new with 
this paper -- he was in his seventies when he wrote it -- 
but it is a tribute to him as a theorist, and to the psycho¬ 
analytic concepts involved, that this explanation appeared 
to be valid and was accorded such a position. 
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Freud*s Predecessors 
There are other theorists who have discussed this 
particular neurosis; whether they have written before or 
after 1927 makes little difference, however, their milieu 
is Freudian. The clinical aspects of his discussion have 
been valid, at least for descriptive purposes, for other 
compulsive gamblers. 
In 1914, von Hattinberg concluded from his analysis 
that the fear inherent in the risk taken by gamblers is 
eroticized. This is derived from a period in infancy when 
the pleasures associated with urethral-anal strivings was 
denied in a manner that engendered "pleasure in fear,” or 
masochism.^ An earlier, 1915, study by Freud may also be 
mentioned: he described criminals as persons who are 
driven to crime by unconscious guilt, and who seek relief 
by being punished, thus rationalizing and relieving their 
guilt by connecting it with reality.^ It is possible to 
derive the masochistic and guilt factors present in the 
gambler's combat with fate from these two articles. The 
erotic feelings give rise to guilt, unconsciously, and so 
the person must question fate to see if he is to be either 
"caught” or expiated; losing and winning are the physical 
referrents. 
Simme1 discussed this theme in 1920.Based on the 
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analysis of one patient, he argued that gambling is an 
expression of the pregenital (anal), sadistic libido. That 
is, there is a narcissistic preoccupation with anal fantas¬ 
ies, and the wish to replace both father and mother (bisex¬ 
uality). He further described the passion as auto-erotic 
(masturbative ) : gambling represents forepleasure ; winning -- 
orgasm; losing -- ejaculation, defecation and castration. 
He thought that should gambling lead to crime, then the 
Oedipal factor must be assumed, because the person is seek¬ 
ing punishment from the (father) state. Simme1 added the 
onanistic factor to the general theory. (Freud emphasized 
it in his 1927 introduction by referring to the short 
story by Stefan Zweig, "Four-and-Twenty Hours in a Woman’s 
Life.") Everything in Simme1’s analysis must have been 
known by Freud, and was, in any event, covered in his intro¬ 
duction to the Dostoevsky biography. 
Later Freudian Theorists 
Freud’s (and Simmel’s) studies shifted analytical 
emphasis directly onto the conflicts of the Oedipal phase 
of development in the search for etiology. Later analysts 
have chosen to emphasize various aspects of this conflict. 
Generally they are related to the unconscious role of fate 
as a father figure, and the residual childhood feelings of 
omnipotence that fate has tended to reinforce. These feel¬ 
ings are the result of incomplete ego-synthesis, in the 
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particular areas that chance governs, as the child develops 
from relying on the pleasure-principle to a reliance on the 
reality-principle. The youth feels that there are areas in 
which the reality-principle, or reality itself, does not 
follow the rules that his parents tell him govern existance. 
So challenging fate is a direct expression of the Oedipal 
rebellion. This, when true, brings the conflict into more 
conscious apprehension than the completely unconscious 
conflict postulated by Freud. Nevertheless, these later 
analysts stay well within his framework. 
An article by Laforgue in 1929 contributed to the under¬ 
standing of the gambler's intense sexual excitement (the 
"pleasurable-pa infu1 tension") during moments of extreme 
17 risk and danger. His thesis is that anxiety can become a 
substitute for unconscious sexual gratification; this has 
the double effect of affording pleasure to the id, and 
allowing the super-ego a means of punishing the ego. The 
anxiety while awaiting fate's answer to a challenge (or 
question) facilitates the sadistic and masochistic pleasures 
18 
Freud used in describing Dostoevsky. 
A 1931 study of Paul Morphy by Jones verified the 
Oedipal conflict.Although chess has a good deal more 
skill than chance involved in it, it could still be some¬ 
what of a question to fate with each game. Jones believed 
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that Morphy’s extraordinary talent for chess sprang from a 
sublimation of his Oedipal aggression.^ 
In 1938 Kris, referring to Freud's introduction, 
emphasized the relationship between masturbation and 
gambling -- the play in each -- and postulated that the 
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sexual excitement from gambling released inner tensions. 
These tensions are of an erotic nature too, but the play 
element is missing. Under intense pressure then, the ego, 
unable to control what it initiated, reaches for the 
reassurance of winning. This grasping changes the gambling 
from a playful pastime to a matter of life and death. 
Reik, in 1942, also attempted to extend Freud's com- 
2 2 
ments a little further. He emphasized the questioning 
aspect of gambling: is the son forgiven by the father for 
his trespasses? Good or bad luck again stand for the 
answers. In 1945 Fenichel, classifying gambling among the 
2 3 
impulse neuroses, added nothing new. He emphasizes the 
anal, masturbative, self-punishment and parricidal (Oedipal) 
themes and underlines Reik's point that gambling is a 
question against fate. 
The Separation of Theory and Clinical Practice 
So far all of the analysts mentioned have been attempt¬ 
ing, with little success, to expand the Freudian hypotheses 
while staying within his framework. The only one who based 
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his discussion upon observation of a gambler was Simme1. 
The next group of analysts to be reviewed begin to break 
away from purely theoretical discussions of the neurosis, 
and add clinical observations to their reports. The 
Freudian language and me tapsychology is retained, but now 
a description of the physical referrents of the terminology 
is included; the language used is the language of experi¬ 
ence as the patient has lived it. There are two parts in 
most of the analytical studies now: a me tapsychological and 
a phenomeno no logica 1 . The former continues in the old 
tradition, while the latter assumes more of the burden of 
description. This shift, or split, in emphasis was not 
characteristic of psychoanalysis in general: clinical 
studies from the field had been published since Freud began 
his work, but the gambling theorists stayed largely within 
this theoretical mold. 
The Influence of Bergler 
Edmund Bergler is almost completely responsible for 
the change in emphasis in the study of this neurosis. His 
articles and case studies have influenced subsequent 
analysts to a great degree. His views are set out in two 
articles and two books, and are all present in his last 
_ . 24 
work, The Psychology of Gambling. 
The most intriguing idea Bergler advances is that the 
ne ur o t i c gambler has an unconscious wish to lose. The main 
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thrust of his last book is toward the substantiation of this 
claim. He postulates that this wish has its origins in the 
2 5 
child's feeling of omnipotence. 
Childhood Omnipotence 
The only world the child knows is one over which he 
has complete control. The misconeeption is fostered, and 
nurtured, by his parents who attempt to satisfy his every 
need. For the child the p le as ur e-pr inc ip le is a reality- 
principle. But as he matures he learns that there is a 
reality outside of, and unresponsive to, his wishes and 
commands. Experience convinces him that he cannot change, 
and hence must cope with a good deal of what reality is 
becoming for his world. The pleasure-principle becomes 
part of the dynamically repressed, and he then functions 
according to the reality-principle. Bergler claims, how¬ 
ever, that there is one area in which the reality-principle 
has no advantage over its repressed counterpart: gambling. 
"There blind chance rules, chance which in games of 'pure' 
gambling cannot be influenced by logic or intelligence." 
(Bergler, 1957, p.18. ) 
Gambling, or a chance-oriented situation, revives the 
childhood fantasy of omnipotence. And, Bergler claims, 
this activates the latent rebellion against logic, intelli¬ 
gence, moderation, morality and renunciation. The pleasure- 
principle, never entirely relinquished, revolts against 
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these concepts implanted by his parents. This aggression, 
however, brings heavy retaliation as an unconscious feeling 
of guilt. It is this which Bergler claims in responsible 
for the unconscious need to lose -- losing is penance for 
the aggression 
Dynamics of the Wish to Lose 
And so the psychic situation is as follows: unconscious 
aggression against, in essence, reality; unconscious guilt 
because of the aggression against precepts learned from 
parents; and finally, the unconscious need to lose as pun¬ 
ishment for the transgression. In neurotics, aggression is 
2 7 
always paid for by some form of self -punishment . The 
concept of neurosis is based on the unconscious transfer 
of conflicts with the parents to conflicts with surrogates. 
Since aggression toward the parents was forbidden, so too 
is that directed toward the surrogates; if the aggression 
is performed then the need for seIf-pun ishment arises. 
Psychic Masochism 
Furthermore, Bergler asserts that the gambler’s rebel¬ 
lion represents a superficial level of his neurosis: at 
bottom is the condition of psychic masochism. This is 
described by the unconscious desire for defeat, humiliation, 
2 8 
rejection and pain. It is a mechanism first set in motion 
in childhood when the youth faces a refusal challenging his 
sense of omnipotence, and reaches its final form in adult- 
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hood when the disproving voices have been internalized into 
the super-ego. As an end result psychic masochists continu¬ 
ally construct situations in which they can be refused, 
rejected or humiliated. This is done in three stages: first 
he (unconsciously) provokes a situation in which he is 
defeated, rejected or denied; second he (consciously and 
unaware of the provocation) strikes out in righteous indigna¬ 
tion; and third follows the (conscious) self-pity. "Fate 
has handed him a raw deal." The adversary in this process, 
whether it be a roulette wheel or the stock exchange, is 
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always unconscionsly identified with the refusing parents. 
Fate becomes the parent (unconsciously) and all of the 
conflicts may be carried on at both levels of consciousness: 
against the chance mechanism consciously and against the 
parent, or super-ego, unconsciously. 
Clinical Emphasis 
The language that Bergler uses in his books and articles, 
although not strictly me tapsycho logica1, is but one step 
removed from it, and that toward the language of experience. 
He also relies a good deal on literary quotations in his 
works to first of all, pay tribute to poets and artists, as 
they were in his opinion the first to communicate under¬ 
standing of the neurosis involved, and secondly as a persua¬ 
sive tactic directed toward those who will not believe a 
30 
point made by a scientist, but will believe the writer. 
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But more importantly he relies a great deal upon clinical 
evidence. Over half of P s yc holo g y is clinical excerpts, 
all of which, naturally, buttress his theoretical views. 
His important contribution is the explanation of 
observed behavior in gambling neurotics: why they continue 
to play until they have lost everything. It may not be so 
much that they want to lose as it is that they must continu¬ 
ally question fate, however. Given the statistical proper¬ 
ties of gambling, it is extremely likely that anyone who 
plays for long periods as these neurotics do, will lose. If 
the need to challenge fate is stronger than the need for 
penance by losing, then this alone will almost guarantee 
(statistically) that they play until they will lose every¬ 
thing. The observable behavior is the same in either case, 
but if the money is really unimportant, then the latter 
explanation could be just as valid as Bergler’s. 
Subsequent Effects 
Analysts writing after 1943 show an obvious debt to 
Bergler. They have, first of all, accepted his position 
that the neurotic gambler has an unconscious wish to lose, 
and they rely more heavily upon the presentation of case 
histories. In addition they are writing, and describing, 
these histories in non-metapsychological terms. The theory 
is therej'it can be readily followed, but is not continuous 
throughout the reports as the analysts are not translating 
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the experiential language into theoretical terms where it 
is of little value for their immediate needs. 
In 1946 Greenson gave a very good description of the 
observable habits, customs and patterns found while watching 
gamblers. This covered the dynamic, latent homosexual, 
aggressive/death and superstitious features that any careful 
observer could detect. But his analysis probed much deeper; 
a depth possible because of his analysis of five compulsive 
gamblers. He emphasized two crucial elements essential to 
the etiology of the gambling neurosis: the feeling of luck 
and the hope that the gambler will be rewarded every time, 
3 1 
and the need to test or challenge luck (or fate). 
In his subsequent analysis of these two factors he 
stays entirely within previous theoretical limits. The feel¬ 
ing of luck is a derivative of the childhood omnipotence, 
and the need to challenge, or test this luck, is a derivative 
of the Oedipal conflict. However, based upon the analyses 
of his patients he argued that the gambler’s confrontation 
with fate could be one of two kinds: a challenge if fate 
is the father, or a wooing if fate is the mother. "In the 
patients I had occasion to analyze, the figure of luck was 
determined by the specific emotional conflicts of the 
patients which were in the foreground at the moment.” 
(Greenson, 1946, p.70.) He gives several clinical examples 
where fate assumed either or both (at different times) 
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figures. His conclusions are repetitive, and he adds that 
a prognosis for the cure of this disorder that is not 
favorable. 
The case history of one patient, reported by Lindner 
in 1950, is as good an example of this neurosis in its 
living form as is Dostoevsky's example in the litefary 
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form. All of the details conform to the theory that has 
developed so far, giving it the distinction of being one of 
the few "pure" cases of this neurosis reported. The major 
themes are present: the Oedipal conflict with a hated 
father; the masturbative component, linked in this case 
to childhood enuresis, a tactic the patient used to his 
advantage in the Oedipal conflict; the father's death and 
subsequent unconscious guilt feelings in the patient; and 
finally, the gambling, precipitated by the return of the 
patient’s mother -- the object of his incestuous desires. 
Lindner adds to what was known already: first, that gambling 
appears to serve similar purposes for the neurotic as does 
alcoholism and drug dependence for these addicts, which is 
to continue to prolong, or retreat to, a state in which 
infantile, pre-causal, patterns of dealing with reality may 
operate; and second, he argues against Fenichel's placement 
of gambling among the impulse neuroses. More properly, 
Lindner claims, the gambler should be classified with the 
obsessional neurotics -- those engaged in what might be 
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called the making of magic. The third remark that he makes 
is that it appears that the gambler must both win and lose. 
If he wins his omnipotence is proved and his incestuous 
desires are condoned, but guilt arises as he is guilty of 
parricide; if he loses he is relieved of the guilt of his 
wishes, but he must expose himself to the penalty for 
having them, and further, he must forfeit the feelings of 
omnipotence. For his sanity he must win and lose. 
Lindner suggested that gambling, as the manifestation 
of a neurotic condition, may exist relatively rarely in 
its pure form. More often it is linked to alcoholism and 
drug dependence as the three seem to satisfy the same needs. 
This is given some support by Galdston in a 1951 paper in 
which he presented case histories of three types: an 
alcoholic, a gambler and a prostitute.^ In each of these 
cases he believes the behavior is explicable on the assump¬ 
tion that they have retained within their psychic mechanisms 
the early pre-causal patterns of comprehending, and dealing 
3 5 
with, reality and experience. He focuses on the omni¬ 
potence, the pleasure-principle, and the vagaries of fate 
as a punishing and/or rewarding figure. 
And finally, Stekel in 1958 and Harris in 1964 present 
several more case histories of the etiology and description 
of this neurosis. ° To report them would be repetitive. 
162 
Suffice it to say that they support Bergler's position with¬ 
out adding anything new to our understanding of ’’Who takes 
risks?” 
Analytic Difficulties 
Several points have been raised in this review: the 
increasing distance between psychoanalytic theory and 
clinical practice; the emphasis of both, however, upon 
childhood experiences in etiology; and the relationship 
between the modes of functioning of the neurotic and the 
normal gamblers. These three observations are related to 
a large degree, not so much in their present conditions as 
in the future conditions which might begin to alleviate 
some of the difficulties of the present trends and thoughts. 
If the first trend continues the result will be an 
uncoordinated collection of psychoanalytic findings on the 
one hand, and a disembodied theory concerning the human 
psyche on the other. If the second trend, or orientation, 
is to prevail, then it will, by de-emphasizing the impor¬ 
tance of current experience as it is lived, discredit the 
idea that man has the ability to make meaningful choices, 
and will further the notion of psychic determinism. This 
latter may be summarized in its extreme form by saying that 
man has a biology but not a history. Both of these points 
bear somewhat upon the third observation: the question of 
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whether or not there is a qualitative distinction between 
the normal and the neurotic individual. 
Freedom-Determinism 
The first two of these existing trends are treated at 
o n 
length in a major work by Yankelovich and Barrett. An 
important contention of their book is that there is a clear 
need to reformulate the psychoanalytic theory of human 
nature. This is based upon their belief that man has both 
biological roots and a history (culture). In their book 
they navigate a course between two currently prevailing 
opinions; that of Sartre, the existentialist, who believes 
that man controls his own destiny by free will and his own 
choices, and that of Levi-Strauss , the anthropologist, who 
sees an inexorable determinism, culminating in the entropy- 
3 8 
burnout death of man. Yankelovich and Barrett claim 
that man is both of these positions to a degree. In their 
belief they present a new psychoanalytic core based upon 
the existential decisions, as well as the instincts, of 
man. The implications of their reformulation of psycho¬ 
analysis for the trend of clinical and theoretical separa¬ 
tion, and for the emphasis upon psychic determinism and 
childhood-oriented determinants, are made clear in their 
excelient book. 
Normal-Neurotic 
The third problem is given little attention by them, 
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however. Freud, and subsequent analysts writing on this 
neurosis, claim that the motivations found in the neurotic 
gambler are also present in the normal: the psycho¬ 
pathology is merely more vivid in the former case. And, 
if one accepts the Freudian metapsychology, then there 
will be no disagreement. The observable behavior of gambling 
until everything is lost, the endless promises to quit that 
are always broken; these belong to the gambling counterpart 
of the better known alcoholic. The psychic concepts and 
conflicts deemed important in the etiology — the Oedipal 
conflict, the harsh parent, masturbation, omnipotent feel¬ 
ings, incestuous desires, etc. -- are found in everybody 
according to Freud. The important point for normal behavior 
is the ability to operate by the reality-principle, however, 
and not in accordance with the wishes of the dynamically 
repressed unconscious. This orientation provides a descrip¬ 
tion of the psychic and observable characteristics of 
gamblers in general, but we are at a loss to explain why, 
and when, a person becomes pathogenic in his symptoms. 
On the other hand, if one questions Freudian psychic 
determinism, and believes that first of all it is possible 
that these could be either random occurrences of thoughts in 
the unconscious, or probability distributions across 
motivating thought processes, and further, that current 
experience is just as important, in and of itself, as child- 
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hood experiences, then the present psychoanalytic theory 
concerning "Who takes risks?" must be revised. Further¬ 
more, the theory must be revised based upon its inadequacy 
for the normal gambler. Since the normal and neurotic may 
still be assumed to be similar in motivation, a theory of 
risk-taking must be able to identify, if not specific 
situational variables, then general conditions for the 
arousal of this behavior. 
Gamble-Not Gamble 
None of the analysts reviewed indicate why a person 
who has nothing more than the presumably normal predis¬ 
positions already mentioned becomes neurotic. Bergler is 
the only one who mentions the issue when he says that 
"the gambling activity triggers the latent feelings of 
omnipotence." The metapsychology does nothing to shed 
light upon this point either: there is actually no reason 
to expect it to, as it considers childhood experiences to 
be the important de te-rminant s of adult neurotic behavior. 
So any experientail factor would be carried back to its 
childhood psychic referrent. The contentions of Yankelovich 
and Barrett, and the existentialists, that man has a history, 
and that experience is reacted to in all of its immediacy 
must be considered. It may be true that as one analyst 
said, "We are all potential gamblers," but to expect this 
potentiality to spontaneously emerge "fully armed” and 
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completely independent of the life-space of the individual, 
is intolerable. The invaluable contribution that psycho¬ 
analysis can make is in the search for the reasons why some 
people take risks and others do not, even though the factors 
important in etiology, such as the Oedipal conflict and 
unconscious guilt, are present in everyone. 
Summar y 
The risk-taker is defined by his theoretical preference 
for bets, or gambles: he will accept bets with a negative 
expected value, while a non-risk-taker will not. This does 
not mean that gambles with positive expected value do not 
contain risk, rather it is a convenient division which is 
characteristic of the real-world gambling situations which 
this thesis is confined to, and within which the behavior 
:i s found. 
The neurotic, the compulsive gambler is an extreme 
'risk-taker: his behavior is so extreme as to be self- 
destructive. Seven descriptive characteristics were given: 
(1) his willingness to gamble, (2) gambling is a normal mode 
of his existing, (3) he wagers excessive amounts during 
gambling, (4) gambling precludes all other of his interests, 
(5) he gambles until he eventually loses everything, (6) he 
is unable to stop, and (7) he experiences a unique "thrill" 
when gambling. 
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The conclusions psychoanalysis reaches about the 
etiology of his behavior are important for identifying the 
unconscious motives of risk-takers. Since the normal and 
neurotic gambler are differentiated by degree and not by 
kind, these conclusions may be applied to risk-takers in 
general. These conclusions, however, are limited to a 
particular way of viewing behavior: clinical evidence is 
(presumably) translated into (theoretical) psychic repre¬ 
sentations of instincts derived from human nature and child¬ 
hood experiences. As long as the Freudian me tapsychology 
remains dominant this will be true, but more frequently 
analysts are retaining the language of experience in their 
reporting, experience as it applies to the lives of their 
patients. As this recent trend continues, on the one hand 
clinical usage will move toward an existential position 
emphasizing the relevancy of immediate experience, and on 
the other the theory will become a disembodied relic of 
another time. The dangers for the theory are obvious, but 
the dangers for clinical practice are equally real— a 
method of investigation with as many theories as there are 
theorists. 
To more fully understand this particular form of 
behavior and to be able to identify more of the important 
characteristics of the risk-taker, both conscious and 
unconscious determinants of this behavior must be considered. 
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The three perspectives mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter will be the guiding structure of the next in order 
to explicate the motives for both normal and neurotic risk¬ 
taking. To remain with conscious explanations has proven 
useless with neurotics: to remain with unconscious explana¬ 
tions for normal gamblers may prove equally useless. While 
the neurotic may feel guilt if winning and relief if losing, 
this is most certainly not the case for the normal gambler. 
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CHAPTER V 
A THEORY OF RISK-TAKING 
Chapters II, III and IV reviewed a large portion of the 
scientific literature concerned with defining risk, and with 
defining, and explaining, risk-taking behavior in terms of 
personality characteristics. The purpose of this chapter is 
-to synthesize the material reviewed into a theoretical frame¬ 
work that may incorporate the existing research, and suggest 
directions for further inquiry. 
A C ompa ris on 
One of the immediate difficulties facing this objective 
stems from the diverse nature of the theoretical disciplines 
'reviewed: experimental psychology, and psychoanalysis. A 
-discussion of the different modes of theorizing will help 
place the subsequent steps of formulating a theory of risk 
and personality into their proper perspective; the framework 
that will eventually be suggested is influenced to a great 
degree by the incorporation of these diverse views of human 
nature . 
Psychology 
Experimental psychology is committed to definitions of 
concepts, and theories of behavior, that are amenable to 
large-scale testing, and independent replication. Universal 
knowledge, free of individual experimenter bias, and the 
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empirical methods necessary to accomplish this, are empha¬ 
sized. The purpose of theory in this discipline is to 
specify important variables, their inter-relations, methods 
of measurement, and methods of testing and evaluating. 
The two principal differences between experimental 
psychology and psychoanalysis for this thesis lie first in 
their definitions of personality, and second in their ways 
of determining personality characteristics for specific 
individuals. Psychology, because of its method of testing, 
emphasizes definitions of personality that do not attempt to 
encompass the whole person, but that do give indications of 
generalized behavioral tendencies. For example, the 
Internal/External scale developed by Rotter (reported on 
p.96 of this thesis) is intended to indicate differences in 
tendencies, not life-styles. The experimental method of 
assessing these tendencies has been mentioned (pp.10-12), 
and in contrast to the manner by which psychoanalysis 
approaches validation, it is a relatively quick, simple 
pr oc edur e . 
Psychoana lysis 
This discipline considers personality in the fullest 
sense of the term, meaning how it relates to the individual's 
entire mode of existing. (This use of personality was 
reported on pages 12-13.) In this sense personality is what 
a person is, and what a person is, is determined, for psycho- 
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analysis, by what he does; hence behavior at its most basic 
core -- the unconscious motives for acting -- are considered 
crucial. Since these elements are unconscious, the analyst, 
in order to be able to say anything meaningful about the 
individual, must spend a number of hours in intimate verbal 
contact with him. There is a close one-to-one association 
that is essential to creating the transference of successful 
therapy. In contrast to psychology, different analysts, 
from different schools, may interpret individual behavior 
within the same contexts, in different ways. The individual 
analyst is very much a part of his analysis; this is opposed 
to the aim of psychology of completely separating experi¬ 
menter effects from research efforts. 
Implications 
As mentioned, the difficulty for this thesis arises 
because these disciplines view behavior from different 
perspectives, for different purposes, and in different 
theoretical languages. Psychology is concerned with valida¬ 
tion free from philosophical bias; its language is that of 
an experimental-statistical perspective. Psychoanalysis is 
concerned with freeing individuals of crippling neurotic 
symptoms; its (clinical) language is expressive of behavior 
as it is lived by the individual. 
A point of view, no matter how scientific, is still a 
point of view, and identical behavioral phenomenon may be 
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interpreted differently by each, without necessarily being 
incorrect. It becomes a problem only when a larger perspec¬ 
tive, encompassing more than one method of theorizing is 
attempted. An example of the problem for this thesis -- 
compare the reasons the two disciplines suggest for gambling: 
psychology postulated that the individual’s level of arousal, 
or his need achievement, or his perceived locus of causality 
are important; psychoanalysis would emphasize unconscious 
guilt arising from the Oedipal conflicts, or feelings of 
omnipotence. Psychology would insist that the gambler wants 
to win; some psychoanalysts would insist that he wants to 
Hose. Both may be correct for their purposes. 
In many ways the theoretical viewpoints of psychology 
and psychoanalysis are antithetical as currently conceived. 
Each of them may presently satisfy limited curiosity on the 
subject of risk-taking separately, but the object of this 
thesis is to contain them within a larger view without 
necessarily making that view a procrustean bed for either. 
How this will be accomplished follows a review of the 
material to be incorporated. 
The Material Reviewed 
This section will consider the essential aspects of the 
material presented in the previous chapters. This material, 
and the implicit assumptions concerning risk-taking, are the 
building blocks for the theory. 
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From Psychology 
From this point of view there are essentially two lines 
to follow: the nature and definition of risk, and its 
measurements; and the various definitions of personality, 
and their assessment. The first is crucial, since without 
adequate definition and manipulation of risk, the correla¬ 
tions with personality characteristics may be invalid. 
Risk 
The entire of Chapter II discussed the definition and 
measurement of risk. These were presented chronologically, 
and from the simplest to the most complex in terms of the 
components assumed important. Risk was related to expecta¬ 
tion by Edwards and others in Chapter I (pp.4-5), but the 
entire utility theory approach was not pursued for several 
reasons. In Chapter II, risk was related to variance by 
several people: Allais and Fisher (p.51); Lichtenstein, 
Littig, Royden et al, Van der Meer, and Coombs and Pruitt 
Cp.52); and Slovic and Lichtenstein (pp.53-54 ). It was 
also related to skewness considerations by Coombs and 
Pruitt (pp.53-54 ), and to a linear combination of expected 
value and variance by Pollatsek and Tversky (pp.53-54). 
The experimental method of these studies consisted of: 
presenting paired choices of two-outcome gambles (a win, and 
a lose alternative); requiring choices to be made in terms 
of personal preference among each pair; and analyzing the 
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data with respect to the crucial probability distribution 
c ompone n ts. 
In the research of Chapter III there were essentially 
two measures of risk utilized: the research dealing with 
need achievement and risk assumed that distance from a 
target was an adequate measure; in the research concerned 
with the other major personality scales, probability alone 
was considered sufficient. In the former area, studies by 
McClelland (pp.83-86) and by Alker ( pp . 9 0-92) f or instance, 
stated that the greater the distance from a target, the 
more the risk involved for that individual. In the latter 
area, the studies by Liverant and Scodel (pp.97-99) and 
Strickland et al (pp.99-101) used the winning probability in 
a dice game as a measure: the lower this number, the 
greater the risk, and vice versa. This same measure was 
used by Kogan and Wallach (p.108) in their study, and also 
by Scodel et al (pp.109-110) in which they were correlating 
this measure with various personality scales. 
Personality 
As stated, definitions of personality indicate tenden¬ 
cies, and not basic behavioral patterns. In Chapter III, 
these were reviewed under three broad class ifications. The 
first was that encompassing research suggesting that indivi¬ 
duals who have a high need to achieve success will prefer 
moderate risk, while those who do not have this need (to 
such a degree) will prefer either very low, or very high, 
risks. Risk was defined for these studies as preferred 
distance from targets. 
The second classification contained research relating 
risk-taking propensities to the individual’s perception of 
the degree of control he has over his own fate. The 
personality scale developed by Rotter (p.96) indicates 
behavioral tendencies based on the perception of past rein¬ 
forcement. The measures of risk that were correlated with 
personality were again related to probability in dice games 
(p p.98-100). 
The third theoretical approach related risk-taking to 
levels of arousal, and personality to those taking risks. 
Presumably, a person can influence his level of arousal 
toward the (personally) optimum by either approaching or 
avoiding risk. Personality was related to risk-taking to a 
degree, the former was assessed by scales of the MMPI, and 
the latter was measured according to responses in an inter¬ 
view which was not reported (pp.103-107) . 
From Psychoanalysis 
Psychoanalysis did not consider risk in the same sense 
that psychology did. The former discipline was concerned 
with treating patients who were trying to combat their 
destructive gambling tendencies. Nor did it consider per- 
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sonality in the same sense; its theorizing on the subject 
emphasized the unconscious factors important in etiology. 
Risk 
The literature considering the gambling neurosis 
assumes that risk is present in the real-world gambling con¬ 
texts that are frequented by those with this neurosis. It 
may be said that in a sense the compulsive gambler does not 
act according to the dictates of the objective situation, 
hence his neurosis is inferred from this behavior. Anyone 
who gambles until all of his money is gone, borrows more, 
and loses it too, as Dostoevsky did (pp.140, 144), is 
neurotic. It appears from the studies of the neurotic that 
there may be at least two meanings to reality. 
The psychoanalyst YJeisman distinguishes between objec¬ 
tive and organic meaning.^ He argues that nothing has 
meaning apart from its relation to something else: objec¬ 
tive meaning depends on relations between symbols and things, 
and organic meaning depends on relations between symbols 
and thoughts. The former results in community meaning, that 
shared by everyone for whom the same symbols designate 
similar objects. The latter, however , comes from the unique 
personal experiences of the individual. The two combine in 
the perception, and meaning, of risk, and since objective 
meaning should remain fairly constant, fluctuations in 
perception may be attributed to organic meaning which is 
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affected by the range of associations arising from the 
unique personal experiences of the individual. A situation 
that is risky for one individual may not be for another. 
By and large, however, psychoanalysis assumes that gambling 
is risky. 
Personality 
The important aspects of personality that coincide 
with this form of excessive risk-taking concern largely 
unconscious forces, relations, and anxieties developed in 
the particular individual since childhood. These factors 
are assumed present in both the normal and neurotic; the 
psycho pathology is most vivid in the latter. From the 
review, these factors concern primarily the unconscious 
guilt arising from Oedipal and bisexual themes (pp . 145-148 ). 
These have their experiential referrants in parental 
relations, notably with the father. Another source of 
unconscious guilt is masochism; it was also assumed important 
by von Hattinberg (p.150). It was thought that "pleasure 
in fear" gave rise to painful guilt, hence, the individual 
must question fate to see if he is to be expiated: winning 
represents the latter, while losing has an opposite effect. 
These early studies (pp.150-151) shifted analytical 
emphasis onto the Oedipal factor in unconscious guilt. 
There is an important link made between the individual, his 
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father, their relations, and fate (a father figure - 
particularly in the super-ego, p.147). Articles by LaForgue, 
Jones, Kris, Fenichel, and Reik (pp.151-153) support various 
aspects of this general argument. 
Bergler (pp.154-158 ) theorizing on this argument, postu¬ 
lates that the neurotic gambler must lose when he questions 
fate; it is necessary to reduce the unconscious guilt he 
feels. Further, Bergler puts the "questioning" argument of 
earlier theorists into a "challenging" one: the gambler, 
because of residual feelings of childhood omnipotence, 
unconsciously believes he can control fate. Subsequent 
analysts stay within one or the other of these closely 
related views: the "questioning" or the "challenging." 
The method psychoanalysis uses to uncover the uncon¬ 
scious experiences, and relations,important in understanding 
personality as they define it, is extremely difficult. It 
involves nothing more apparently difficult than one person 
talking to another; but behind this talk lies a wealth of 
experience, background and training on the analyst's part, 
and a willingness to engage in transference and free- 
p 
association on the patient's part. Further, it requires a 
great deal of time to effect a cure -- if ever - and it is 
an expensive proposition. 
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Psychology and Psychoanalysis 
Next, combining the material from these two disci¬ 
plines, we may begin to discuss risk and personality in 
more general terms than either view does separately; and 
perhaps by the two views interacting, more light may be shed 
upon the entire subject than by their single consideration. 
■Risk Definition 
On the one hand, from psychology, we have definitions 
of risk that are in correspondence with real-world refer- 
rents of properties of probability distributions: expected 
value, variance, skewness. On the other, from psycho¬ 
analysis, we have an acceptance of the risk inherent in 
gambling modes featuring these properties. But further, we 
must consider the unique personal experiences of each 
individual we hope to make valid statements about. As such 
we must define risk, and hence risk-taking behavior, within 
a context that has this meaning for the individual. 
From psychoanalysis, the patients faced risk; they may 
have deliberately sought it out for the unique "thrill” that 
Bergler mentions (pp.17-18), but they faced it. And the 
modes they encountered may be related to the moment discus¬ 
sions of Chapter II: the expected value of any gamble is 
negative, and there are variance and skewness considerations 
present. But most importantly -- they can lose! 
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From psychology, the individuals tested faced situa¬ 
tions that were related: there were expected value, 
variance, and skewness considerations; but these individuals 
were gambling with the experimenter's money. It was impos¬ 
sible for them to lose anything as a result of these 
experiments; they could lose only on individual trials, and 
then only a few cents. 
If we consider these facts, keeping in mind the organic, 
as well as the objective meaning of risk, then we must doubt 
whether the participants in the psychological studies actu¬ 
ally perceived risk in those situations. This argument is 
similar to the one criticizing the risk measures used in the 
studies on need achievement, as they did not consider inter¬ 
personal differences in skill levels when utilizing skill 
tasks (pp.93, 113). If it is possible that risk is not 
perceived, then the behavior that psychologists label "risk¬ 
taking" is not indicative of the individual responses in, 
whatever for them would be, risky situations. Perhaps this 
is a reasonable explanation for the fact that the initial 
studies reported statistically significant results, while 
replications produced either no results, or opposite effects 
(pp . 111-112 ) . This would suggest that it is more difficult 
than initially realized to generate the appropriate condi¬ 
tions that will produce the perception of risk in laboratory 
experiments. The neurotic gamblers would undoubtedly agree. 
184 
By not adequately considering the two meanings of risk, 
the studies reviewed are open to criticisms concerning the 
proper emphasis to be given each within a particular context. 
Psychologists appeared to be more interested in other aspects 
of research in general, and hence, did not consider the 
possibility that objective measures of risk can be over¬ 
whelmed in meaning and importance by organic meanings for 
some individuals, and in some situations. Psychoanalysts 
could have considered this problem also: it may be possible 
that a useful criterion for distinguishing normal and 
neurotic risk-takers lies in whether or not each "sees” 
risk in a gambling context, i.e. the organic meaning of the 
milieu that defines objective risk creates the sum total of 
some, or no, risk, depending upon whether the individual is 
normal, or neurotic. This assumes that risk is to be 
avoided, however; a position that might be untenable given 
3 
verbal reports of what gamblers are after. 
More reasonably,- perhaps, is the position that people 
react to risk differently because they "feel” it differently. 
Why, for instance, will one person spend an evening at the 
opera, and another spend it gambling, each relinquishing the 
same amount of money, and each equally satisfied with the 
results of the evening? They both receive ’’psychic" satis¬ 
faction from the evening, but why the different modes? The 
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opera may be explained in terms of enjoyment, cultural 
activity, relaxation, etc.; but what about the gambling? 
This is a serious point for this thesis. The objective 
and organic meanings of risk imply that determining risk- 
taking behavior is a good deal more difficult than supposed 
by the psychological studies, and also that psychoanalysis 
should be considering the factors that are responsible for 
organic "distortions” of objective meanings in this context. 
Personality Assessment 
If risk is not adequately defined, and risk-taking 
behavior not easily arousable within the laboratory, then 
results of the correlations that psychology obtained would 
be suspect, even if there were agreement on personality 
factors, which there is not. From the review of Chapter III, 
there was not one personality scale that produced results 
not questioned by another study. 
Psychoanalysis, however, did not face a problem quite 
like this one: there was general agreement on the factors 
important in the etiology of neurotic gambling; but upon 
examination these may not be quite so useful as imagined. 
The factors the analysts concentrated upon have been reported 
and there was no serious disagreement, except for one 
criticism that Linder made Cp.160). There are other uncon¬ 
scious factors the analysts could have centered upon, such 
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as depression or schizophrenia, but they did not. It has 
been well documented that Freudian psychologists assume 
that the normal and neurotic are just relative positions on 
4 
a continuum. Keeping this in mind, there must then, be a 
quantitative difference in the presence of these unconscious 
factors, and not a qualitative one. The important thing is 
not their presence, they are assumed in all of us, but their 
degree of presence: for the neurotic they are quantitative¬ 
ly greater than for the normal or the non-r isle-taker . 
As these factors are considered to be quantitatively 
larger at the neurotic extreme, the metapsychology would 
probably insist that the particular childhood experiences 
were especially strong, or frequent, or painful. Clinical 
theory, with somewhat of an existential perspective on the 
patient, would possibly emphasize other factors, such as 
recent emotional crisis, financial burden, etc., instead 
of childhood experiences. (An existentialist would empha¬ 
size the experiential factors completely.) 
Whether fate is perceived (consciously or unconsciously) 
as a father figure, an oracle, “lady luck,” fortune, or what¬ 
ever, an important relationship between the gambler and the 
psychic representative has developed: one that generally 
involves unconscious guilt. In addition to the psychic 
consequences of the interaction between the gambler and the 
game, there is an economic one. Money is related to personal 
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satisfaction for most gamblers, at least on the conscious 
level: any gambler will say that winning is good and losing 
is bad; and if he has no money, he cannot play. Analysts 
maintain that unconsciously he wants to lose, however. If 
the normal and neurotic differ in degree and not in kind, 
then there are some curious interactions between the con¬ 
scious and unconscious that have not been explained. It 
appears that simple quantitative differences cannot suffi¬ 
ciently clear this up. 
The S yn the sis 
The objective is to incorporate these theoretical 
points of view into a viable theory of risk-taking and 
personality. But it appears that there are several problems 
associated with each discipline's methods of theorizing 
about this particular behavior-. To restate these: it 
appears that risk has not been adequately defined, and hence, 
risk-taking behavior, or responses, have not been considered 
within a proper perspective. Also there are two very 
diverse definitions of personality that must be integrated: 
one indicating unconscious factors, and the other indicating 
conscious tendencies. A further difficulty that psycho¬ 
analysis faces that has not been mentioned in this chapter 
is the separation of clinical practice from metapsychology 
Cp.162 ) . 
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At this time some assumptions will be presented, which 
may hopefully assist in the full consideration of the 
difficulties of synthesis. If one assumes that unconscious 
motives for behavior do not always take precedent over 
conscious formulations, and further, that identical motives 
may be conscious for one person, and not for another, then 
some clarification of this situation is possible. 
The major contention of this chapter is that a des¬ 
criptive theory of personality can reconcile the two diver¬ 
gent modes of theorizing about this behavior. Further, the 
descriptive approach will emphasize observation from the 
three existential perspectives of relatedness already men¬ 
tioned (pp.132-133). Before the theory is described in 
detail, an example of its possible usefulness may be shown. 
Psychoanalysis claims that the neurotic gambles to lose 
(unconsciously) , but psychology might say that there is a 
conscious reason, and that he wants to win. Observation 
over a period of time will tend to reinforce the position 
that he wants to lose, but careful observation would take 
into account the statistical properties of the gambles also: 
this latter will almost guarantee that he will lose, and 
no matter whether he wants to or not. This does not destroy 
the validity of unconscious motives -- there must be some 
reason for engaging in a statistically unfavorable game -- 
they may be other than the wish to lose, however. 
The Theory 
A descriptive theory of personality is probably more 
appropriate than any other type: it is only as useful as 
it is helpful to whomever is utilizing it, but it has an 
advantage in that it begins by encompassing observed 
behavior within its framework. There are some basic 
functions that a theory of this nature should be able to 
perform: encompass observable behavior on the subject, 
and be able to explain what it includes; suggest areas of 
directions for further observations and/or hypotheses; and 
allow other persons to validate these hypotheses and 
related deductions by its communicable nature, to name three 
Personality may be defined, as Allport has done, as 
"what a person is."^ From a scientific point of view, what 
a person "is" is what he does, and what he does is the 
result of his original motives, modified by an environment, 
into observable behavior. Hence, an adequate theory of 
personality may be essentially descriptive. The descriptive 
aspects of behavior must be tempered by a frame of reference 
or point of view, and the theory must suggest what observ¬ 
able behavior is to be incorporated into itself. The 
conscious and unconscious motives for risk-taking behavior 
that originate within the individual may be followed from 
inception, through the formulative influences of other 
persons and an environment, to their eventual expression as 
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observed behavior, which in turn modifies both the indivi¬ 
dual and his environment, hence, the motives and/or behavior 
may be modified, etc., as part of a dynamic process. The 
description of this process of personality and its express¬ 
ion may certainly be oriented within the existential per¬ 
spectives mentioned earlier. This descriptive approach can 
consider the risk-taker to be more than just his unconscious 
motives, and more than the tendencies indicated by his 
responses to personality tests. 
A further characteristic of the descriptive approach 
is its recognition that the objects in an individual’s 
environment transcend their physical presence. This is an 
example of the distinction between objective and organic 
meaning. Just as a shovel is more than a shovel because of 
the mental associations it arouses, so is the gambling 
scene more than the sum of its components such as probabil¬ 
ity, value, etc. , because of the motives of the risk-taker. 
These associations are what makes the three existential 
perspectives inter-connected. It may be true as Freud said 
that Fate, or chance, is in the last regard nothing more 
than a father figure, but to ascribe interpersonal charac¬ 
teristics to an essentially impersonal concept is sympto¬ 
matic of a degree of mental illness, even though the 
associations are made in the intrapersonal sphere. 
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A descriptive theory of personality that emphasizes 
observation based upon real-world (gambling) contexts, and 
observation over a period of time, should not be faced with 
the problem of questionable behavioral responses as psycho¬ 
logy was. By careful specification of the nature of the 
behavior the researcher is interested in, observation out¬ 
side of the laboratory, and within the appropriate context, 
will yield the crucial first information necessary to 
research: the risk-taker will make himself known by his 
actions. 
Risk-taking behavior must be observed within an environ¬ 
ment, however. That in question is characterized by the 
various apparatus and rules related to gambling. In the 
laboratory experiments of psychology these objects and rules 
were constructed to fit the needs of the particular experi¬ 
menter, and were limited primarily by the nature of the 
testing devices employed, and the fear of anyone’s winning 
or losing large sums of money. Results of these studies, 
as pointed out, were generally invalid with respect to risk 
measures. In contrast, the patients treated by psycho¬ 
analysis had been exposed to, and had made personally crucial 
decisions within, true risk-taking, gambling situations. 
But their responses to this environment had been as unreal¬ 
istic as those made in the psychological laboratories; their 
responses to a "normal” gambling situation earned them the 
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categorical label of neurotic, a fate not shared by the 
"normal" people responding in the laboratory. 
Any point of view implies a certain way of seeing and 
recording the data of sense impr essions and this descriptive 
approach is no different; its perspectives can be, and must 
be, explicitly set out in order to, first, alert the observer 
to what he is looking for, and second, to announce the 
possible source of bias in reporting, as some things will be 
missed because of the particular view. This descriptive 
approach, in order to incorporate as much of the diverse 
modes of theorizing as possible, will emphasize the three 
existential perspectives: the impersonal, the interpersonal, 
and the intrapersonal. 
An observer can be considering any of a number of 
general questions, and an unlimited number of specific ones; 
but those that a theory must deal with -- in its explanation 
of behavior -- are simple to state: who, what, when, where, 
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why and how? These may assume different importance at 
different times, and from different perspectives. In risk¬ 
taking, the "why" of behavior could be described from 
primarily the intrapersonal view; the "what, when, where and 
"how" may be accomodated within the impersonal and inter¬ 
personal views. "Who" is the simultaneous consideration 
of all of them, as well as their inter-relations. To 
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emphasize the flexibility and usefulness of this approach, 
some of the research reviewed, as well as some of the 
problems associated with constructing a descriptive theory 
of risk-taking, will be discussed. The ability of this 
method to incorporate diverse points of view should tie 
the material of the review together. 
The Perspectives 
From the review it is possible to derive several reasons 
why people gamble: for the money; for the "pleasurable- 
painful tension".or thrill that Bergler reports; because they 
are unconsciously asking fate, or their displaced father- 
figure, if their wishes — Oedipal, incestuous -- are to be 
granted; because of latent feelings of omnipotence, the 
residual of childhood pleasure-principle operations; because 
of (either conscious or unconscious) feelings of psycho¬ 
kinesis; because they seek an escape from the boredom of 
their lives; because they are regressing to pre-causal modes 
of dealing with reality; for apparently an endless number 
of reasons. Part of this confusion stems from the diffi¬ 
culty of an individual really knowing why he does something, 
and part of it is a result of the current state of affairs 
in risk-taking research. It could be that either all or 
none of the above reasons are valid; but no ma tter how many 
of them are valid, there must be a classification scheme 
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that can accept diverse reasons without becoming confused 
in their incorporation. 
The Impersonal 
At different times people interact with different things 
in their world: these things are classified here under 
three headings according to the relation of the person 
observed with the object. If the nodal "I," the person 
being observed, is interacting with objects in his environ¬ 
ment, or if it is possible to consider him as an object when 
dealing with large numbers (the "subject” of psychology), 
then his actions and motives may be described from the 
impersonal point of view. 
Most of the research from Chapters II and III fit into 
t 
this perspective. The choices a person makes from among 
the alternatives available to him may be readily observed 
and classified. The research dealing with probability and 
variance preferences, for instance, may fit here. Although 
this research was inconclusive as reported, it may not 
ultimately be, given that observation can eliminate the 
problem of identification of risk-taking behavior for the 
experimenter. Once this first hurdle is past then the 
experimental psychologist can administer any tests he wants 
to, and he may continually refer to observable behavior for 
ver if ication. 
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The Interpersonal 
Behavior from this perspective explicitly considers 
the interpersonal activity of relationships. Not only is 
it necessary to have an environment within which to define 
behavior, but many times it is necessary to include the 
others that the subject individual interacts with. Some 
gambling modes require a good deal of interaction among 
competing individuals: poker for instance. One possible 
reason for gambling could follow from the type of persons 
that the subject individual interacts with on an on-going 
basis -- group pressures could be responsible for his 
behavior. 
There is a good deal of research that is applicable to 
this view, much of it was discussed in the review (see 
Table 5.1). To place it into a different format, however, 
conceptualize all of the modes of gambling as lying on a 
continuum, with all chance, no skill at one end, and some 
chance, maximum skill at the other. The former extreme may 
be characterized as highly routinized, structured, with 
little room for freedom of choice: roulette and craps are 
at this end. The latter extreme is very unstructured, 
ambiguous (in terms of what others will do), and contains a 
maximum of individual decision freedom: poker is at this 
end. If a continuum is constructed this way, then there is 
a good deal of psychological research that may be applicable, 
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Some Theorists Concerned with Situational Structure 
''<-Ajr • $ ulL i 0 Uc. p. f ft' 
THEORIST 
AMBIGUOUS , r+ ^ 
UNSTRUCTURED 
UNAMBIGUOUS, 
STRUCTURED 
A1lpor t Low Ego-Invo1vement High Ego-1nvolvement 
Bern Mand Tac t 
C hr is t ie High Mach Low Mach 
DeChar ms Origin Pawn 
Heider Internal Locus 
of Causality 
External Locus 
of Causality 
Kelley Self Envir onment 
Kogan & Wallach C ognitive 
R isk-taker 
Motivational 
i Risk-taker 
Rotter Inter na1 :Ex ter na 1 
Witkin Field Independent Field Dependent 
TABLE 5.1 
and that may be tested within this context. Table 5.1 pre¬ 
sents some theorists who have dealt explicitly with the 
structured/unstructured or unambiguous/ambiguous variable 
(some of these were reported in Chapter III, pp.90-93, 96). 
The row variables correspond to the particular way 
each theorist has labeled dichotomized behavior, and the 
column variables correspond to generally similar modes of 
functioning by individuals across paradigms. That is, 
these theorists have postulated behavior of several kinds, 
and in different situations, but there is an underlying 
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sameness to the responses which indicates that there is 
something in the situations common to each, and capable of 
eliciting fairly constant reactions for the individuals in 
each of the dichotomized groups. The common core for each 
is reflected in the degree of structuredness of the situa¬ 
tion and the appropriateness of reactions to them. In the 
first column the individual categorical labels generally 
imply that this person prefers less structure, can tolerate 
ambiguity and is not dependent upon the judgement of others 
for moral support. In the other column the labels imply 
the exact opposite. 
The person who may happen to fit the observable char¬ 
acteristics implied in the first solumn will generally 
prefer gambling modes in which he has some decision freedom, 
and the one described by the characteristics of the second 
column will generally prefer modes featuring pure chance. 
The following description of the high Mach (similar to the 
cognitive risk-taker, the internals of Heider and Rotter, 
and to a lesser degree the other categorizations in the 
first column) gives some idea of the relative functioning 
of these t ype s: 
High Machs initiate and control the social 
structure of mixed-Mach groups. They are 
preferred as partners, chosen and identified 
as leaders, judged as more persuasive, and 
appear to direct the tone and content of inter¬ 
action -- and usually also the outcome. This 
characterization appears more true in more 
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open-ended situations in which subjects have 
greater choice of content and strategy, and 
true only when the high Machs are intrinsically 
motivated by the situation. (Christie and 
Geis, 1970 , p.313 . ) 
As there are quite different personality types who 
function best in each of the extremes, so there are differ¬ 
ent persons who prefer roulette over poker and vice-versa. 
If psychoanalysis is correct in its judgement that the 
compulsive gambler consciously wants to win but unconsciously 
needs to lose, then one would expect him to prefer games in 
which there is the most direct, clear-cut opportunity for 
fate to answer his unconscious questioning, free of any bias 
created by his conscious decisions. He would be expected to 
be found playing roulette, as Dostoevsky's Alexis does. 
Alexis, for example, is tortured throughout the novel, not 
only by his desire to gamble, but also by an unquenchable 
desire to know everything that is going on — he cannot 
tolerate ambiguity in his relations with the other members 
of the General’s party. 
This psychological research indicates that one who 
prefers structure; well-defined rules and functions; is 
dependent upon the judgement of others for moral support; 
and prefers the anonymity of procedural decision-making; 
will probably be the roulette or dice player. 
If the risk-taker closely resembles the descriptions 
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given of the motivational risk-taker and the low Mach, if 
he prefers structure and clear-cut answers in his mode of 
existing, he will probably prefer those games in which he 
is not called upon to make too many decisions on his own 
that may soon prove unsound. In contrast, the blackjack 
and poker players prefer the freedom of making their own 
dec isions . 
The point of this research is that the experimental 
categories in the studies are similar to the skill and 
cha nee/chance-only situations inherent in gambling modes, 
and the behavioral and personality comments that these 
theorists make are applicable to the gamblers who have 
preferences for various games. There is a behavioral 
difference, hence a personality difference, between the 
gambler who favors poker and the one who favors roulette. 
However, it can parallel just as easily the non-risk-taker 
and the preferences he may have for structure, so it is not 
a differentiating procedure separating risk-takers and non¬ 
risk-takers -- chance and choice still make the separation -- 
but it is useful for differentiating personality among 
risk-takers. This behavioral difference, and personality 
difference, could well be more clearly manifested in the 
intrapersonal perspective as the reasons "why” they gamble 
are described from that point of view. 
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So far there is no conflict between the incorporation 
of these two points of view, nor need there be. The opera¬ 
tional definition of personality used here -- what a person 
"is,” which implies that what he does is characteristic -- 
requires these perspectives for adequate description of 
his mode of relating to the world. But the individual has 
a private world of feelings and motives also; these define 
the intrapersonal sphere. 
The Intrapersonal 
As far as objective meanings are concerned, the inter- 
rogatives, "what, when, where and how," may be described 
from the first two perspectives; but "why," and hence, "who," 
as well as organic meanings of the other questions, may be 
answered within this perspective. These latter factors are 
rooted in the unique personal experiences of the individual, 
and as such they have meaning that is extremely personal -- 
a factor which has many implications for verification, as 
these personal motives may be unconscious. 
The entire psychoanalytic research reported in Chapter 
IV falls within this realm, as well as the research on 
arousal regulation reported in Chapter III. This latter 
research is actually from clinical psychology, and its 
research methods fall somewhere between those of experi¬ 
mental psychology and psychoanalysis (a point returned to 
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later). Within this perspective the unconscious motives 
for the particular behavior may be described, albeit not 
by direct observation, but nevertheless it forms a place 
to set these explanations out, and enrich the psychological 
view by considering possible organic misperceptions of 
objective reality. 
Psychological studies such as that by Strickland et al 
are an excellent example of how new insights into this 
behavior may be brought about by the study of parapsychology. 
There is a large amount of research done on this, and much 
of it uses the same apparatus that is found in gambling 
modes. Study in the United States has lagged far behind 
that in Europe, notably the USSR, but where there is serious 
study of this phenomenon, notably psychokinesis, then there 
should also be theory concerning its etiology, and techni¬ 
ques for its assessment. These could be valuable. It may 
be that the successful gambler really can control inanimate 
objects to his favor.. 
Because of the basic differences between poker and 
roulette (the presence, or absence, of skill), the motives 
for preferring these modes of risk-taking may well be 
dissimilar. The roulette player could be more actively 
engaged in the "questioning" of fate, or the expression of 
omnipotent feelings than the poker player. The latter could, 
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quite conceivably, be engaged more in an interpersonally 
manipulative activity than in an expression of unconscious 
wishes. This is one of the issues that could be addressed 
by research within the perspectives proposed; and it could 
also give an example of how the various perspectives be¬ 
come dominant for explanatory purposes as different 
motives are important. 
As was mentioned, psychoanalysis lacked a theory, or 
reference point of view within a larger philosophy, and it 
is possible that these perspectives may provide that function 
for this particular behavior. As far as the problems of 
organic definitions and meanings are concerned, there are 
now other points in a theory, explicitly related to observ¬ 
able behavior, which may be tied to these meanings by 
psychoanalysis. This should provide an immense first step 
toward specifying who distorts objective meanings, under 
what conditions, and why. The explicit ties that may be 
made to the other perspectives in order to accomplish this 
enrich the inter-relationship of the points of view as a 
whole . 
The Inter-Relations 
The fact of objective and organic meaning, as well as 
the fact that the individual must be described from all of 
these perspectives simultaneously, are what makes their 
inter-relationship both necessary, and advantageous. The 
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objective meaning of something described in the impersonal 
sphere has an organic referrent in the intrapersonal sphere, 
which is the result of experiences in the other perspectives. 
Personality development is dynamic, and growth through 
experience and manipulative intervention with an environment 
defines it for the individual. 
To an observer, or experimenter, the dynamic relation¬ 
ships are not usually clear: he can tell whether or not a 
person is interacting with another person, or a thing, or 
perhaps manipulating a person as a thing, but complete 
separation is not a simple thing because the environment 
is continually giving feedback to the individual; and it 
is rare when he himself is able to separate objective from 
organic meanings for anything -- an experience with some¬ 
thing, no matter how banal, changes that thing's meaning 
for the person as a result. The problem of testing arises. 
Testing 
Behavioral research in psychology may be testing either 
"large" theories which encompass the most general and 
universal of statements and hypotheses; small segments of 
these "large" theories; or "small" theories concerned with 
a particular aspect of human behavior. Examples of the 
first type are the Freudian psychoanalytic theory, the 
logotherapy of Frankl, Roger's c 1 ient-centered therapy and 
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Binswanger’s existential view. Examples of the second are 
Christie’s machiavellianism, Festinger's theory of cognitive 
dissonance, the risky-shift phenomenon and the psychological 
theories of risk-taking that were reviewed earlier. 
This latter type of theory, concerned with one facet of 
behavior as it manifests itself, is the most prevalent in 
research today. There is, quantitatively, little research 
being done on the more comprehensive theories at this time. 
That which is being done on the latter confines itself to 
small segments of these theories, as the current testing 
and validating procedures are amenable to this. However, 
the overwhelming majority of research is being done on the 
smaller, more limited, aspects of human behavior in the 
psycho logica 1 theories currently in vogue. 
The research paradigms of the sub-divisions of psycho¬ 
logy should be familiar at this point, and so will not be 
described again. There is a sameness to them which suggests 
that the statistical and methodological aspects are rigidly 
fixed by prior fiat: this sameness manifests itself in the 
format of reporting. To almost completely understand one of 
these typical pieces of research on risk-taking, all that is 
necessary is to read the introduction specifying the theory, 
read the hypotheses, and read the results. 
It is relatively easy to find fault with any of this 
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research, but this fault-finding is trivial. There are two 
critical views that may be taken: one on the reporting 
per se , and one which encompasses the research within some 
larger framework, or world-view. This latter is important, 
for it is a preconception that all research should fit 
within some larger framework, and should have relevance for 
some aspect of behavior as it is lived. This is what makes 
fault-finding with most research easy, but trivial, as it 
usually lacks this generality; but it is probably impossible 
to think that research can be free of any philosophically, 
or culturally imposed, perceptual bias. 
All of us think we understand behavior long before we 
study the implicit philosophies and explanations of psycho¬ 
logy. It is difficult to verbalize this naive perception 
of behavior; natural awareness is influenced by many 
subjective influences. But everyone starts from a spontane¬ 
ous awareness. The basic structure of perceived behavior 
is obscured by accidental features arising from the situa¬ 
tion, and by the subjective bias of the individual due to 
his personality, culture, etc. Objective meaning, as well 
as organic meaning, has an ambiguity dependent upon these 
factors . 
The function of the psychologist is to change naive 
perception into a more detailed conceptual knowledge. 
Psychologists in the area of risk and personality differed 
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from one another in their conclusions because they formula¬ 
ted their original perceptions without first involving 
themselves in an explication of the behavior they were 
discussing. The neglect of rigor in this first crucial 
phase of investigation stands in marked contrast to the 
statistical and methodological techniques later brought 
to bear . 
Only when the behavior which is perceived has been 
expressed in clear concepts and formulations is it possible 
to go further in understanding. The aim of explication is 
the precise formulation of behavior; the behavior may be 
known, but only in a vague way without proper terminology 
and structure. Explication should be the basis for the 
formulation of psychological statements. From the point 
of view of a theory of risk-taking behavior, without an 
adequate phenomenological explication of "what" is being 
observed, measured, correlated, tested, etc., much of the 
efforts of psychology are wasted. 
Explication, as opposed to explanation, connotes an 
operation of the phenomeno logist by which he makes explicit 
what is already implicitly present in behavior. This aims 
at discovering the fundamental psychological structure of 
a phenomenon of behavior; it attempts to make explicit 
precisely what a specific behavior is and means within a 
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larger context, and consequently what distinguishes it from 
other behavior. Explication starts with behavior itself 
and not theories about behavior. 
As the existentialist van Kaam states: "There is only 
one order in which empirical science can be pursued: philo¬ 
sophical and scientific theorizing; sense observation; and 
concrete, manipulative intervention." (van Kaam, 1967, 
p,90.) These are, he assumes, characteristic of man’s 
scientific mode of existing, and further, there is a hier¬ 
archy in that the development of the second or third pre¬ 
supposes that of the first or second. A criticism that may 
be made of psychological research is on its place within 
this triad. 
By involving himself in theory-construction enterprises, 
as is done in this chapter, and by next immersing himself 
in real-world observation, following the suggestions of the 
theory, and employing this tactic to identify those who 
engage in risk-taking behavior, the psychologist will have 
a sound foundation which will suggest several possibilities 
for manipulative intervention in order to reinforce the 
first step. 
For the psychologist, proper identification of those 
who exhibit the behavior of interest is crucial. Given 
this first step, it should be relatively easy to discover 
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the relationships, if any, between the three major research 
areas reported in Chapter III. The behavior of a known 
"low need-achiever, internally-controlled, low level of 
arousal" person could be monitored, and tested further for 
other distinguishing characteristics. Also the MMPI, 
administered by Steiner et al, has a large history of 
experimental development insofar as the profiles of "normal" 
persons are concerned. A comparison of the profile of a 
risk-taker with this standard (based upon risk-takers as 
well as non-risk-takers) would be interesting. 
The ability to check these various hypotheses with 
observable behavior, as well as the explicit consideration 
of all three perspectives on behavior, should tend to 
broaden the definitions of personality now in vogue in 
psychology. It is impossible to believe that these paper- 
and-pencil tests, presently constituting most of the person¬ 
ality area, are comprehensive enough to explain behavior. 
They indicate general tendencies, but more is possible. 
One of the ways that psychology can get to some of the 
motives that psychoanalysis normally appraoches, is by the 
consideration of much the same method--getting to know the 
person about whom generalizations are being made. And if 
this actively involves the individual in helping guide and 
shape the conclusions, then fine. The assumption that the 
209 
individual would not be honest if he were aware of what 
the experimenter were after seems a dreary view of human 
nature. Further, the statement ’’getting to know the person” 
implies that interaction will be going on for some time, 
and Americans are not noted for their reticence in talking 
about themselves. This ’’knowing” is a method that is 
similar to that used by the O.S.S. in WWII, and falls between 
g 
the present positions of psychology and psychoanalysis. 
More specifically, the steps necessary in determining 
"Who takes risks?” are a modification of the current methods 
of clinical psycho logy; the difference lies in the impetus 
for study: usually the clinician is treating disturbed 
persons. In this instance, the assessment methods are 
retained and applied to risk-takers. The risk-takers are, 
first of all, distinguished by observation over time; the 
object is to be able to study the ’’true” risk-taker, and 
his identification is thus essential. 
Next, the clinician has several interview techniques 
available to him which offer much greater depth of analysis 
than the personality scales of psychology, and which get 
to some of the same unconscious factors that psychoanalytic 
therapy may reach. Many of these interview techniques have 
been codified into fairly standard procedural forms, and 
their use and interpretation thus becomes less dependent 
upon the particular administrator. The essence of the 
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argument for testing in this thesis is that the large 
numbers, quick-testing methods of experimental psychology 
do not sufficiently get to the core of adequate description 
of motives or behavior, and hence are of little use for 
answering important questions of the nature proposed. 
Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, can get to these factors 
and can describe their dynamic properties quite adequately; 
but it requires slow, time-consuming effort to accomplish 
this, and the purposes of the analyst are not primarily 
research-oriented. A further problem for a researcher who 
does want to investigate these motives, and within this 
framework, is his lack of qualification for utilizing this 
method. However, the training in clinical psychology is 
not as difficult as that in psychoanalysis, and more 
importantly, clinicians do engage in research. 
This thesis, then, proposes the intensive, objective, 
methods of personality assessment of clinical psychology, 
utilizing less numbers of persons than experimental psycho¬ 
logy, but more than the small numbers of patients studied 
by psychoanalysis. Although smaller numbers of people may 
be studied in this manner than in the usual psychological 
research, these persons will be studied more intensively 
by this approach, particularly as it utilizes the extensive 
clinical interview and testing methods. 
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In addition to determining answers to some of the 
obvious problems concerning risk-taking behavior (those 
reported at the beginning of the chapter), there are several 
non-obvious things derivable from current knowledge that 
may be fitted into the proposed framework. One of these 
concerns psychokinesis — can a successful gambler really 
"control" the game? Others are related to the "thrill," 
the utility of gambling -- does legalization make gambling 
more, or less, pleasurable for any individual; does the time 
before the bet is placed affect this, the shorter the time, 
the less the indecision after betting, and the greater the 
thrill (does decisiveness influence the pleasure?); does 
being present at the time of the chance event increase 
pleasure; will lottery ticket sales be highest immediately 
before and after drawings; does essentially random proba¬ 
bility learning, such as that encountered in roulette, 
influence betting behavior? Other questions can be thought 
of from just the review and the perspectives, related to 
"who, what, when, where, why and how" -- they are, in fact, 
almost endless. But within this framework they may be 
systematically attacked as theorizing leads to observation, 
which leads to intelligent manipulation, and subsequent 
sense validation. 
The essential difference in testing a theory of this 
nature, as opposed to standard techniques, lies in the 
212 
perspective that the experimenter assumes. This perspective 
has, historically, been from the top down, as it were; 
assume as general a theory as possible, and modify it as 
observed data cannot be compressed into a model. Rather 
this thesis suggests that the experimenter should adopt an 
existential attitude, emphasizing the primacy of the indiv¬ 
idual in all of his uniqueness, and going from the existen¬ 
tial to the categorical only as the data warrants in the 
explicit deduetive-induetive cycle. Comprehensiveness 
may be lost, but a useable micro approach is much better 
than a macro model, which for the individual, is probably 
mean ingless. 
Extensions 
The context within which risk-taking behavior may be 
observed is not limited to gambling by any means. Risk, as 
an experimental variable whose presence has an effect upon 
behavior, has been studied in conjunction with many other 
situations: decision-making, insurance, sporting events, 
suicide and consumer buying behavior, to name a few. The 
important issues in these areas may not concern risk¬ 
taking per se, as gambling would, but may concern underlying 
attitudes toward risk as they relate to some other behavior. 
If this is so, the theory presented in this thesis may be 
important as a file of information concerning risk-taking in 
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general, and as such, may be useful as a basis for extending 
theoretical discussion to other situations. 
The kinds of behavior these other areas may be con¬ 
sidering will be different than the ones reviewed in this 
thesis: the interrogatives, "who, what, when, where, why 
and how," will quite likely be different, but observable 
behavior is still of interest, and the particular way of 
theorizing about behavior discussed in this thesis, and the 
perspectives important for accurate description, may be 
useful. 
Decision Theory 
Decision theory was mentioned in Chapter I (pp.3-6) 
and at that time it was eliminated from cons ideration in 
the main development of the thesis. Now, however, it may be 
re-examined to see the implications that a theory of the 
nature proposed carries for the study of decision-making 
under conditions of risk. 
The main thrust of this body of literature is that 
there are powerful mathematical techniques that may be 
applied to business decision situations involving risk. 
These generally contain several alternatives available to 
the decision-maker, each having a value and a probability 
of occurrence. The value of each alternative is usually 
expressed in terms of utility (to the decision-maker), 
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and specialized techniques such as statistical decision¬ 
making, Bayesian estimation, mathematical optimization, 
game theory, etc., are applied in order to suggest optimal 
behavior for that decision-maker. The important aspect 
is that guidelines for behavior in the presence of risk 
are advanced. These are usually in the form of a specified 
course of action, given the existing situation, and given 
some initial utility assignments by the decision-maker. 
However, Chapter I mentioned the difficulties of deriving 
utility curves; the unexplained perversities of human nature 
(beyond the explanatory power of utility curves) indicates 
the need for a more reasonable view of behavior, its 
explication within this type of context, and hence its 
prediction -- a view based upon more than the responses of 
utility assessment. 
The theory proposed emphasizes observation within a 
context that may reasonably be expected to arouse the rele¬ 
vant behavioral responses and, hence, make possible 
explication. It may be that the research attempting to 
construct individual utility curves, and then use them for 
prediction, experienced the same difficulties as the research 
on risk-taking: the artificial situation did not sufficient¬ 
ly resemble the real-world referrent. A utility curve 
developed from preferences among gambles involving small 
prizes may not be useful in understanding, or predicting, 
behavior within a game theory situation involving choices 
made against the interests of an opponent. This thesis 
emphasized the need for observation of the appropriate 
behavior (between the steps of theory construction, and 
manipulation) before predictions about behavior are made. 
Other examples, perhaps more specific, follows. 
Insurance 
Insurance is a means of shifting financial risk for 
loss, theft, or damage of an item onto an insuring institu¬ 
tion. The buyer of non-deductible insurance pays a premium 
to protect himself against the possibility of a large loss; 
the insuring institution assumes the financial risk. The 
buyer of deductible insurance assumes part of this risk 
himself, in return for a smaller premium. He assumes 
financial responsibility up to some stated dollar value, 
beyond which the institution is responsible. In this latter 
case, the more risk the buyer is willing to assume (finan¬ 
cially) the lower his premium. There are differences in 
insurance buying behavior. The question is why do some 
people insure heavily, while others inadequately, or not 
at all? It could be that "not insuring" is a form of risk¬ 
taking, and if so, may be investigated within the framework 
proposed by this thesis. An important distinction for 
study could be that separating the insurance buyer (non¬ 
risk-taker?) from the non-buyer (risk-taker?). Depending 
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upon results this could have implications for sales promotion, 
and for setting premium levels. 
Suicide 
In a sense, suicide is the ultimate risk, as a success¬ 
ful attempt carries the payoff of death. There can be 
controversy surrounding this valuation: there may be any 
of a number of reasons why a person would attempt suicide, 
and there may be a corresponding number of valuations of the 
end result. Further, only a small number of attempts end 
in death. Cohen discusses the difference between success¬ 
ful and non-successful attempts at suicide, and points out 
that there could possibly be a delineation between those 
persons falling into each group, except that subjective 
probabilities of success usually vary widely from more 
objective figures.^ The question concerning this behavior, 
and all of the organic distortions of reality the suicide 
makes, is why? 
When discussing behavior of this sort it is impossible 
to suggest laboratory experiments in the usual sense -- the 
clinical psychologist, or psychoanalyst, must confine his 
observations to those who have attempted and failed, as 
well as to the reconstruction of the world of those who try 
and succeed. And short paper-and-penci1 tests are not 
going to be useful as far as answering the question "why?" 
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either; many of the techniques of the psychoanalyst are 
called for, and the methods of clinical psychology may 
provide some of these. 
There are, as a matter of fact, three widely differing 
descriptions of this behavior available now: Cohen's 
statistical description based upon records; Alvarez' account 
based upon his review of the subject, but including most 
impor.tantly the fact that he attempted suicide; and the 
psychoanalytic literature on the subject.’1’'1' These may 
readily be incorporated into the theory, and into the per¬ 
spectives offered. 
Buyer Behavior 
The last area to be mentioned concerns the more familiar 
day-to-day task of consumer purchasing. One may assume that 
for most people, the purchase of a major item -- house, car, 
etc. -- contains risk. In this situation, as opposed to 
gambling, risk is a phenomenon to be avoided. It does not 
seem obvious that, all other things equal, a person would 
buy the item with the greater risk associated with it. 
Given the popularity of consumer publications and panels, 
one suspects that price, per se, is not the single criteria 
for purchase; risk reduction may be important. 
Business is concerned with this behavior, as its object 
is to sell goods and services, at a profit. Much research 
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has been undertaken in order to examine buyer behavior, and 
it appears that there are several problems associated with 
this inquiry, many of them perhaps traceable to the same 
methodological problems faced by psychology. These are the 
ones related to the assessment of the appropriate behavior 
in laboratory settings. The perspectives an observation 
proposed in this thesis can encompass this research, perhaps 
to its advantage. The research in this area closely 
resembles that in psychology, and the careful observation 
and description of behavior from the three perspectives may 
be helpful to those conducting this research. 
There are many other areas of inquiry which may be 
related in some way to risk-taking behavior, and their 
consideration with in a theory that can incorporate a vast 
amount of information on the subject will do much to answer 
the question, "Who takes risks under the following 
conditions...?" It may be that as a result of more investi¬ 
gation, risk-taking behavior will exhibit a greater degree 
of generality than the presently conceived point of view 
(of this thesis) that it is related, in its expression, to 
the unique personal experiences of the individual as he faces 
the "gestalt" of objects, motives, and persons that define 
each particular environment. 
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Summar y 
Briefly summarizing the main thrust of this chapter: 
several crucial problems were uncovered as a result of the 
reviews of Chapter II, III and IV. These problems concerned 
the nature of risk and its perception, and the diverse 
definitions of personality that were to be synthesized; the 
former is a difficulty caused by the differences within 
objective and organic meanings of perceptual stimu1i. 
Further, these problems did much to confound the entire 
psychological research, in that risk-taking behavior was not 
adequately specified. The problem psychoanalysis faced 
concerned a widening split between theory and practice; and 
both disciplines, by the very fact of their different 
natures, imply difficulties in the synthesis of their 
diverse ways of viewing behavior. 
These problems, and the steps necessary to circumvent 
their effects, did much to dictate a broad, descriptive 
theory of personality; one that can encompass the diverse 
points of view of psychology and psychoanalysis, but one 
that also explicitly considers the six short interrogatives 
of good reporting. But the most important points are that 
it begins with observation of the relevant behavior, not 
speculations about what form it should assume in the 
laboratory; and it incorporates description into itself -- 
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description which should force clarification of exactly 
what is being theorized about, rather than fostering 
ambiguity as does a more terse theory: one in which vari¬ 
ables are postulated, but their interpretations with regard 
to observation are open to question. 
This theory, beginning with observable behavior, allows 
almost unlimited possibilities for experimentation in 
answering the question, "Who takes risks?” 
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CHAPTER VI 
COMMENTARY 
The objectives of this thesis were: (1) to unify the 
literature of experimental psychology and psychoanalysis 
concerned with risk-taking behavior and personality, (2) 
to synthesize the material from these two sources with the 
purpose of answering the question MWho takes risks?", (3) 
to accomplish these two purposes by presenting a theoreti¬ 
cal framework which will allow the unification and synthesis 
and (4) to discuss the definition of risk, and its measure¬ 
ment, as this knowledge is crucial for the accomplishment 
of the other objectives. The primary method by which these 
objectives were to be fulfilled was a literature review. 
The reviewer, as a critic, has two functions, however. 
He must first interpret the material under scrutiny; this 
entails examination for method and analysis, factors which 
make the specific article an important piece of research 
when well done. Next, however, he must judge the work, 
aside from its intrinsic merits, for the relation it con¬ 
tains to a larger theory or perspective, guiding inquiry. 
Research is not undertaken completely free of philosophical 
bias, and the full value of an individual effort lies in the 
consideration of what it says on its own, and what it says 
for, and about, its guiding preconceptions of human behavior. 
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To accomplish the objectives of this thesis, material 
from experimental, social, mathematical and clinical 
psychology, as well as psychoanalysis, was reviewed. 
Chapter II dealt with the objective meaning of risk, 
Chapter III concerned the research attempting to correlate 
risk-taking behavior with various personality tendencies, 
and Chapter IV reviewed the psychoanalytic literature on 
the gambling neurosis. Summarized at the end of each of 
these chapters was a discussion of the problems the research 
encountered. 
The major problem encountered concerned the nature and 
definition of risk; its objective meaning can be clarified, 
but its "personal” meaning for any individual is uniquely 
dependent upon his experiences. The results this problem 
had were to cast suspicion on the validity of the behavioral 
responses labeled "risk-taking" by psychologists. If, for 
the various reasons given in the review, risk is not 
adequately defined in the laboratory, then the studies 
relating risk-taking to personality are invalid. 
Risk-taking behavior can be observed, however. Psycho¬ 
analysis discussed the reasons why people gamble, but 
unfortunately, the experiential referrents deemed important 
in its causes were in childhood for those neurotics studied: 
the metapsychology would insist upon this; but clinical 
practitioners are becoming less satisfied with the theory, 
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and are adopting more of an existential attitude toward 
their patients. As such the reports of factors influential 
in the genesis of this neurosis would be related to more 
immediate experience than previously, but there has, as yet, 
been no publication on this. 
That risk-taking behavior may be observed, suggests 
that the psychologist involve himself in real-world obser¬ 
vation. If he is to make general statements about human 
behavior and personality, it seems that he should know some¬ 
thing about the behavior in question, and about the person¬ 
ality of the persons -- beyond a fifteen minute paper-and- 
pencil test. And the psychoanalyst, in order to do more 
than emphasize certain unconscious factors — and then 
assume that they are characteristic of everyone, the degree 
is the only difference -- must adopt a view of human nature 
that may be more closely related to observable behavior 
(this is part of Yankelovich and Barrett’s argument, p.163). 
These criticisms imply that a theory of personality 
should be descriptive. In order to be useful it must be 
able to describe behavior in various circumstances. In 
Chapter V this thesis adopted this type of theory, and 
emphasized the existential aspects of behavior and person¬ 
ality by underscoring the place of observation. There is 
a continual inductive-deductive cycle in theorizing: it 
proceeds by starting with a theory, gathering the data of 
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sensory perception, manipulating crucial variables, modify¬ 
ing the theory, observing behavior, manipulating, etc. 
Observation, as a component in this triad, has been ignored 
too long. 
To contain the diverse theoretical orientations, the 
theory emphasizes observation within three perspectives: 
the impersonal, the interpersonal and the intrapersonal. 
The first and second of these incorporate evidence that is 
typically the result of experimental psychological studies; 
the third contains the private, conscious and unconscious, 
motives for behavior -- psychoanalysis is the prime source 
for this information. 
But the experimental methods of psychoanalysis and 
psychology seem to define end-points on a continuum. There 
must develop a method that incorporates the best of each: 
the experimenter, by observation, may determine "who," in 
an objectively identifiable sense, "takes risks," but he 
must take more time with his subsequent descriptive phase of 
personality theorizing before he can say anything meaningful 
about him. (This discussion assumes that a psychologist 
would be interested in this sort of an exercise, and not a 
psychoanalyst. The latter is committed to the more practi¬ 
cally useful purposes of therapy, but he is not excluded.) 
There is an important source of information on this 
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behavior that also supports the idea of a descriptive theory 
of personality similar to the one suggested. This is the 
fictional literature concerned with gambling. Dostoevsky's 
The Gambler was briefly described, much too briefly for its 
moods and descriptions to come across; Otto Soyka's Master 
in Gambling, E.T.A. Hoffman's Gambler's Luck, and Frank 
Norris' Vandover and the Brute, are three other examples. 
This thesis was not the place for a review of the novels 
concerning this behavior, but the fact that The Gambler is 
still greater in psychological complexity than the sum of 
the research on gambling suggests that the descriptive 
approach is valuable. 
Perhaps this state of affairs is a result of the 
different techniques, and points of view, adopted by the 
writer and the psychologist. The latter is limited by the 
necessity of being "scientific," which in turn limits him 
because of the state of development of scientific methods. 
He must adopt a view which tends to be narrow because of 
the possible censure of not being scientific. The novelist 
is perhaps limited for opposite reasons: his equipment, 
words and description, must combine to produce a work that 
is "believable." In some cases, Dostoevsky for instance, 
perspective must be rather broad (in a relative sense) or 
he faces criticism. 
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If the psychologist were able to incorporate descrip¬ 
tion -- words -- into his scientific methods, and the 
theory this thesis proposes explicitly allows it, then his 
horizons would be immeasurably broadened, and his insights 
more relevant to the complexity of behavior as it is lived. 
Although it is true that the purpose of science is to make 
apparent complexity simple, there is danger in becoming 
too simple; human behavior is one of the areas in which 
this danger appears to be the greatest. 
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